This analysis (made in 2004) does not take in account the proliferation of popup blockers that have significantly reduced the prevalence of such bad, unsolicited popup ads they refer to. Remember the "Your computer is infected with a virus!"? <br>
<br>My recent experience with popups is that they are used fairly infrequently, and often for login purposes, typically in syndicated enterprise services.<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 1:54 PM, Chris Messina <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:chris.messina@gmail.com">chris.messina@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">Here's the VbV example UI:<div><br></div><div><a href="http://www.flickr.com/photos/factoryjoe/142616582/" target="_blank">http://www.flickr.com/photos/factoryjoe/142616582/</a></div>
<div><br></div><div>Apparently VbV has been used in previous scams:</div>
<div><br></div><div><a href="http://www.hoax-slayer.com/verified-by-visa-scam.shtml" target="_blank">http://www.hoax-slayer.com/verified-by-visa-scam.shtml</a></div><div><br></div><div>In 2005, one of the VbV program heads said [1]:</div>
<div><br></div><div>"Verified by Visa is a program that Visa eliminates online payment fraud liability for online merchants who provide a mechanism in their checkout process that lets shoppers enter a special Verified by Visa cardholder authentication password provided by a Visa card issuer. About 4 million out of 230 million eligible Visa cards issued in the U.S. are registered in the Verified by Visa program, and about 25,000 merchants participate in the program worldwide."</div>
<div><br></div><div>It actually sounds like the envisioned an OAuth-like pre-registration solution:</div><div><br></div><div>"To make the Verified by Visa program more effective and widespread, Visa is looking into a system under which a card issuer could require a cardholder to register for the program before completing an online checkout process. Under the current system, card issuers can only produce messages in the checkout process that offer unregistered cardholders the option of signing up and creating a Verified by Visa password. The new system could include a software component that would rate the risk level of a particular cardholder transaction–based on criteria such as the cardholder’s location or credit history–in determining whether to require the cardholder to register for Verified by Visa."</div>
<div><br></div><div>More details for personal use of VbV: <a href="https://usa.visa.com/personal/security/vbv/index.html" target="_blank">https://usa.visa.com/personal/security/vbv/index.html</a></div><div>For merchants: <a href="http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk_management/vbv.html" target="_blank">http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk_management/vbv.html</a></div>
<div><br></div><div>What's most interesting/relevant to us is the Nielson Norman design document with usability recommendations for implementing VbV. Mind you, these recommendations are from *2004*. Oh my word:</div>
<div>
<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
Our evaluation supports Visa’s plan to eliminate the use of pop-up windows. Pop-up </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
windows are mostly perceived negatively by users and often result in disastrous </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
usability outcomes. People often associate pop-up windows with advertisement or </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
superfluous content that is unrelated to their immediate task at hand. They are </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
intrusive, and startling. They make users feel that they are being advertised to, </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
rather than informed. People often immediately close pop-ups or even worse </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
struggle with them and lose their place on the website. </blockquote></blockquote><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
</blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
Embedding Verified by Visa in HTML-based pages is a better strategy than opening a </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
new window of any size on top of the launching web page’s window. The embedded </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
approach prevents people from accidentally clicking outside the parent browser </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
window and thus burying the new window underneath it. We’ve seen users in other </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
studies make this error over and over again then they can’t find their way back to </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
the parent window and conclude that they had lost their data. Also, many people </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
don’t see the application window’s icon at the bottom of the screen. </blockquote></blockquote><div><br></div><div>and:</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<b>The Frame Method preserves context</b></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
When pages look similar, people know they’re still on the same site. Pages that look </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
dramatically different are jarring and make people wonder if they’re on the right </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
page or even on the right website. Preserving context offers an integrated </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
experience that eases people through the signup and checkout process, which is </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
critical in minimizing abandonment. </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
<br></blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
We usually recommend against using traditional frames because of problems such as </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
printing and bookmarking. However, in this case, it is acceptable since most people </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
will not need to print or bookmark Verified by Visa screens — and the benefit of </blockquote><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">
having some branding far outweighs the disadvantages of not having any. </blockquote><div> </div><div>Read it: <a href="http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/usability_recommendations.pdf" target="_blank">http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/usability_recommendations.pdf</a></div>
<div><br></div><div>Chris</div><div><br></div><div>[1] <a href="http://www.internetretailer.com/internet/marketing-conference/22592-verified-visa-security-program-used-as-bait-phishing-scams.html" target="_blank">http://www.internetretailer.com/internet/marketing-conference/22592-verified-visa-security-program-used-as-bait-phishing-scams.html</a><div>
<div></div><div class="h5"><br>
<br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 8:04 AM, Breno <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:breno.demedeiros@gmail.com" target="_blank">breno.demedeiros@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="border-left: 1px solid rgb(204, 204, 204); margin: 0pt 0pt 0pt 0.8ex; padding-left: 1ex;">The idea is that you must trust the site with your verified by visa<br>
credentials to start with.<br>
<div><div></div><div><br>
On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 5:00 AM, Ben Laurie <<a href="mailto:benl@google.com" target="_blank">benl@google.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 1:29 AM, Breno <<a href="mailto:breno.demedeiros@gmail.com" target="_blank">breno.demedeiros@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>> I think we are stretching this analogy to the breaking point.<br>
>><br>
>> Visa Payment Trust Model vs OpenID Trust Model.<br>
>><br>
>> Visa Payments: User trusts parent frame (merchant/bank) with<br>
>> credentials (credit card)<br>
>> OpenID: User does not necessarily trust parent frame (RP) with that<br>
>> particular set of credentials (own credentials at the OP)<br>
>><br>
>> Visa Payments: User does not necessarily trust the framed site<br>
>> (payment processor) with his credentials because of lack of brand<br>
>> recognition.<br>
>> OpenID: User trusts the iframed site (OP) with this particular set of<br>
>> credentials.<br>
>><br>
>> Visa Payments: Parent frame (merchant/bank) has explicit agreement<br>
>> with payment processor and wishes to leverage the user's trust in the<br>
>> merchant to have him/her enter this credentials at the processor.<br>
>> OpenID: No explicit agreement between RP and OP.<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> So the iframe in Visa Payments is the mechanism by which one<br>
>> accomplishes a transfer of trust (user -> merchant/bank) --> (user -><br>
>> payment processor), and this is covered by legal agreements.<br>
>> Accordingly, the burden on the user to protect him/herself against<br>
>> phishing is simply to recognize the merchant/bank site. Iframing is<br>
>> the appropriate mechanism in this case.<br>
><br>
> I totally don't understand this. When the "merchant" is a phishing<br>
> site whose purpose is to get my "verified by visa" password, what<br>
> legal agreement is protecting me?<br>
><br>
>><br>
>> In the case of OpenID, iframing requires that the user transfers (user<br>
>> -> OP) --> (user -> RP). This implies that the OP is leveraging its<br>
>> brand identity (in the login box) to convey trust to the user in the<br>
>> RP (including trust in releasing own OP's credentials there). There is<br>
>> no contractual framework in OpenID to allow that. The user is burdened<br>
>> with the need to recognize that the iframe points to the OP.<br>
>><br>
>> That is not to be said that the analogy is _never_ good. If the OP<br>
>> implements non-spoofable authentication (e.g., token-based auth), then<br>
>> the trust transference is not required. However, for OP that accept<br>
>> password-based authentication, the iframe model does not work without<br>
>> an explicit (and publicly recognizable by the user base) mutual<br>
>> agreement.<br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> On Wed, Mar 25, 2009 at 5:23 PM, jDavid <<a href="http://jdavid.net" target="_blank">jdavid.net</a>@<a href="http://gmail.com" target="_blank">gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>>> I wonder if the story for HTTPS/SSL is a good one for us to look at?<br>
>>><br>
>>> or did it just happen so early in browser life that it was easy?<br>
>>><br>
>>> 2009/3/25 Johannes Ernst <jernst+<a href="http://openid.net" target="_blank">openid.net</a>@<a href="http://netmesh.us" target="_blank">netmesh.us</a>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This is really interesting.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> It seems to me that we are struggling with a problem that is in no way<br>
>>>> specific to OpenID. It sounds like we should try and get everybody in a room<br>
>>>> that has the same problem -- like Visa in this example -- regardless of<br>
>>>> whether they have ever heard of or like OpenID, and come up with:<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> 1. this is the best we can do with existing browsers, and we all educate<br>
>>>> the user the same way about the flow<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> 2. a wish list for the browser companies how to offer better browser<br>
>>>> support natively for this particular pattern. Some generic pattern markup<br>
>>>> (not OpenID-specific, but for the redirect pattern) might be advantageous.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> On Mar 25, 2009, at 10:57, Martin Atkins wrote:<br>
>>>><br>
>>>>> Allen Tom wrote:<br>
>>>>>><br>
>>>>>> Do you have more details about the verified by visa process? I'm not<br>
>>>>>> familiar with it.<br>
>>>>>> I actually bought something online this morning, and I noticed that the<br>
>>>>>> merchant's checkout confirmation page mentioned something about portions of<br>
>>>>>> the screen being rendered by my credit card issuer in an iframe, which I<br>
>>>>>> thought was a weird thing to tell to the end user.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> I'm by no means an expert on 3D-Secure (which is the technology<br>
>>>>> underlying Verified By Visa), but the flow seems very similar to OpenID:<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> * Merchant does "discovery" on your credit card to find out who your<br>
>>>>> provider is.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> * Merchant sends you to that provider where the provider authenticates<br>
>>>>> you by some means -- in my case, I get asked to enter three letters out of a<br>
>>>>> secret word and some other security questions, but I assume this varies from<br>
>>>>> provider to provider -- and sends an assertion back to the merchant.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> * The merchant recieves the assertion and processes the transaction.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> The ever-reliable Wikipedia tells me that the Verified By Visa brand of<br>
>>>>> the protocol recommends loading the provider's UI in an iframe in order to<br>
>>>>> *stop* users seeing the address bar, because many savvy users mistook it for<br>
>>>>> a phishing scam:<br>
>>>>> <a href="http://ambrand.com/2006/09/06/is-securesuitecouk-a-phishing-scam/" target="_blank">http://ambrand.com/2006/09/06/is-securesuitecouk-a-phishing-scam/</a><br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> (one might argue that this would be less of an issue if the issuing banks<br>
>>>>> served the data in their own domain rather than outsourcing it, but I<br>
>>>>> digress.)<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> The "criticism" section of the Wikipedia page on 3D-secure details a<br>
>>>>> bunch of problems that OpenID implementors have also encountered.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> _______________________________________________<br>
>>>>> user-experience mailing list<br>
>>>>> <a href="mailto:user-experience@openid.net" target="_blank">user-experience@openid.net</a><br>
>>>>> <a href="http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience" target="_blank">http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Johannes Ernst<br>
>>>> NetMesh Inc.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> <a href="http://netmesh.info/jernst" target="_blank">http://netmesh.info/jernst</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> _______________________________________________<br>
>>>> user-experience mailing list<br>
>>>> <a href="mailto:user-experience@openid.net" target="_blank">user-experience@openid.net</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience" target="_blank">http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>> --<br>
>>> --<br>
>>> Justin Kruger -- Sr. Software Engineer - MySpace MDP<br>
>>> <a href="http://jDavid.net" target="_blank">http://jDavid.net</a><br>
>>> <a href="mailto:jDavid.net@gmail.com" target="_blank">jDavid.net@gmail.com</a><br>
>>><br>
>>> Anton Freeman: Vincent! How are you doing this Vincent? How have you done<br>
>>> any of this? We have to go back.<br>
>>> Vincent: It's too late for that. We're closer to the other side.<br>
>>> Anton Freeman: What other side? You wanna drown us both?<br>
>>> Vincent: You wanna know how I did it? This is how I did it Anton. I never<br>
>>> saved anything for the swim back.<br>
>>><br>
>>> _______________________________________________<br>
>>> user-experience mailing list<br>
>>> <a href="mailto:user-experience@openid.net" target="_blank">user-experience@openid.net</a><br>
>>> <a href="http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience" target="_blank">http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience</a><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>> --<br>
>> Breno de Medeiros<br>
>> _______________________________________________<br>
>> user-experience mailing list<br>
>> <a href="mailto:user-experience@openid.net" target="_blank">user-experience@openid.net</a><br>
>> <a href="http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience" target="_blank">http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience</a><br>
>><br>
> _______________________________________________<br>
> user-experience mailing list<br>
> <a href="mailto:user-experience@openid.net" target="_blank">user-experience@openid.net</a><br>
> <a href="http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience" target="_blank">http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience</a><br>
><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</div></div>--<br>
<div><div></div><div>Breno de Medeiros<br>
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</div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><br></div></div>-- <br>Chris Messina<br>Citizen-Participant &<br> Open Web Advocate<br><br><a href="http://factoryjoe.com" target="_blank">factoryjoe.com</a> // <a href="http://diso-project.org" target="_blank">diso-project.org</a> // <a href="http://vidoop.com" target="_blank">vidoop.com</a><br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><br>-- <br>--Breno<br><br>+1 (650) 214-1007 desk<br>+1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)<br>MTV-41-3 : 383-A <br>PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7)<br>