Address Bar

Breno de Medeiros breno at google.com
Fri Mar 27 14:09:04 UTC 2009 

This analysis (made in 2004) does not take in account the proliferation of
popup blockers that have significantly reduced the prevalence of such bad,
unsolicited popup ads they refer to. Remember the "Your computer is infected
with a virus!"?

My recent experience with popups is that they are used fairly infrequently,
and often for login purposes, typically in syndicated enterprise services.

On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 1:54 PM, Chris Messina <chris.messina at gmail.com>wrote:

> Here's the VbV example UI:
> http://www.flickr.com/photos/factoryjoe/142616582/
>
> Apparently VbV has been used in previous scams:
>
> http://www.hoax-slayer.com/verified-by-visa-scam.shtml
>
> In 2005, one of the VbV program heads said [1]:
>
> "Verified by Visa is a program that Visa eliminates online payment fraud
> liability for online merchants who provide a mechanism in their checkout
> process that lets shoppers enter a special Verified by Visa cardholder
> authentication password provided by a Visa card issuer. About 4 million out
> of 230 million eligible Visa cards issued in the U.S. are registered in the
> Verified by Visa program, and about 25,000 merchants participate in the
> program worldwide."
>
> It actually sounds like the envisioned an OAuth-like pre-registration
> solution:
>
> "To make the Verified by Visa program more effective and widespread, Visa
> is looking into a system under which a card issuer could require a
> cardholder to register for the program before completing an online checkout
> process. Under the current system, card issuers can only produce messages in
> the checkout process that offer unregistered cardholders the option of
> signing up and creating a Verified by Visa password. The new system could
> include a software component that would rate the risk level of a particular
> cardholder transaction–based on criteria such as the cardholder’s location
> or credit history–in determining whether to require the cardholder to
> register for Verified by Visa."
>
> More details for personal use of VbV:
> https://usa.visa.com/personal/security/vbv/index.html
> For merchants: http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk_management/vbv.html
>
> What's most interesting/relevant to us is the Nielson Norman design
> document with usability recommendations for implementing VbV. Mind you,
> these recommendations are from *2004*. Oh my word:
>
>  Our evaluation supports Visa’s plan to eliminate the use of pop-up
>>> windows. Pop-up
>>
>> windows are mostly perceived negatively by users and often result in
>>> disastrous
>>
>> usability outcomes. People often associate pop-up windows with
>>> advertisement or
>>
>> superfluous content that is unrelated to their immediate task at hand.
>>> They are
>>
>> intrusive, and startling. They make users feel that they are being
>>> advertised to,
>>
>> rather than informed. People often immediately close pop-ups or even
>>> worse
>>
>> struggle with them and lose their place on the website.
>>
>>
>
>>  Embedding Verified by Visa in HTML-based pages is a better strategy than
>>> opening a
>>
>> new window of any size on top of the launching web page’s window. The
>>> embedded
>>
>> approach prevents people from accidentally clicking outside the parent
>>> browser
>>
>> window and thus burying the new window underneath it. We’ve seen users in
>>> other
>>
>> studies make this error over and over again  then they can’t find their
>>> way back to
>>
>> the parent window and conclude that they had lost their data. Also, many
>>> people
>>
>> don’t see the application window’s icon at the bottom of the screen.
>>
>>
> and:
>
> *The Frame Method preserves context*
>
> When pages look similar, people know they’re still on the same site. Pages
>> that look
>
> dramatically different are jarring and make people wonder if they’re on the
>> right
>
> page or even on the right website. Preserving context offers an integrated
>
> experience that eases people through the signup and checkout process, which
>> is
>
> critical in minimizing abandonment.
>
>
>> We usually recommend against using traditional frames because of problems
>> such as
>
> printing and bookmarking. However, in this case, it is acceptable since
>> most people
>
> will not need to print or bookmark Verified by Visa screens — and the
>> benefit of
>
> having some branding far outweighs the disadvantages of not having any.
>
>
> Read it:
> http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/usability_recommendations.pdf
>
> Chris
>
> [1]
> http://www.internetretailer.com/internet/marketing-conference/22592-verified-visa-security-program-used-as-bait-phishing-scams.html
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 8:04 AM, Breno <breno.demedeiros at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The idea is that you must trust the site with your verified by visa
>> credentials to start with.
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 5:00 AM, Ben Laurie <benl at google.com> wrote:
>> > On Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 1:29 AM, Breno <breno.demedeiros at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> >> I think we are stretching this analogy to the breaking point.
>> >>
>> >> Visa Payment Trust Model   vs OpenID Trust Model.
>> >>
>> >> Visa Payments: User trusts parent frame (merchant/bank) with
>> >> credentials (credit card)
>> >> OpenID: User does not necessarily trust parent frame (RP) with that
>> >> particular set of credentials (own credentials at the OP)
>> >>
>> >> Visa Payments: User does not necessarily trust the framed site
>> >> (payment processor) with his credentials because of lack of brand
>> >> recognition.
>> >> OpenID: User trusts the iframed site (OP) with this particular set of
>> >> credentials.
>> >>
>> >> Visa Payments: Parent frame (merchant/bank) has explicit agreement
>> >> with payment processor and wishes to leverage the user's trust in the
>> >> merchant to have him/her enter this credentials at the processor.
>> >> OpenID: No explicit agreement between RP and OP.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> So the iframe in Visa Payments is the mechanism by which one
>> >> accomplishes a transfer of trust (user -> merchant/bank) --> (user ->
>> >> payment processor), and this is covered by legal agreements.
>> >> Accordingly, the burden on the user to protect him/herself against
>> >> phishing is simply to recognize the merchant/bank site. Iframing is
>> >> the appropriate mechanism in this case.
>> >
>> > I totally don't understand this. When the "merchant" is a phishing
>> > site whose purpose is to get my "verified by visa" password, what
>> > legal agreement is protecting me?
>> >
>> >>
>> >> In the case of OpenID, iframing requires that the user transfers (user
>> >> -> OP) --> (user -> RP). This implies that the OP is leveraging its
>> >> brand identity (in the login box) to convey trust to the user in the
>> >> RP (including trust in releasing own OP's credentials there). There is
>> >> no contractual framework in OpenID to allow that. The user is burdened
>> >> with the need to recognize that the iframe points to the OP.
>> >>
>> >> That is not to be said that the analogy is _never_ good. If the OP
>> >> implements non-spoofable authentication (e.g., token-based auth), then
>> >> the trust transference is not required. However, for OP that accept
>> >> password-based authentication, the iframe model does not work without
>> >> an explicit (and publicly recognizable by the user base) mutual
>> >> agreement.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Wed, Mar 25, 2009 at 5:23 PM, jDavid <jdavid.net at gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>> I wonder if the story for HTTPS/SSL is a good one for us to look at?
>> >>>
>> >>> or did it just happen so early in browser life that it was easy?
>> >>>
>> >>> 2009/3/25 Johannes Ernst <jernst+openid.net at netmesh.us>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> This is really interesting.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> It seems to me that we are struggling with a problem that is in no
>> way
>> >>>> specific to OpenID. It sounds like we should try and get everybody in
>> a room
>> >>>> that has the same problem -- like Visa in this example -- regardless
>> of
>> >>>> whether they have ever heard of or like OpenID, and come up with:
>> >>>>
>> >>>> 1. this is the best we can do with existing browsers, and we all
>> educate
>> >>>> the user the same way about the flow
>> >>>>
>> >>>> 2. a wish list for the browser companies how to offer better browser
>> >>>> support natively for this particular pattern. Some generic pattern
>> markup
>> >>>> (not OpenID-specific, but for the redirect pattern) might be
>> advantageous.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> On Mar 25, 2009, at 10:57, Martin Atkins wrote:
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> Allen Tom wrote:
>> >>>>>>
>> >>>>>> Do you have more details about the verified by visa process? I'm
>> not
>> >>>>>> familiar with it.
>> >>>>>> I actually bought something online this morning, and I noticed that
>> the
>> >>>>>> merchant's checkout confirmation page mentioned something about
>> portions of
>> >>>>>> the screen being rendered by my credit card issuer in an iframe,
>> which I
>> >>>>>> thought was a weird thing to tell to the end user.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> I'm by no means an expert on 3D-Secure (which is the technology
>> >>>>> underlying Verified By Visa), but the flow seems very similar to
>> OpenID:
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> * Merchant does "discovery" on your credit card to find out who your
>> >>>>> provider is.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> * Merchant sends you to that provider where the provider
>> authenticates
>> >>>>> you by some means -- in my case, I get asked to enter three letters
>> out of a
>> >>>>> secret word and some other security questions, but I assume this
>> varies from
>> >>>>> provider to provider -- and sends an assertion back to the merchant.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> * The merchant recieves the assertion and processes the transaction.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> The ever-reliable Wikipedia tells me that the Verified By Visa brand
>> of
>> >>>>> the protocol recommends loading the provider's UI in an iframe in
>> order to
>> >>>>> *stop* users seeing the address bar, because many savvy users
>> mistook it for
>> >>>>> a phishing scam:
>> >>>>> http://ambrand.com/2006/09/06/is-securesuitecouk-a-phishing-scam/
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> (one might argue that this would be less of an issue if the issuing
>> banks
>> >>>>> served the data in their own domain rather than outsourcing it, but
>> I
>> >>>>> digress.)
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> The "criticism" section of the Wikipedia page on 3D-secure details a
>> >>>>> bunch of problems that OpenID implementors have also encountered.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>>> user-experience mailing list
>> >>>>> user-experience at openid.net
>> >>>>> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Johannes Ernst
>> >>>> NetMesh Inc.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>  http://netmesh.info/jernst
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>>
>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>> >>>> user-experience mailing list
>> >>>> user-experience at openid.net
>> >>>> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience
>> >>>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>> --
>> >>> --
>> >>> Justin Kruger -- Sr. Software Engineer - MySpace MDP
>> >>> http://jDavid.net
>> >>> jDavid.net at gmail.com
>> >>>
>> >>> Anton Freeman: Vincent! How are you doing this Vincent? How have you
>> done
>> >>> any of this? We have to go back.
>> >>> Vincent: It's too late for that. We're closer to the other side.
>> >>> Anton Freeman: What other side? You wanna drown us both?
>> >>> Vincent: You wanna know how I did it? This is how I did it Anton. I
>> never
>> >>> saved anything for the swim back.
>> >>>
>> >>> _______________________________________________
>> >>> user-experience mailing list
>> >>> user-experience at openid.net
>> >>> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Breno de Medeiros
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> user-experience mailing list
>> >> user-experience at openid.net
>> >> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience
>> >>
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > user-experience mailing list
>> > user-experience at openid.net
>> > http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Breno de Medeiros
>> _______________________________________________
>> user-experience mailing list
>> user-experience at openid.net
>> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Chris Messina
> Citizen-Participant &
>  Open Web Advocate
>
> factoryjoe.com // diso-project.org // vidoop.com
> This email is:   [ ] bloggable    [X] ask first   [ ] private
>
> _______________________________________________
> user-experience mailing list
> user-experience at openid.net
> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/user-experience
>
>


-- 
--Breno

+1 (650) 214-1007 desk
+1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
MTV-41-3 : 383-A
PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7)
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-user-experience/attachments/20090327/00c0fe83/attachment-0002.htm>

More information about the user-experience mailing list