<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">I don't think I disagree with Mike on a single point here. I'll forward Mike's proposed change to the definition of phishing resistant to Ben Laurie as he too was involved in the original definition.<div><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Another extension looking at either enrollment properties or the actual authentication mechanism used would not be hard to draft. For the time being, we should not include this functionality in PAPE. Remember the UNIX philosophy, do one thing and do it really well!<div><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>CC'ing this message to the <a href="mailto:specs@openid.net">specs@openid.net</a> list to catch everyone up on the discussion.<br><div><br class="webkit-block-placeholder"></div><div>Thanks,</div><div>--David</div><div><br><div><div>On Nov 6, 2007, at 9:25 PM, Mike Jones wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="border-collapse: separate; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Helvetica; font-size: 12px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: auto; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-horizontal-spacing: 0px; -webkit-border-vertical-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-decorations-in-effect: none; -webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0; "><div lang="EN-US" link="blue" vlink="blue" style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><o:smarttagtype namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name="PersonName"><div class="Section1"><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">Let me react to what I believe is your core point around phishing-resistance and then respond to particulars. You wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; font-style: italic; ">Again - the root cause of the differing opinions is that the policy is very subjective and its going to be very hard for us to nail down what it exactly signifies.<o:p></o:p></span></font></i></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">To the extent that people believe the definition of phishing-resistant is subjective, we've either failed to be sufficiently precise or people have failed to understand the definition. The definition in draft 2 reads:<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="text-indent: -0.25in; margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="black" face="Symbol"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Symbol; color: black; "><span>·<font size="1" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font: normal normal normal 7pt/normal 'Times New Roman'; "> <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></font></span></span></font><font size="2" color="black" face="Verdana"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana; color: black; ">Phishing-Resistant Authentication<a name="anchor7"></a><o:p></o:p></span></font></div><p style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="black" face="Verdana"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana; color: black; ">An authentication mechanism where the End User does not provide a shared secret to a party potentially under the control of the Relying Party. (Note that the potentially malicious Relying Party controls where the User-Agent is redirected to and thus may not send it to the End User's actual OpenID Provider).<o:p></o:p></span></font></p><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">The consensus both among the spec authors and those on the call was that this definition is already sufficiently clear to be able to make objective determinations about whether particular methods meet this criterion or not. Based on the recent discussion, I'd actually reword it slightly to be even more clear so that it reads as follows (while leaving the intended meaning and the determinations that result the same):<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="text-indent: -0.25in; margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="black" face="Symbol"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Symbol; color: black; "><span>·<font size="1" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font: normal normal normal 7pt/normal 'Times New Roman'; "> <span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></span></font></span></span></font><font size="2" color="black" face="Verdana"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana; color: black; ">Phishing-Resistant Authentication<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><p style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="black" face="Verdana"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana; color: black; ">An authentication mechanism where the End User does not provide shared secrets to a party potentially under the control of the Relying Party that could enable that party to then authenticate elsewhere as if it were the End User. (Note that the potentially malicious Relying Party controls where the User-Agent is redirected to and thus may not send it to the End User's actual OpenID Provider).<o:p></o:p></span></font></p><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">I agree with you that a subjective definition serves no one well. If you believe that this definition is not already sufficiently clear the best thing to do would be to suggest precise wording to tighten it up until you believe that it can be objectively applied.<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">Next, let me respond to some of your other points:<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">[Siddharth] This is actually an area where we had the different opinions on the mailing list. Per Kim's email we would like to see the group take a realistic approach of treating security more as a continuum.<o:p></o:p></span></font></i></em></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">I agree that it's a continuum. I also agree that subjective, squishy definitions will do more harm than good. By example, passwords are neither phishing-resistant nor multi-factor. Self-issued InfoCards are phishing-resistant but not multi-factor (unless you count having the card on your machine as a factor). OTPs are multi-factor but not phishing-resistant. Client-side certificates backed by a PIN are both phishing-resistant and multi-factor. Etc. It is a continuum, but we still need to be precise about applying the meanings of the different terms or they become valueless.<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">We should also discuss scenarios where the OP is using phishing resistant server authentication technologies such as EV SSL certificates as well.<o:p></o:p></span></font></i></em></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">I agree that EV certificates help but the problem is that you're counting on the user to notice that the phishing site didn't have an EV cert. Your password and/or OTP value could still be phished if the user didn't notice the difference and then used at the real site by the attacker. EV certs will reduce phishing (which is good!) but can't prevent it.<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></i></em></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">On a related note, I saw a blog post about CardSpace not requiring SSL in the future. We should discuss how that would affect the security properties as well.<o:p></o:p></span></font></i></em></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">Agreed, this is a good discussion to have. Because no shared secret is being released that can be used by the attacker to impersonate you at other sites, this is still phishing-resistant with respect to the PPID released for authentication purposes. I highly recommend that those who are interested in this topic read<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://blogs.msdn.com/vbertocci/archive/2007/09/25/windows-cardspace-will-work-without-https-too.aspx" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">Vittorio Bertocci's treatment of the subject</a>.<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; font-style: normal; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></i></em></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">Again - the root cause of the differing opinions is that the policy is very subjective and its going to be very hard for us to nail down what it exactly signifies. </span></font></i></em><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">The English phrase "phishing-resistant", I agree is subjective. The definition included in the specification is not. Using the definition rather than the possible subjective meanings of the phrase will remove this ambiguity.<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "> [Siddharth] That's good feedback. However if I'm not releasing any PII, I don't see why this could be a privacy issue. And of course its well understood in the security space that 'security by obscurity' doesn't work.<o:p></o:p></span></font></i></em></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">No one was suggesting security by obscurity. However I know that I've heard from more than one person, including Kim, that they'd rather not give attackers any information that they could use to refine their attacks that's not absolutely necessary to convey. This goes back to Law 2: "Minimal Disclosure for a Defined Use".<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">It could certainly be valuable to some RPs this information about authentication credential itself, while other RPs could care less. I think we should explore what is the best way for the OP to optionally convey this information.<o:p></o:p></span></font></i></em></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">No argument there. It should be left up to the market to decide whether to do this or not. That's why, if demand arises for it, a separate parallel specification should be developed for communicating this information. Then RPs and OPs can decide for themselves.<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">One thought is that we can include an extension point in the PAPE spec. </span></font></i></em><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><a name="OLE_LINK2"></a><a name="OLE_LINK1"><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">That actually violates the compromise that was made to get the PAPE spec out at all. Some felt that both authentication policies and authentication methods could be covered by the same spec. Others were strongly opposed to this, for some of the reasons stated above, as well as others. In the end we decided that the two were different and should be covered by different specifications.<o:p></o:p></span></font></a></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">I suspect that any authentication methods specification would be similar in form to the PAPE spec. But lacking any demonstrated demand for it, no one wanted to take on the additional effort to write this second specification on a speculative basis, even though doing it would be simple. If demand for this materializes I'm sure that it could be written quickly. If so, it should try to borrow from other's work on this topic, including that done by the SAML committee.<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> Best wishes,<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span lang="EN" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> </span></font><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div><div class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><hr size="2" width="100%" align="center" tabindex="-1"></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; font-weight: bold; ">From:</span></font></b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bajaj, Siddharth [<a href="mailto:SBajaj@verisign.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">mailto:SBajaj@verisign.com</a>]<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Sent:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Tuesday, November 06, 2007 10:14 AM<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">To:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><st1:personname w:st="on">Mike Jones</st1:personname><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Cc:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bradescu, Roxana;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><st1:personname w:st="on"><a href="mailto:david@sixapart.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">david@sixapart.com</a></st1:personname>; Johnny Bufu;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:osis-general@netmesh.org" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">osis-general@netmesh.org</a><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Subject:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>RE: [osis-general] OSIS PAPE call results</span></font><o:p></o:p></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">That resolves one. Others that I haven't heard back from folks on the couple of other points</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">- The table in Appendix A.1.1 of<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0-02.html" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0-02.html</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>needs to be updated to be consistent with the definition in Section 4.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br> Specifically:</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "> PIN and soft OTP token should not be marked as phishing-resistant.</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "> PIN and hard OTP token should not be marked as phishing-resistant.</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "> Information Cards should be added and listed as phishing-resistant.</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "> Active password managers that only release the password to the correct site should be listed as phishing-resistant.</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "> [Siddharth] This is actually an area where we had the different opinions on the mailing list. Per Kim's email we would like to see the group take a realistic approach of treating security more as a</span></font></i></em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; font-style: italic; "><br><em><i><font face="Arial"><span style="font-family: Arial; "> continuum . We should also discuss scenarios where the OP is using phishing resistant server authentication technologies such as EV SSL certificates as well. On a related note, I saw a blog</span></font></i></em><br><em><i><font face="Arial"><span style="font-family: Arial; "> post about CardSpace not requiring SSL in the future. We should discuss how that would affect the security properties as well. Again - the root cause of the differing opinions is that the policy is</span></font></i></em><br><em><i><font face="Arial"><span style="font-family: Arial; "> very subjective and its going to be very hard for us to nail down what it exactly signifies. </span></font></i></em></span></font></i><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">- If relying parties and OPs want to communicate actual authentication methods used, that should happen via a different spec than PAPE. Then the market can decide whether to use PAPE,<br> this spec, both, or neither. (However some in the group have both privacy concerns about this and concerns about enabling attackers by giving them additional information to use in their<br> attacks.)</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "> [Siddharth] That's good feedback. However if I'm not releasing any PII, I don't see why this could be a privacy issue. And of course its well understood in the security space that 'security by</span></font></i></em><i><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; font-style: italic; "><br><em><i><font face="Arial"><span style="font-family: Arial; "> obscurity' doesn't work. . It could certainly be valuable to some RPs this information about authentication credential itself, while other RPs could care less. I think we should explore what is the</span></font></i></em><br><em><i><font face="Arial"><span style="font-family: Arial; "> best way for the OP to optionally convey this information. One thought is that we can include an extension point in the PAPE spec. </span></font></i></em></span></font></i><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">Thanks,</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "> <o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">Siddharth</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><hr size="2" width="100%" align="center" tabindex="-1"></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; font-weight: bold; ">From:</span></font></b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><st1:personname w:st="on">Mike Jones</st1:personname><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>[<a href="mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">mailto:Michael.Jones@microsoft.com</a>]<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Sent:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Tuesday, November 06, 2007 10:11 AM<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">To:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bajaj, Siddharth<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Cc:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bradescu, Roxana;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><st1:personname w:st="on"><a href="mailto:david@sixapart.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">david@sixapart.com</a></st1:personname>; Johnny Bufu;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:osis-general@netmesh.org" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">osis-general@netmesh.org</a><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Subject:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>RE: [osis-general] OSIS PAPE call results</span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">Very good. It's this second phase that didn't know enough about. So guess I can count one of my accomplishments today as learning more about the crypto behind client-side certs. :-)<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">Definitely phishing-resistant…<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> Thanks Siddharth,<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> -- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div><div class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><hr size="2" width="100%" align="center" tabindex="-1"></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; font-weight: bold; ">From:</span></font></b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bajaj, Siddharth [<a href="mailto:sbajaj@verisign.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">mailto:sbajaj@verisign.com</a>]<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Sent:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Tuesday, November 06, 2007 10:06 AM<br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">To:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><st1:personname w:st="on">Mike Jones</st1:personname><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Cc:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bradescu, Roxana;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><st1:personname w:st="on"><a href="mailto:david@sixapart.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">david@sixapart.com</a></st1:personname>; Johnny Bufu;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:osis-general@netmesh.org" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">osis-general@netmesh.org</a><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Subject:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Re: [osis-general] OSIS PAPE call results</span></font><o:p></o:p></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><o:p> </o:p></span></font></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><br>A good reference of SSL works is at RSA Labs Crypto FAQ -<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2293" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2293</a><o:p></o:p></span></font></div><p style="margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; ">The SSL Handshake Protocol consists of two phases: server authentication and an optional client authentication. In the first phase, the server, in response to a client's request, sends its certificate and its cipher preferences. The client then generates a master key, which it encrypts with the server's public key, and transmits the encrypted master key to the server. The server recovers the master key and authenticates itself to the client by returning a message authenticated with the master key. Subsequent data is encrypted and authenticated with keys derived from this master key. In the optional second phase, the server sends a challenge to the client. The client authenticates itself to the server by returning the client's digital signature on the challenge, as well as its public-key certificate.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p><p style="margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; ">Siddharth<o:p></o:p></span></font></p><p style="margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><st1:personname w:st="on"><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; ">Mike Jones</span></font></st1:personname><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>wrote:<o:p></o:p></p><blockquote type="CITE" style="margin-top: 5pt; margin-bottom: 5pt; "><u1:smarttagtype name="PersonName" namespaceuri="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags"><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">Sorry for the confusion. I apparently failed to successfully ask a question about this point to those of you who are experts out there, so let me try again…<u1:p></u1:p></span></font><o:p></o:p></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>The table in Appendix A.1.1 at<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0-02.html#anchor13" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0-02.html#anchor13</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>contains the method description "PIN and digital certificate via HTTPS". The question I tried to ask was: does this method release different information to every relying party or does it release the same information to each relying party?<u1:p></u1:p></span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>Maybe even more to the point: does using the certificate at one relying party release enough information for that relying party to then be able to authenticate to another one as you? That's the crux of the issue that decides the phishability question.<u1:p></u1:p></span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p> Thanks,<u1:p></u1:p></span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> -- Mike<u1:p></u1:p></span></font><o:p></o:p></div><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><u1:p></u1:p></span></font><div class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><hr size="2" width="100%" align="center" tabindex="-1"></span></font></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; font-weight: bold; ">From:</span></font></b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bradescu, Roxana [<a href="mailto:rbradescu@verisign.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">mailto:rbradescu@verisign.com</a>]<o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Sent:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Tuesday, November 06, 2007 7:58 AM<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">To:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Bajaj, Siddharth; <st1:personname u4_x003a_st="on" w:st="on">Mike Jones</st1:personname>; <st1:personname u4_x003a_st="on" w:st="on"><a href="mailto:david@sixapart.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">david@sixapart.com</a></st1:personname>; Johnny Bufu;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:osis-general@netmesh.org" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">osis-general@netmesh.org</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Subject:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>RE: [osis-general] OSIS PAPE call results</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>Any responses to Sidd’s feedback?? The last point particularly about SSL client auth (user to IDP) being considered phishable and requiring different certs per RP doesn’t really make sense.<u1:p></u1:p></span></font><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><b><font size="2" color="gray" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 10pt; color: gray; font-weight: bold; "><u1:p></u1:p>Roxana Bradescu | VeriSign Innovation | office: 650-426-4489 | mobile: 650-576-9262 |<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:rbradescu@verisign.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">rbradescu@verisign.com</a></span></font></b><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align: center; margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><u1:p></u1:p><font size="3" face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt; "><hr size="2" width="100%" align="center" tabindex="-1"></span></font></div><div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; font-weight: bold; ">From:</span></font></b><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:osis-general-bounces@netmesh.org" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">osis-general-bounces@netmesh.org</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>[<a href="mailto:osis-general-bounces@netmesh.org" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">mailto:osis-general-bounces@netmesh.org</a>] <b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">On Behalf Of </span></b><st1:personname u4_x003a_st="on" w:st="on">Bajaj, Siddharth</st1:personname><o:p></o:p></span></font></div></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" face="Tahoma"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Tahoma; "><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Sent:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Thursday, November 01, 2007 4:03 PM<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">To:</span></b><st1:personname u4_x003a_st="on" w:st="on">Mike Jones</st1:personname>; <st1:personname u4_x003a_st="on" w:st="on"><a href="mailto:david@sixapart.com" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">david@sixapart.com</a></st1:personname>; Johnny Bufu;<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="mailto:osis-general@netmesh.org" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">osis-general@netmesh.org</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><br><b><span style="font-weight: bold; ">Subject:</span></b><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>Re: [osis-general] OSIS PAPE call results</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "><u1:p></u1:p><u1:p></u1:p>Hi Mike and others,</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "><u1:p></u1:p>There was some confusion over the timing of the call. Mary and I called in at noon. I think part of the reason was that because we have deferred daylight savings by a week this year, not all systems have been updated. My treo showed the meeting to be at noon. And when you sent out the other email, I had unfortunately stepped out and was away from my email. So apologies. </span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "><u1:p></u1:p>Thanks for sending out the minutes of the call. Can you also send out the list of participants to today's call.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "><u1:p></u1:p>Please see inline for more specific comments - </span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><u1:p></u1:p><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">Today we held the call discussing OSIS feedback on the PAPE spec. Topics covered and recommendations made on the call were:</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>- Authorization decisions should be made solely by the relying party. The identity provider should accurately report the status of all policies requested by the relying party that the authentication complies with and may also choose to report the status of any policies that apply that were not explicitly requested. The policies are not mutually exclusive and no relationship between the different policies should be implied. A clarification to this effect should be added to the draft.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>[</span></font><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; ">Siddharth] agreed. As long as the spec removes all ambiguities in the policies - e.g. multi-factor, and physical multi-factor. </span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>- There was a request for a definition of Active Authentication as used in the auth_time element description. Intuitively, this involves at least having the user being at the machine as a participant in the authentication interaction in some manner. We agreed that we should look for an existing definition of active authentication that appears to apply.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>- The table in Appendix A.1.1 of<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0-02.html" style="color: blue; text-decoration: underline; ">http://openid.net/specs/openid-provider-authentication-policy-extension-1_0-02.html</a><span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span>needs to be updated to be consistent with the definition in Section 4. Specifically:</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> PIN and soft OTP token should not be marked as phishing-resistant.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> PIN and hard OTP token should not be marked as phishing-resistant.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> Information Cards should be added and listed as phishing-resistant.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> Active password managers that only release the password to the correct site should be listed as phishing-resistant.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>[Siddharth] This is actually an area where we had the different opinions on the mailing list. Per Kim's email we would like to see the group take a realistic approach of treating security more as a continuum . We should also discuss scenarios where the OP is using phishing resistant server authentication technologies such as EV SSL certificates as well. On a related note, I saw a blog post about CardSpace not requiring SSL in the future. We should discuss how that would affect the security properties as well. Again - the root cause of the differing opinions is that the policy is very subjective and its going to be very hard for us to nail down what it exactly signifies. </span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>- If relying parties and OPs want to communicate actual authentication methods used, that should happen via a different spec than PAPE. Then the market can decide whether to use PAPE, this spec, both, or neither. (However some in the group have both privacy concerns about this and concerns about enabling attackers by giving them additional information to use in their attacks.)</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="blue" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: blue; "><u1:p></u1:p>[Siddharth] That's good feedback. However if I'm not releasing any PII, I don't see why this could be a privacy issue. And of course its well understood in the security space that 'security by obscurity' doesn't work. . It could certainly be valuable to some RPs this information about authentication credential itself, while other RPs could care less. I think we should explore what is the best way for the OP to optionally convey this information. One thought is that we can include an extension point in the PAPE spec. </span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>Finally, while we failed to discuss this on the call, I also believe that:</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> PIN and digital certificate via HTTPS is phishable if the same certificate value is released to every site.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "> PIN and digital certificate via HTTPS is not phishable if a different certificate value is released to every site.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; ">and that the table should be updated accordingly in this case as well. Someone who's an expert in this method should pipe in and provide guidance.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p>[Siddharth] Certificate is public information. The client/browser signs a challenge using the private key which is never released to the server. The challenge is negotiated as part of the SSL handshake so that it cannot be replayed by another (rogue) site. You could have session hijacking type attacks, but these are typically a result of poor SSL implementations, not the protocol or the method.</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div><div style="margin-top: 0in; margin-right: 0in; margin-left: 0in; margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; font-size: 12pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman'; "><font size="2" color="navy" face="Arial"><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial; color: navy; "><u1:p></u1:p><u1:p></u1:p>Siddharth</span></font><u1:p></u1:p><o:p></o:p></div></u1:smarttagtype></blockquote></div></o:smarttagtype></div></span></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div></body></html>