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<font face="Arial">I should add that the NAPPS spec currently
*incompletely* describes the AppInfo endpoint <br>
<br>
paul<br>
<br>
</font>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/8/14, 2:36 PM, Paul Madsen wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:534441A9.1090803@gmail.com" type="cite">
<meta content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
<font face="Arial">hi Mike, inline</font><br>
<br>
paul<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/7/14, 9:19 AM, Mike Varley
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:78F7F7C2-7C13-43C2-9984-0AF8743358C4@securekey.com"
type="cite">
<meta http-equiv="Context-Type" content="text/html;
charset=us-ascii">
A couple comments/questions:
<div>1) what is the 'API' endpoint the bootstrap URL request is
going to? Is this the RS?</div>
</blockquote>
would be the AppInfo endpoint (hosted by AS1) that the NAPPS spec
describes<br>
<br>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
charset=ISO-8859-1">
To obtain application metadata information, the <em>TA</em> MAY
make a GET or POST request to the AppInfo Endpoint.<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:78F7F7C2-7C13-43C2-9984-0AF8743358C4@securekey.com"
type="cite">
<div>2) Seems like a lot of round-trips. On mobile, performance
will suffer</div>
</blockquote>
if the round trips are performed only for gathering consent ....<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:78F7F7C2-7C13-43C2-9984-0AF8743358C4@securekey.com"
type="cite">
<div>3) how does consent from the browser result in an AT to the
App?</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
John proposed a model where<br>
<br>
1) the TA is delivered an id_token targeted at AS2<br>
2) the user agent is sent to AS2 for consent<br>
3) once consent is obtained, the TA exchanges the id_token for an
AT <br>
4) TA hands AT to app<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:78F7F7C2-7C13-43C2-9984-0AF8743358C4@securekey.com"
type="cite">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>MV</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Apr 4, 2014, at 5:53 PM, John Bradley <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com">ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div>If the target of the SAML IdP initiated login is
the OAuth authorization Uri we shouldn't need extra
attributes in the SAML assertion. <br>
<br>
Sent from my iPhone</div>
<div><br>
On Apr 4, 2014, at 3:16 PM, Paul Madsen <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">I dont think we should preclude
IdP-init SAML into the AS2 consent page - for those
SaaS currently set up as SAML SPs & OAuth AS<br>
<br>
implying us defining a scope param on the SAML
Response?<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/4/14, 2:16 PM, John
Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:0B8F5110-CD04-4ACC-8E1F-D2B03B3E5AE1@ve7jtb.com"
type="cite"> Yes.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There are two options I can think of for the
last step of AS2 collecting consent.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The request can have a response_type of code
and the TA gets back a code that it can use to get
a AT from the AS2 token endpoint. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The other would be to make the call to AS2 with
a response-type of "none" just to collect consent,
getting back nothing.</div>
<div>The TA would then use the JWT assertion flow to
exchange a JWT for the access token.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I think the second option is more secure and
allows a JWT issued by AS1 to be used instead of a
refresh token issued by AS2. The advantage is
that AS1 has the ability to revoke access to the
resource without needing a separate API to AS2.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>John B.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Apr 4, 2014, at 2:00 PM, Paul Madsen
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>John, something like <br>
<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://www.websequencediagrams.com/cgi-bin/cdraw?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgYnJvd3NlcgoACAxUQQACDUFTMQACDlBJABEPMgoKClRBLT5BUzE6IGdldCB1c2VyIGF1dGhlbnRpY2F0ZWQKQVMxLT5UQTogUlQsQVQAKQdQSQArBUJvb3RzdHJhcChBVCkKQVBJACQGYm9vABEFVVJMAFoGAIEmBwAVBQArBgAWBQCBPQcAeQcADg4AcgUALwlyZWRpcmVjdCB0byBBUzIoaWRfdG9rZW4sc2NvcGUpAD4NMjoAgT0FenJlcXVlc3QAGhJub3RlIG92ZXIgACgFdmFsaWRhdGUgAE0ICgpBUzIAgSoLY29uc2VudCgAZgY_CgoKCgo&s=patent">http://www.websequencediagrams.com/cgi-bin/cdraw?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgYnJvd3NlcgoACAxUQQACDUFTMQACDlBJABEPMgoKClRBLT5BUzE6IGdldCB1c2VyIGF1dGhlbnRpY2F0ZWQKQVMxLT5UQTogUlQsQVQAKQdQSQArBUJvb3RzdHJhcChBVCkKQVBJACQGYm9vABEFVVJMAFoGAIEmBwAVBQArBgAWBQCBPQcAeQcADg4AcgUALwlyZWRpcmVjdCB0byBBUzIoaWRfdG9rZW4sc2NvcGUpAD4NMjoAgT0FenJlcXVlc3QAGhJub3RlIG92ZXIgACgFdmFsaWRhdGUgAE0ICgpBUzIAgSoLY29uc2VudCgAZgY_CgoKCgo&s=patent</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/4/14, 1:42
PM, John Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:50B3AAE5-5023-422A-B5B4-061B0FA1690A@ve7jtb.com"
type="cite"> I was thinking of a bootstrap
URL that trigged idP initiated login at
AS2. That way the bootstrap URI is
essentially opaque as it is both specified
and consumed by the IsP/AS of the TA.
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Apr 4, 2014, at 1:26 PM, Chuck
Mortimore <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cmortimore@salesforce.com">cmortimore@salesforce.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Sounds similar, yes,
although working out a boostrap
URL across different ASs might be
quite difficult in practice</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri,
Apr 4, 2014 at 10:25 AM, Paul
Madsen <span dir="ltr"> <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com"
target="_blank">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div>hey Chuck, you write <br>
<br>
'If the TA were to simply
use it's primary token to
initialize an OAuth
authorization request for
the scope of the requesting
native app, we could
simplify this whole thing.
'<br>
<br>
John had (in this thread)
previously proposed
something similar <br>
<br>
'If we have a web app
bootstrap AS1 could give a
bootstrap URI to the App
that would create a
authenticated session at AS2
for the user to do the
normal OAuth consent flow.'<br>
<br>
I believe John's model
accomplishes the same thing
as your proposal, ie
delivers the user's browser
(in an authenticated state)
to an AS where consent can
be gathered - albeit perhaps
with more steps<span
class="HOEnZb"><br>
<br>
paul<br>
<br>
</span>
<div>
<div class="h5">
<div>On 4/2/14, 5:49 PM,
Chuck Mortimore wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>We don't think
there should at
all be an "implied
consent"
model (i.e.,
authentication at
the AS authorizes
the App for
whatever it
needs). This
sound quite
dangerous, and
don't believe this
would at all be
suitable for a
tightly controlled
enterprise
environment. We
do support models
that "feel" like
this, but consent
really isn't
implicit...It's
simply isn't
controlled or
visilbe to the the
user. We always
run the request
through an
authorization
check, and it is
not at all coupled
to authentication.
Picture us
checking a role on
the AS.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As far JIT
consent model,
it's a bit harder
to achieve when
using the Token
Endpoint, unless
we explicitly
specify the TA is
collecting
consent, what to
collect, etc.
Standardizing a
consent UI strikes
me as very
difficult.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The way we've
balanced the two
in our environment
is to always
perform consent on
the authorization
endpoint. Based
on the
configuration of
the app, we're
either checking
server side admin
defined consent,
or prompting the
user. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's possible
we could continue
to use this model
in NAPPS - if we
consider the real
difficult issue
for users is
actually
authenticating,
then authorization
is really not a
big deal. If the
TA were to simply
use it's primary
token to
initialize an
OAuth
authorization
request for the
scope of the
requesting native
app, we could
simplify this
whole thing. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-cmort</div>
</div>
<div
class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div
class="gmail_quote">On
Thu, Mar 20, 2014
at 1:37 PM, Paul
Madsen <span
dir="ltr"> <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com"
target="_blank">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote">
<div>exploring
#5 and your
scenario<br>
<br>
something like<br>
<br>
1) TA gets
user
authenticated
and obtains
refresh token
with certain
scopes<br>
2) TA somehow
knows that for
a particular
app,
additional
consent is
needed, and
that a 3rd
party AS2 has
to collect it<br>
3) TA uses its
RT to obtain
an id_token
targeted at
3rd party AS2<br>
4) TA attaches
id_token to
authz request
when browser
sent to AS2 <br>
5) AS2
collects
consent<br>
6) AS2 returns
code/token etc
to TA<br>
<br>
Different
options for
Steps #3 &
#4 exist <br>
<span><br>
paul<br>
<br>
</span>
<div>
<div>
<div>On
3/20/14, 3:44
PM, John
Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
type="cite">Inline<br>
<div>
<div>On Mar
20, 2014, at
4:34 PM, Paul
Madsen <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com"
target="_blank">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div>possible
permutations?<br>
<br>
Single AS<br>
1) consent
collected at
AS</div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> 2)
consent
collected at
TA (and
reported to AS
in access
token
request?) <br>
</div>
</blockquote>
For 2 some UI
elements need
to be
delivered to
the TA perhaps
via AppInfo<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div><br>
Two ASs<br>
3) consent
collected at
AS1 (and
reported to
AS2 in
id_token?)<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
If AS 2 trusts
AS1to collect
consent it
could just
list the
scopes
granted.<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> 4)
consent
collected at
TA (and
reported to
AS2 in access
token
request?)<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
This perhaps
works if the
TA is making a
authenticated
request to
AS2. I think
3 or 5 is more
likely.<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> 5)
consent
collected at
AS2<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
If we have a
web app
bootstrap AS1
could give a
bootstrap URI
to the App
that would
create a
authenticated
session at AS2
for the user
to do the
normal OAuth
consent flow.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div>paul<br>
<br>
<div>On
3/20/14, 11:02
AM, John
Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>I think our conversation about collecting consent was mostly focused on the basic case where the AS the TA is talking to can directly mint access tokens.
We still may need to collect user consent beyond what was agreed to at initial setup of the TA.
I think you are going one step further where the first party AS collects consent on behalf of the 3rd party AS/RS and indicates that in the id_token.
The second one is harder in that the third party AS would somehow need to communicate it's scopes out of band to the 1st party AS for collection.
John B.
On Mar 20, 2014, at 11:51 AM, Mike Varley <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:mike.varley@securekey.com" target="_blank"><mike.varley@securekey.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Yeah, probably - something like a 'consent' field in the id_token or AppInfo response that the RS can match to the scope. Just making something up on the spot (and in no way really thought through but what the heck) maybe something like:
consent: implicit //> RS should decide if it trusts AS, or maybe query AS as to what the implied consent involves.
consent: <consent_token> //> RS should examine token to see if it matches the scope and session the token was issued to.
consent: none //> RS should explicitly ask for consent
Note that the RS will always have final say on whether to trust the AS/TA, and whether or not to explicitly collect further user consent.
This is just a thought, love to hear more ideas.
thanks,
MV
On Mar 20, 2014, at 10:39 AM, Paul Madsen <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><paul.madsen@gmail.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Thanks Mike, yes Chuck raised some of the same concerns/points
What might a 'consent extension point' look like? Just suitable OPT mechanisms?
Paul
On 3/20/14, 10:32 AM, Mike Varley wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Hi all, sorry to have missed the meeting. I noticed that the consent question came up, and I'd like to share some of the challenges I've come across, just for consideration (again, apologies if this was covered on the call). In general, the experience has been that the various subtleties and nuances of consent can vastly complicate the model and user experience.
If you have a model of 'implied consent' (i.e., authentication at the AS authorizes the App for whatever it needs):
- may be suitable for tightly controlled Enterprise deployments
- provides a simplified user experience
- puts the user at risk of leaking data/PII
- "all-or-nothing" consent may be a barrier to entry for users
If you have a JIT consent model:
- more suitable for 'public' or general federations of Apps and Resources
- more burden on the user, as they have to authorize against each RS for each App
- usually involves more network round-trips, which on a mobile device can impose a noticeable delay
- RSs have to choose an entity to trust that consent has been collected:
-- Trust the AS has presented the user with the right scopes/terms of service
(how does the AS keep these in sync with the RS policy? Is there anything in the 'scopes' themselves that leak PII? )
-- Trust the TA that it has collected consent directly from the RS before issuing tickets to the Apps
(usually means the RS must return a 'session scope auth token' to the TA that gets embedded in the Auth Token - and AppInfo endpoint must point TA to RS consent endpoints)
-- Trust only 'yourself' (RS) meaning each App will have to present the authentication token with a _desired_ scope, and the RS must be able to collect consent itself.
(has App UI implications, as the App must now be able to render the RS consent screen)
User consent is a very important part of this kind of system, to be sure - but attempting to solve the "entire problem for all ecosystems" will probably only lead to pain and sadness ;) So I am assuming the NAPPS spec will only try to define 'consent extension points', where any particular ecosystem can expand on to fit their own consent / privacy model.
I hope this was useful.
Thanks,
MV
On Mar 20, 2014, at 8:38 AM, Paul Madsen
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><paul.madsen@gmail.com></a>
wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Attending
Paul
John
Chuck
Ashish
1) Ashish reported back on the RSA F2F
Attending were Mike & Caleb from MSFT, some MobileIron & Airwatch folks, somebody from OneLogin
Ashish asked for people's assessment of group value. Group agreed there was a need and worthwhile
Microsoft challenging the value - claiming that something like this would be eventually be addressed by the OS vendors. Group feels the interapp piece (that the OS vendors will address) is just half the problem, the other half is the on-the-wire protocol between TA & AS
In offline conversations with John, MSFT reps agreed that there was value in defining the on-the-wire protocol.
Perhaps we can clarify that we don't intend to mandate a particular interapp protocol
Ashish adds there was agreement that we need more ISVs participating , action item was to reach out to contacts at the SaaS.
John indicates he talked to Layer7 at MWC and that they feel they have comparable functionality
2) Discussion of the different models for token-chaining, and how/where the complexity of dealing with token chaining sits - does the TA deal with the exchange, or does the app deal with the exchange
John points out the implications of the trust models, and who needs to know what?
AI - John will put together a summary of the different models and the pros/cons of each
Ashish asked about a model where the trust and token exchange happens at the AS level
Permuations appear to be
- TA asks downstream AS for AT
- Downstream app asks downstream AS for AT
- Upstream AS asks downstream AS for AT
Implications for consent gathering
2) Discussion about the use case of bridging from the TA into web app SSO
Everybody has a different way to do this
Ashish points out an issue about how to get session info into a web clip....
Different UI implications/models
AI - Paul will start a thread on the use case on the NAPPS list
3) Chuck remains concerned about the consent model - believes the spec as it is is primarily focused on authentication, and not about authz.
Different consent models differ on where the consent happens, at the TA or at the AS
John points out that this relates to the lack of the 'pre-authenticated authz request'
Chuck wants their server involved in collecting consent, and wants that to happen JIT and not a priori
John points out that this ties in with the bootstrap to browser app piece
AI - Chuck will summarize his thoughts on consent (where & when) on the list
Meeting closed
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