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<font face="Arial">adoption might guide us to minimize the load on
AS2 as much as possible, ie an OAuth AS can participate even
without Connect features<br>
<br>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/4/14, 5:08 PM, John Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:3139E4AC-57C8-4EFB-94AE-35723CACD150@ve7jtb.com"
type="cite">
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The normal connect flow has none as a response_type option for
doing this sort of thing. The main difference is AS2 needs to
support the SAML or JWT assertion flow.
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Apr 4, 2014, at 4:05 PM, Paul Madsen <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div> the second option would appear to demand more of AS2
than the 'normal' Connect flow?<br>
<br>
paul<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/4/14, 2:16 PM, John
Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:0B8F5110-CD04-4ACC-8E1F-D2B03B3E5AE1@ve7jtb.com"
type="cite"> Yes.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There are two options I can think of for the last
step of AS2 collecting consent.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The request can have a response_type of code and
the TA gets back a code that it can use to get a AT
from the AS2 token endpoint. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The other would be to make the call to AS2 with a
response-type of "none" just to collect consent,
getting back nothing.</div>
<div>The TA would then use the JWT assertion flow to
exchange a JWT for the access token.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I think the second option is more secure and allows
a JWT issued by AS1 to be used instead of a refresh
token issued by AS2. The advantage is that AS1 has
the ability to revoke access to the resource without
needing a separate API to AS2.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>John B.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Apr 4, 2014, at 2:00 PM, Paul Madsen <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div> John, something like <br>
<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="http://www.websequencediagrams.com/cgi-bin/cdraw?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgYnJvd3NlcgoACAxUQQACDUFTMQACDlBJABEPMgoKClRBLT5BUzE6IGdldCB1c2VyIGF1dGhlbnRpY2F0ZWQKQVMxLT5UQTogUlQsQVQAKQdQSQArBUJvb3RzdHJhcChBVCkKQVBJACQGYm9vABEFVVJMAFoGAIEmBwAVBQArBgAWBQCBPQcAeQcADg4AcgUALwlyZWRpcmVjdCB0byBBUzIoaWRfdG9rZW4sc2NvcGUpAD4NMjoAgT0FenJlcXVlc3QAGhJub3RlIG92ZXIgACgFdmFsaWRhdGUgAE0ICgpBUzIAgSoLY29uc2VudCgAZgY_CgoKCgo&s=patent">http://www.websequencediagrams.com/cgi-bin/cdraw?lz=cGFydGljaXBhbnQgYnJvd3NlcgoACAxUQQACDUFTMQACDlBJABEPMgoKClRBLT5BUzE6IGdldCB1c2VyIGF1dGhlbnRpY2F0ZWQKQVMxLT5UQTogUlQsQVQAKQdQSQArBUJvb3RzdHJhcChBVCkKQVBJACQGYm9vABEFVVJMAFoGAIEmBwAVBQArBgAWBQCBPQcAeQcADg4AcgUALwlyZWRpcmVjdCB0byBBUzIoaWRfdG9rZW4sc2NvcGUpAD4NMjoAgT0FenJlcXVlc3QAGhJub3RlIG92ZXIgACgFdmFsaWRhdGUgAE0ICgpBUzIAgSoLY29uc2VudCgAZgY_CgoKCgo&s=patent</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 4/4/14, 1:42 PM,
John Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:50B3AAE5-5023-422A-B5B4-061B0FA1690A@ve7jtb.com"
type="cite"> I was thinking of a bootstrap URL
that trigged idP initiated login at AS2. That
way the bootstrap URI is essentially opaque as
it is both specified and consumed by the
IsP/AS of the TA.
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div>
<div>On Apr 4, 2014, at 1:26 PM, Chuck
Mortimore <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cmortimore@salesforce.com">cmortimore@salesforce.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Sounds similar, yes,
although working out a boostrap URL
across different ASs might be quite
difficult in practice</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Apr
4, 2014 at 10:25 AM, Paul Madsen <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com"
target="_blank">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote">
<div> hey Chuck, you write <br>
<br>
'If the TA were to simply use
it's primary token to initialize
an OAuth authorization request
for the scope of the requesting
native app, we could simplify
this whole thing. '<br>
<br>
John had (in this thread)
previously proposed something
similar <br>
<br>
'If we have a web app bootstrap
AS1 could give a bootstrap URI
to the App that would create a
authenticated session at AS2 for
the user to do the normal OAuth
consent flow.'<br>
<br>
I believe John's model
accomplishes the same thing as
your proposal, ie delivers the
user's browser (in an
authenticated state) to an AS
where consent can be gathered -
albeit perhaps with more steps<span
class="HOEnZb"><br>
<br>
paul<br>
<br>
</span>
<div>
<div class="h5">
<div>On 4/2/14, 5:49 PM,
Chuck Mortimore wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div>We don't think
there should at all be
an "implied consent"
model (i.e.,
authentication at the
AS authorizes the App
for whatever it
needs). This sound
quite dangerous, and
don't believe this
would at all be
suitable for a tightly
controlled enterprise
environment. We do
support models that
"feel" like this, but
consent really isn't
implicit...It's simply
isn't controlled or
visilbe to the the
user. We always run
the request through an
authorization check,
and it is not at all
coupled to
authentication.
Picture us checking a
role on the AS.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As far JIT consent
model, it's a bit
harder to achieve when
using the Token
Endpoint, unless we
explicitly specify the
TA is collecting
consent, what to
collect, etc.
Standardizing a
consent UI strikes me
as very difficult.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The way we've
balanced the two in
our environment is to
always perform consent
on the authorization
endpoint. Based on
the configuration of
the app, we're either
checking server side
admin defined consent,
or prompting the user.
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>It's possible we
could continue to use
this model in NAPPS -
if we consider the
real difficult issue
for users is actually
authenticating, then
authorization is
really not a big deal.
If the TA were to
simply use it's
primary token to
initialize an OAuth
authorization request
for the scope of the
requesting native app,
we could simplify this
whole thing. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>-cmort</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On
Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at
1:37 PM, Paul Madsen <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com" target="_blank">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote">
<div> exploring #5
and your scenario<br>
<br>
something like<br>
<br>
1) TA gets user
authenticated and
obtains refresh
token with certain
scopes<br>
2) TA somehow
knows that for a
particular app,
additional consent
is needed, and
that a 3rd party
AS2 has to collect
it<br>
3) TA uses its RT
to obtain an
id_token targeted
at 3rd party AS2<br>
4) TA attaches
id_token to authz
request when
browser sent to
AS2 <br>
5) AS2 collects
consent<br>
6) AS2 returns
code/token etc to
TA<br>
<br>
Different options
for Steps #3
& #4 exist <br>
<span> <br>
paul<br>
<br>
</span>
<div>
<div>
<div>On
3/20/14, 3:44
PM, John
Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
type="cite">
Inline<br>
<div>
<div>On Mar
20, 2014, at
4:34 PM, Paul
Madsen <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com"
target="_blank">paul.madsen@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> possible
permutations?<br>
<br>
Single AS<br>
1) consent
collected at
AS</div>
</blockquote>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> 2)
consent
collected at
TA (and
reported to AS
in access
token
request?) <br>
</div>
</blockquote>
For 2 some UI
elements need
to be
delivered to
the TA perhaps
via AppInfo<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> <br>
Two ASs<br>
3) consent
collected at
AS1 (and
reported to
AS2 in
id_token?)<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
If AS 2 trusts
AS1to collect
consent it
could just
list the
scopes
granted.<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> 4)
consent
collected at
TA (and
reported to
AS2 in access
token
request?)<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
This perhaps
works if the
TA is making a
authenticated
request to
AS2. I think
3 or 5 is more
likely.<br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> 5)
consent
collected at
AS2<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
If we have a
web app
bootstrap AS1
could give a
bootstrap URI
to the App
that would
create a
authenticated
session at AS2
for the user
to do the
normal OAuth
consent flow.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div> paul<br>
<br>
<div>On
3/20/14, 11:02
AM, John
Bradley wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>I think our conversation about collecting consent was mostly focused on the basic case where the AS the TA is talking to can directly mint access tokens.
We still may need to collect user consent beyond what was agreed to at initial setup of the TA.
I think you are going one step further where the first party AS collects consent on behalf of the 3rd party AS/RS and indicates that in the id_token.
The second one is harder in that the third party AS would somehow need to communicate it's scopes out of band to the 1st party AS for collection.
John B.
On Mar 20, 2014, at 11:51 AM, Mike Varley <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:mike.varley@securekey.com" target="_blank"><mike.varley@securekey.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Yeah, probably - something like a 'consent' field in the id_token or AppInfo response that the RS can match to the scope. Just making something up on the spot (and in no way really thought through but what the heck) maybe something like:
consent: implicit //> RS should decide if it trusts AS, or maybe query AS as to what the implied consent involves.
consent: <consent_token> //> RS should examine token to see if it matches the scope and session the token was issued to.
consent: none //> RS should explicitly ask for consent
Note that the RS will always have final say on whether to trust the AS/TA, and whether or not to explicitly collect further user consent.
This is just a thought, love to hear more ideas.
thanks,
MV
On Mar 20, 2014, at 10:39 AM, Paul Madsen <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><paul.madsen@gmail.com></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Thanks Mike, yes Chuck raised some of the same concerns/points
What might a 'consent extension point' look like? Just suitable OPT mechanisms?
Paul
On 3/20/14, 10:32 AM, Mike Varley wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Hi all, sorry to have missed the meeting. I noticed that the consent question came up, and I'd like to share some of the challenges I've come across, just for consideration (again, apologies if this was covered on the call). In general, the experience has been that the various subtleties and nuances of consent can vastly complicate the model and user experience.
If you have a model of 'implied consent' (i.e., authentication at the AS authorizes the App for whatever it needs):
- may be suitable for tightly controlled Enterprise deployments
- provides a simplified user experience
- puts the user at risk of leaking data/PII
- "all-or-nothing" consent may be a barrier to entry for users
If you have a JIT consent model:
- more suitable for 'public' or general federations of Apps and Resources
- more burden on the user, as they have to authorize against each RS for each App
- usually involves more network round-trips, which on a mobile device can impose a noticeable delay
- RSs have to choose an entity to trust that consent has been collected:
-- Trust the AS has presented the user with the right scopes/terms of service
(how does the AS keep these in sync with the RS policy? Is there anything in the 'scopes' themselves that leak PII? )
-- Trust the TA that it has collected consent directly from the RS before issuing tickets to the Apps
(usually means the RS must return a 'session scope auth token' to the TA that gets embedded in the Auth Token - and AppInfo endpoint must point TA to RS consent endpoints)
-- Trust only 'yourself' (RS) meaning each App will have to present the authentication token with a _desired_ scope, and the RS must be able to collect consent itself.
(has App UI implications, as the App must now be able to render the RS consent screen)
User consent is a very important part of this kind of system, to be sure - but attempting to solve the "entire problem for all ecosystems" will probably only lead to pain and sadness ;) So I am assuming the NAPPS spec will only try to define 'consent extension points', where any particular ecosystem can expand on to fit their own consent / privacy model.
I hope this was useful.
Thanks,
MV
On Mar 20, 2014, at 8:38 AM, Paul Madsen
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:paul.madsen@gmail.com" target="_blank"><paul.madsen@gmail.com></a>
wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<pre>Attending
Paul
John
Chuck
Ashish
1) Ashish reported back on the RSA F2F
Attending were Mike & Caleb from MSFT, some MobileIron & Airwatch folks, somebody from OneLogin
Ashish asked for people's assessment of group value. Group agreed there was a need and worthwhile
Microsoft challenging the value - claiming that something like this would be eventually be addressed by the OS vendors. Group feels the interapp piece (that the OS vendors will address) is just half the problem, the other half is the on-the-wire protocol between TA & AS
In offline conversations with John, MSFT reps agreed that there was value in defining the on-the-wire protocol.
Perhaps we can clarify that we don't intend to mandate a particular interapp protocol
Ashish adds there was agreement that we need more ISVs participating , action item was to reach out to contacts at the SaaS.
John indicates he talked to Layer7 at MWC and that they feel they have comparable functionality
2) Discussion of the different models for token-chaining, and how/where the complexity of dealing with token chaining sits - does the TA deal with the exchange, or does the app deal with the exchange
John points out the implications of the trust models, and who needs to know what?
AI - John will put together a summary of the different models and the pros/cons of each
Ashish asked about a model where the trust and token exchange happens at the AS level
Permuations appear to be
- TA asks downstream AS for AT
- Downstream app asks downstream AS for AT
- Upstream AS asks downstream AS for AT
Implications for consent gathering
2) Discussion about the use case of bridging from the TA into web app SSO
Everybody has a different way to do this
Ashish points out an issue about how to get session info into a web clip....
Different UI implications/models
AI - Paul will start a thread on the use case on the NAPPS list
3) Chuck remains concerned about the consent model - believes the spec as it is is primarily focused on authentication, and not about authz.
Different consent models differ on where the consent happens, at the TA or at the AS
John points out that this relates to the lack of the 'pre-authenticated authz request'
Chuck wants their server involved in collecting consent, and wants that to happen JIT and not a priori
John points out that this ties in with the bootstrap to browser app piece
AI - Chuck will summarize his thoughts on consent (where & when) on the list
Meeting closed
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