[Openid-specs-native-apps] IOS 8 interapp messaging
Chuck Mortimore
cmortimore at salesforce.com
Fri Jun 6 19:28:59 UTC 2014
Nat's spec is less applicable when you have a AZA. I was providing a
more generalized response on how to protect the URL scheme mechanism.
Nat's spec would be useful if you were simply leaving a single app for
authentication and expecting a callback. The public key method might
work better with an AZA, although the introduction of the AZA probably
leaves some soft of MITM vector if it's being addressed with a custom scheme
On Wed, Jun 4, 2014 at 3:45 AM, Paul Madsen <paul.madsen at gmail.com> wrote:
> trying to understand where Nat's spec fits here.
>
> The TCSE spec requires an two-stage code-style flow as opposed to a
> single-stage implicit-style flow
>
> As I see it, there are logically two client-server interactions here
>
> 1) that between app & TA (nee AZA)
> 2) that between the TA and the AS
>
> Both could theoretically be either code or indirect style (though #2 will
> be code so we don't rule out TA authentication to the AS)
>
> So we end up with the following permutations
>
> *1) Implicit & implicit*
>
> AS TA App
> <--- request ----
> <---- request -----
> ------- token ------>
> ----- token ----->
>
> *2) Implicit & Code*
>
> AS TA App
> <--- request ----
> <---- request -----
> -------- code ------>
> <------ code -------
> ------- token ------>
> ----- token ----->
>
> *3) Code** & implicit *
>
> AS TA App
> <--- request ----
> <---- request -----
> ------- token ------>
> ------ code ----->
> <---- code ------
> ----- token ----->
>
> *4**) Code & Code*
>
> AS TA App
> <--- request ----
> <---- request -----
> -------- code ------>
> <------ code -------
> ------- token ------>
> ------ code ----->
> <---- code ------
> ----- token ----->
>
> TCSE could protect against an attacker app, having squatted on the custom
> URL of the legit app, stealing the code returned by the TA in Options #3 &
> #4 above.
>
> TCSE does not apply in an 'IdP init' model where the application is
> launched from a UI provided by the TA.
>
> paul
>
> On 6/3/14, 12:03 PM, Chuck Mortimore wrote:
>
> Did some work on this at Salesforce over the last couple weeks.
>
> When calling aza, on iOS the app is able to determine calling app
> identity by an injected bundle id. On Android you can get a cert hash.
> Both are OS asserted so are relatively secure assuming a non-jailbroken
> device. There doesn't seem, at least on iOS, to be a good way from
> preventing hijacking of the aza's custom scheme, so this is likely
> susceptible to at least some sort of phishing
>
> As far as callbacks back into the requesting app, we've looked at two
> approaches. Either Nat's
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03 as well as
> issuing an ephemeral public/private key, passing the public key in the
> request, and encrypting the response. Both seem to work well enough for
> protection against hijacked callbacks. At this point, we're heading
> towards the former given the relative simplicity.
>
> -cmort
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 3, 2014 at 8:18 AM, Paul.madsen <paul.madsen at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Writ the URL scheme mechanism, has anybody done the exercise of
>> assessing the associated security characteristics in Android and iOS?
>>
>>
>> Sent from my Samsung Galaxy smartphone.
>>
>>
>> -------- Original message --------
>> From: Lloyd Burch
>> Date:06-03-2014 11:00 AM (GMT-05:00)
>> To: paul.madsen at gmail.com, openid-specs-native-apps at lists.openid.net
>> Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-native-apps] IOS 8 interapp messaging
>>
>> I have now watched it three time and am looking for more information on
>> the details.
>>
>> What I would like to know is, can the called and calling application know
>> the ID of each other and can that be validated via iOS?
>>
>> Using the URL Schema calls is a little SLOW, but it is all we have now.
>> This should fix this.
>>
>> Lloyd
>>
>>
>>
>> >>> Paul Madsen <paul.madsen at gmail.com> 6/2/2014 1:42 PM >>>
>> >
>> http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/2/5773080/ios-8-apps-can-talk-to-each-other
>> perhaps relevant to mobile binding spec
>> paul
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Openid-specs-native-apps mailing list
>> Openid-specs-native-apps at lists.openid.net
>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-native-apps
>>
>>
>
>
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