

# Account Porting

[draft-account-porting-01](#)

OpenID MODRNA / GSMA CPAS workshop; 27–28 Sept 2016

[James Manger](#) (Telstra)

Co-authors of spec: James, Torsten, Arne


# Mobile Connect should keep working when a user ports to another MNO

- Aim: For Relying Parties (RPs, aka Service Providers) to be able to ***automatically*** recognize the same user signing-in before & after they port to a new OpenID Connect Provider (OP, aka MNO)
- Specify a porting mechanism that can work for any OpenID Connect Providers, not just MNOs doing Mobile Connect
- The basic idea:
  - A user logs in to both OPs (Old & New) in the same session, linking the two
  - RPs get evidence of that linking, authenticated by both Old & New OPs

# draft...01

- Step 0: setup
  - Old OP metadata lists 'Porting data' and 'Porting check' APIs; and encryption algorithms
  - New OP has client\_id/secret to call 'Port data' API
  - RPs registered with OPs
- Step 1: port
  - New OP calls Old OP's 'Port data' API → token; with OAuth 2.0 flow for user consent
- Step 2: sign-in to RP
  - OpenID Connect from New OP to RP
  - id\_token has New OP's 'sub' for user, plus lists Old OP with per-RP token (encrypted token)
- Step 3: confirm port
  - If RP doesn't recognize {New OP/sub}; call Old OP's 'Port check API' → Old OP's 'sub'
  - Repeat if still not recognized and Old OP lists an even older OP
  - Link {New OP/sub} to existing {Old OP/sub}

draft...01<sup>†</sup>



<sup>†</sup> Changes since draft...01: renamed `port_token_plain/port_token` to `port_token/enc_port_token`

# Step 0: metadata

→ GET `https://OldOP.example.net/.well-known/openid-configuration`

```
←  
{  
    "issuer": "https://oldop.example.net/",  
    "authorization_endpoint": "https://oldop.example.net/connect/authorize",  
    "token_endpoint": "https://oldop.example.net/connect/token",  
    "port_data_endpoint": "https://oldop.example.net/connect/port_data",  
    "port_check_endpoint": "https://oldop.example.net/connect/port_check",  
    "port_enc_algs_supported": [ "A256GCM", "A256CBC-HS512" ],  
    ...  
}
```

# Step 1: Porting data API

OAuth 2.0 flow

- HTTP/1.1 303 See other  
Location: `https://OldOP.example.net/connect/authorize?scope=porting_data&...`  
...
- GET `https://OldOP.example.net/connect/port_data/me`  
Authorization: Bearer `E3yyDiR5_i8CFCVDo3h8T5qgKpAdu8XkGZBv81vn428`
- ←  
`{"port_token": "309YHawMDXLpKb-FVjQ1_qSS9R9wbwb0TWbUxLvqAAI"}`

Opaque to others (New OP & RPs).  
Old OP can encode state of user port  
(eg sub, New OP... as JWE)

# Step 2: OpenID Connect login to RP

← HTTP/1.1 303 See other

Location: <https://NewOP.example.net/connect/authorize?scope=openid&...>

...

*click Ok*

Eg Mobile Connect  
confirmation on phone

→ POST <https://NewOP.example.net/connect/token?...>

Authorization: Basic *B64(rp\_client\_id:rp\_client\_secret)*

```
← {  
  "access_token": "XQ2-FHA0q7gqExq7vfRbopmkg_QPSuS4FFoigG4nZvU",  
  "id_token": JWT({  
    "iss": "https://NewOP.example.net/",  
    "sub": "JRrr09BzhZ6BJ9t0yD8DzyZjg7ziB3a40jeoUvZkUgw",  
    "aka": {  
      "iss": "https://OldOP.example.net/",  
      "enc_port_token": "eyJ0eX...3JnIn0..48V...U3b.GYV...qfc..."  
    },  
  },  
  ...}))}
```

pairwise

Actually  
JWE("309...AAI") per RP,  
but opaque to RP

# Step 3: Porting check API

→ GET `https://OldOP.example.net/connect/port_check?iss=https://NewOP.example.net/&sector_id=rp.example.org&enc_port_token=eyJ0eX...3JnIn0..48v...U3h.GYV...qfc...`

No direct RP authentication

- Old OP:

- Decrypts `enc_port_token`
- Confirms it issued `port_token`
- Matches New OP (decryption key = `iss` parameter = port destination)
- Matches `sector_id` (query parameter = JWE parameter)

Match `iss`, `sector_id`

← {  
 "sub": "kY6N64H86MBTho9I-JlRnpvaLOwAb5m3yYta6pq1VFM",  
 "aka": {  
 "iss": "https://**anotherop**.example.net/",  
 "enc\_port\_token": "QSfmp2V30cNqKShhyOjQEwDaQzLNhji5w5nD-EZq3ok"  
 }  
}

For the corner case of multiple port before an RP visit



# Step 3b: Encrypting port\_token


- JSON Web Encryption (JWE)
- Direct encryption with `client_secret` shared by Old OP and New OP
- JWE protected header:


```
{  "typ": "oidc-porting",  "alg": "dir",  "enc": "A256GCM",  "kid": "s6BhdRkqt3",  "sector_id": "rp.example.org"}
```
- AEAD algorithm chosen from Old OP metadata
- Secret key = `truncate(SHA2(client_secret))`, as per OpenID Connect Core [§10.2]
  - Key id = *client\_id*
- Plaintext = `port_token`


MUST use fresh encryption for each `sector_id`

Drop if RP authenticates to Porting check API

## Porting example








<-- dotted lines are redirects

# Design decisions



# Alternative #1: Authenticate RP ✓

- Instead of Old OP recognizing the same sector\_id for RP as New OP, the RP authenticates to the Old OP's Porting check API
- Step 3: Porting check API
  - POST `https://OldOP.example.net/connect/token?grant_type=client_credentials&...`  
Authorization: Basic `B64(rp_client_id:rp_client_secret)`
  - GET `https://OldOP.example.net/connect/port_check?iss=https://NewOP.example.net/&enc_port_token=eyJ0eX...3JnIn0..48V...U3b.GYV...qfc...`  
Authorization: Bearer `v8BmvE6ZxKukm_3_rGRbvT0oynXP1SB1WkGAxfA9Fwo`
- Old OP:
  - Decrypts `enc_port_token`; confirms `port_token` valid for a port to New OP; match `iss` to `kid`
  - Return "sub" appropriate to the authenticated RP
- ← { "sub": "kY6N64H86MBTho9I-JlRnpvaLOwAb5m3yYta6pq1VFM" }
- ✓ Old OP and New OP don't have to agree on sector\_id
- ✗ Extra effort for RP to authenticate; extra OAuth 2.0 flow

Omit?

# Alternative #2: Signed porting statements

- [draft-account-migration-02](#)
- Old OP maintains a DB of user+RP relationships
- Creates a signed message for each RP/sector\_id vouching to the port
- New OP gets signed messages from Old OP (with OAuth 2.0 consent)
- New OP includes an RP's signed message in id\_token
- ✓ RP does not need to call Old OP (other than to get public key)
- ✗ Old OP needs long-term signing keys
- ✗ OPs need user+RP DB; cannot just calculate 'sub' on demand

## Alternative #3: Same “sub”

- Early 2016 version of Mobile Connect Lifecycle Processes
- New OP gets Subject Ids (subs) from Old OP; reuses same subs
- RP should confirm port with Old OP
- ✓ id\_token unchanged
- ✗ Risks from confusing subs from OPs in scheme vs other OPs
- ✗ OPs need user+RP DB; cannot calculate ‘sub’



# Changes for draft...-02 — to be agreed

- ☐ Rename port\_token\_plain/port\_token to port\_token/enc\_port\_token, porting\_data scope to port\_data
- ☐ Drop no-encryption-needed option from Porting data API
- ☐ Authenticate RP to Old OP's Porting check API
  - ☐ Standard OAuth 2.0 grant\_type=client\_credentials flow first
- ☐ Add privacy considerations
- ☐ ...
- ☐ ...
- ☐ ...

# Resources

- Mobile Operator Discovery, Registration & Authentication (MODRNA) OpenID working group
  - Web page: <http://openid.net/wg/mobile/>
  - Bitbucket repo: <https://bitbucket.org/openid/mobile/>
  - Email list: [openid-specs-mobile-profile@lists.openid.net](mailto:openid-specs-mobile-profile@lists.openid.net)
  - Email archive: <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs-mobile-profile/>
- draft-account-porting
  - Web: <https://id.cto.telstra.com/2016/openid/draft-account-porting.html>
  - [Bitbucket repo](#): draft-account-porting.{html|.eg.png}
  - Earlier drafts named draft-account-migration
- GSMA CPAS (Mobile Connect technical group)
  - Basecamp: <https://basecamp.com/2588644/projects/9050876>