[Openid-specs-heart] Taking up the notion of a de-identification scope

Sat May 12 18:45:09 UTC 2018

Yes I do have some comments on the topic of FHIR and de-identification....
Mostly warning, but some encouraging words. I am not convinced what needs
to be done can be done using scopes.

https://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2017/09/fhir-and-bulk-de-identification.html

a bit older, but still relevant
http://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2015/06/fhir-does-not-need-deidentifytrue.html

on the break-the-glass, I also have plenty to say... but what I am hearing
is that this is better handled as a http header, not as an OAuth mechanism.
I question this, as I point out it is an authorization-override concept,
but that the override must be previously authorized.

I would find break-the-glass to be an unusual concept for HEART
functionality. It requires medical necessity, and professional judgement
that it is medically necessary. This is in the healthcare professional
space, not in the patient space.

John

John Moehrke
Principal Engineering Architect: Standards - Interoperability, Privacy, and
Security
CyberPrivacy – Enabling authorized communications while respecting Privacy
HITRUST Certified CSF Practitioner
M +1 920-564-2067
JohnMoehrke at gmail.com
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https://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com
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On Sat, May 12, 2018 at 11:01 AM, Eve Maler <eve.maler at forgerock.com> wrote:

> Justin and I have been discussing the idea of adding another specialty
> scope, somewhat similar to our existing mechanism for
> confidentiality/sensitivity scopes and the break-the-glass ("btg") scope,
> for indicating that the disclosed data should be de-identified.
>
> The group did discuss this a bit, a long time back, but we put it on the
> back burner because de-identification can never be "complete" (i.e., you
> never reach full computational anonymization). But there are transformation
> processes that do "as good a job as possible", and I believe we can couch
> the capability in the right terms. As well, when I have talked with people
> about HEART (a lot of people when I was at the RSA conference, for
> example!), a demand for this type of feature came up.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> ====
>
> In addition, whether we have two (conf/sens and btg) or three (adding
> de-id) such mechanisms, I think the spec would really benefit from a bit
> more text explaining the consequences of how they work -- and possibly how
> they might compare to each other. We've got the bare minimum spec text
> right now. Currently, things work like this:
>
>    - In all cases: RS has the choice to advertise the capability to
>    handle each scope, in OAuth, by including it in developer documentation,
>    and in UMA, by registering the scope as part of a registered resource.
>    (This means it's not possible for an AS to be caught unawares offering a
>    scope that an RS can't handle.)
>
>
>    - Conf/sens scopes: If the scope is MISSING from a client-presented
>    access token, the RS SHOULD filter out the corresponding conf/sens data.
>
>    Implications that we don't describe anywhere yet:
>
>    - The SHOULD is a very strong word in spec writing, but we don't say
>       what the rationales should be for *not* being able to filter out
>       the data as "promised".
>
>       - Given that *absence* of the scope is a signal to filter (this is
>       because the scope names are based on the HL7 codes and the way the "logic
>       direction" runs), "default policies" or similar in the patient's UX that
>       automatically set up filtering would be a good idea.
>
>
>    - btg: If the scope is PRESENT in a client-presented access token,
>    then the RS MUST leave a human-readable audit trail of access given on that
>    basis.
>
>    Implications that we don't describe anywhere yet:
>
>    - Pre-set policies would be a big benefit here given that we say "The
>       resource is intended to be accessed when the resource owner is
>       unavailable", a UX consideration but an important one.
>
>       - It's likely that setting up some sort of trust framework or
>       similar will be needed for determining which claims would suffice for
>       letting (say) an emergency responder get access when the resource owner is
>       unavailable.
>
> I suspect that if we add something like a "de-identify" scope, its logic
> would work OPPOSITE to the conf/sens scopes because we could name it in a
> more obvious fashion. And so if it were PRESENT in a client-presented
> access token, that would be the signal for the RS to do the
> de-identification operation on delivered content.
>
> (Refer to this spec
> <http://xml2rfc.tools.ietf.org/cgi-bin/xml2rfc.cgi?modeAsFormat=html/ascii&url=https://bitbucket.org/openid/heart/raw/master/openid-heart-fhir-oauth2.xml>
> for the relevant language.)
>
> ====
>
> We do have a meeting on Monday, and I apologize for having to miss it --
> I'll be in Munich at the EIC conference, presenting HEART status to the
> OpenID Foundation workshop, for one thing!
>
> [image: ForgeRock] <https://www.forgerock.com/> *Eve Maler*
> VP Innovation & Emerging Technology  |  ForgeRock
> *t* (425) 345-6756  |  *e* eve.maler at forgerock.com
> *twitter* xmlgrrl  |  *web* www.forgerock.com
>
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