[Openid-specs-heart] FHIR Client Registration is the existential issue for HEART

Glen Marshall [SRS] gfm at securityrs.com
Tue Dec 13 13:52:35 UTC 2016


I prefer this be a parking lot issue for HEART.  We have enough on our plate to deliver a profile for the core HEART functions.  The API Task Force recommendations do not have the force of current regulations.  I expect a marketplace solution for them, outside of HEART, should the recommendations find their way into regulations.


Glen F. Marshall
Consultant
Security Risk Solutions, Inc.
698 Fishermans Bend
Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
Tel: (610) 644-2452
Mobile: (610) 613-3084
gfm at securityrs.com
www.SecurityRiskSolutions.com<http://www.securityrisksolutions.com/>

From: Openid-specs-heart [mailto:openid-specs-heart-bounces at lists.openid.net] On Behalf Of Adrian Gropper
Sent: Monday, December 12, 2016 20:03
To: openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net; Josh Mandel <jmandel at gmail.com>; Justin P Richer <jricher at mit.edu>
Cc: Grahame Grieve <grahame at healthintersections.com.au>
Subject: [Openid-specs-heart] FHIR Client Registration is the existential issue for HEART

This summer's API Task Force had, arguably, only one major conclusion:

"A Resource Server can warn a patient if the RS believes that a client requesting patient-directed exchange is un-trusted AND the patient can choose to click-through that warning and grant access to the resource anyway."
The API Task Force acknowledged situations where an RS could still block a client but these are limited to denial of service attacks and other threats against the integrity of _other_ patients' data on a system.
There are efforts now underway to establish trust audits for FHIR clients which could be presented as part of a "software statement" in order to avoid the API Task Force warning.

Regardless of whether these software statement efforts are successful and can be used to bypass the the API Task Force "warning", HEART has to deal with the API Task Force outcome and profile how a warning is issued when a patient-specified client does not come with a "trusted" software statement.
As far as I can tell, the only way for HEART to enable the API Task Force conclusion is for us to specify a way for the RS to communicate the "warning" to the AS when a software statement is deemed inadequate by the RS AND to accept a "click-through" message back from the AS.
As an alternative, the RS could bypass the AS and send the warning directly to the resource owner and expect a direct reply by secure message or via the patient portal that was used to register the resource with the AS in the first place. This alternative does not involve either HEART or UMA and could be considered a parking lot issue.

Adrian


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