[Openid-specs-heart] The Number and Ownership of Authorization Servers.

Tue Dec 15 20:11:24 UTC 2015

Glenn - this is a narrow slice of the type of research that we should be
thinking about enabling with HEART.

Seriously, the PPRNs are executing far more agile processes and the PMI is
going to be trying even more progressive mechanisms.  Don't get me wrong, we
will still be doing this kind of trial but the real knowledge to be
harvested and one of the yet unrealized ROIs of all the investment in HIT is
the next generation of research on top of technologies like HEART.

The type of research where the person is a subject that has data taken away
from them and never hears from the researcher again is still going to be
important but from the perspective of HEART I was hoping we would be looking
forward not back.

We need to be thinking about how a consumer can use their authorization
server to make data available for research purposes and to enable
researchers to share learning and additional questions back to their
partners in research - the consumer.

I want to challenge you to think about it from the perspective of a Person
having all of their clinical information under their control and an
authorization server that allows them to decide how to share
bi-directionally with the researcher.

Honestly - there is nothing wrong with thinking about how we can support
ongoing research but I don't think we get to the big payoff until we are
reusing clinical data outside the context of the care delivery system it was
originally generated in.  

Aaron Seib, CEO

@CaptBlueButton 

 (o) 301-540-2311

(m) 301-326-6843

From: Openid-specs-heart
[mailto:openid-specs-heart-bounces at lists.openid.net] On Behalf Of Glen
Marshall [SRS]
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2015 2:19 PM
To: openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net
Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-heart] The Number and Ownership of Authorization
Servers.

I don't think the typical patient knows or cares about the AS, nor be
technically knowledgeable enough to express access authorization rules.

In the research use case, the business and technical preconditions that I am
thinking of are:

*	The IRB has approved the research
*	The research project administration has acquired computing resources
(CDRNs) and security services (identification, authentication,
authorization, audit, administrative UI, etc.).
*	Prospective research subjects review the purpose the research and
consent to it via a wet signature on a form.
*	The research subject's consent implicitly authorizes clinical data
collection, and that data is registered in the research projects
authorization server.  In this case, and only for the research, the AS
operates on behalf of all research subjects.  It is independent of any other
AS in the ecosystem.

A specific instance that I have in mind was a research study that my wife
participated in last September.  She enrolled as a research subject for
post-operative pain relief for a total shoulder arthroplasty with biceps
tenodesis, comparing intra-operative injections of a pain-relief drug versus
spinal nerve-blocks.   She signed the research consent form.  The clinical
data associated with her operation and post-operative experience then became
available to the researchers.  At no point was she involved in the
technology that supports it, but I'm sure that the operative report and
nursing charts were provided to the researchers.  (I'm happy to report that
pain relief was sufficient for her to spend only one night in the hospital.)

I suspect that other research studies follow a similar pattern, with
patients only signing a consent that then enables the research treatment and
data-collection processes.

Glen 

Glen F. Marshall
Consultant
Security Risk Solutions, Inc.
698 Fishermans Bend
Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
Tel: (610) 644-2452
Mobile: (610) 613-3084
gfm at securityrs.com
www.SecurityRiskSolutions.com

On 12/15/15 13:45, Debbie Bucci wrote:

Would a typical consumer really know or care that they have an Authorization
server?  Isn't it more likely a service will have an AZ at its core but the
service would have to offer something more?  Perhaps that service will be
widely used enough that an enterprise or corporate entity would respect -
perhaps replicate authorizations permissions - but I personally think its
unrealistic to believe there will only be just one.  Alice may not even know
it.

On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Aaron Seib <aaron.seib at nate-trust.org>
wrote:

"The consumer should be supported in choosing a standards based
authorization service (and\or identity provider) that is independently
operated by the consumer themselves (build or buy) or by someone that they
have selected (outsourced where the consumer pays a third party to do this
on their behalf or allows another to sponsor its operation on their behalf).
The independently operated service may be operated publically (the state of
Deleware may make one available to all Delewarians) or privately (the third
party that gets paid by the consumer or the sponsor of the consumer) and or
the consumer may elect to leverage one operated by the Resource owner."

I think that answers the question of ownership.

Now -I don't think there is an answer to the number of AS' a person may
have.  Clearer we all start with having 0.  Some people may work their way
up to having one or more.  I gather that some consumers will want more than
one but I don't think I internalized the why but I may not have to know the
why.  If I understand correctly the RO can only ever rely on one on a
transaction basis.  The rule could be to always use the latest one I pointed
you to.  

In a practical sense each RS may have to have on set up for those consumers
that haven't got one otherwise.  So maybe that is the default behavior?  A
RO should disclose nothing until the consumer has indicated which AS to use
and then only use the latest one that they pointed you to.

I don't think we can get any more granular then that right?  You might have
3 AS that you have configured and you gave the enterprise that owns the RS
where your mental health data one the URL for your AS1, the enterprise that
has your physical therapy records the URL for AS2 and the PCP you have seen
since you lived at home with your mom is still using AS3.

Aaron Seib, CEO

@CaptBlueButton 

 (o) 301-540-2311

(m) 301-326-6843

 <http://nate-trust.org> 

From: Eve Maler [mailto:eve.maler at forgerock.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2015 12:38 PM
To: Aaron Seib
Cc: openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net

Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-heart] The Number and Ownership of Authorization
Servers.

Eliding old text below to make the thread shorter...

Here's my reading. The phrase is a term of art originally crafted by Adrian.
It's a bit analogous to business/IT decisions about "build, buy, or
outsource", only applied to individuals' ability to be autonomous and have
sovereignty over their own lives (decisional autonomy, a key component of
privacy writ large) and data (a key component of data privacy).

build: Alice could literally write the AS code herself and stand up her own
service, say, under her deck at home on her own hardware, or on a "blade
server" at her ISP.

buy: Alice could personally invest the time to investigate and contract with
a software solution supplier and stand up her own service, again on one of
the above hardware choices.

outsource: Alice could survey the available AS SaaS services on the market
and choose one.

Adrian's HIE of One open-source project makes some of the above scenarios
possible.

You can imagine the layers of "terms of service" or "EULA" or whatever that
would/could apply at each level of the hardware/software/trust relationship
stack, and we wouldn't want to stick our noses into 99% of it except where
the services and apps and operators first have to "meet" at a technical
level. The UMA WG, in fact, is only sticking its nose into the UMA-specific
part of it, plus some exemplar agreements to give a flavor of what's
possible in those larger terms of service, EULAs, consent receipts, etc.
(The consent receipts might have a larger proportion of UMA-specific content
in them than the others!)

Eve Maler
ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology
Cell +1 425.345.6756 <tel:%2B1%20425.345.6756>  | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter:
@xmlgrrl
Join our ForgeRock.org OpenUMA <http://forgerock.org/openuma/>  community!

On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 9:25 AM, Aaron Seib <aaron.seib at nate-trust.org>
wrote:

Okay - so what is the answer?  I am assuming that the first case that argued
that the topic of number and ownership of AS should be out of scope is off
but the language in the charter isn't clear to me yet. 

Support independent authorization services and identity providers, to be
chosen by people who may build, run, or outsource these services.

Support is clear to me - it implies that it should allow for so the first
word I am good with.

What is meant by an independent authorization service?  Specifically what
are we saying?  Independent as in not ran by the government (Private) or
independent as in not ran by either the Resource Owner or the person that
the data is about (the consumer who is the subject of the PHI)?

What is meant by "To be chosen by people"?  We got all kinds of people.  The
guy who runs the lottery machine down the street is a people.  At least his
mom thinks so.  

Was it meant to say that a consumer has a right to choose the AS and IdP
that they want used?  That would be clearer if it said it that way.  The
last eight words seem to be tacked onto the end 'who may build, run or
outsource these services'.

I am assuming it was intended to mean that "The consumer should be supported
in choosing a standards based authorization service (and\or identity
provider) that is independently operated by the consumer themselves or by
someone that they have selected.  The independently operated service may be
operated publically or privately and the consumer may elect to leverage one
operated by the Resource owner."

I presume this is something that is doable, right?  The Resource Owner
doesn't incur any additional burdens by selecting the independent AS
preferred by the consumer do they?  If they do we are going to have to
figure out how to limit that liability or they will never do it, right?

I think the perception of a privacy risk is most prevalent when the resource
owner is also the operator of the authorization server selected by the
consumer.  The consumer should be familiar with those risk before making
that choice and this should not be referred to as an independent AS, right?

The notion of which Independent AS' are trustworthy (and if a Resource Owner
operated AS could be trusted) is out of scope but I don't think that implies
that their existence doesn't have to be acknowledged to get where we are
going.  Right?

From: Eve Maler [mailto:eve.maler at forgerock.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, December 15, 2015 11:24 AM
To: Aaron Seib
Cc: Adrian Gropper; Crandall, Glen; openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net

Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-heart] The Number and Ownership of Authorization
Servers.

Actually, what's in our charter related to number/ownership/trust around
(UMA) authorization servers would probably be these passages
<http://openid.net/wg/heart/charter/> :

*	"The following efforts are out of scope: ... Development of related
trust frameworks."
*	(non-normative background info:) "PoF's primary focus is on privacy
and security protocols that could demonstrate machine-executable
representation of patient authorization and consent.  At the center of the
effort is the notion that both implicit and explicit authorizations are
necessary for the exchange. The authorization could be managed through a
recognized/trusted Patient Authorization Service that the patient to could
use mediate the exchange of their own personal health from a number of
patient portals that they may have access to."
*	"The specifications must meet the following basic requirements, in
addition to specific use cases and requirements later identified by this
Working Group: ... Support independent authorization services and identity
providers, to be chosen by people who may build, run, or outsource these
services."

What are the technical requirements for profiling the specs to support an AS
that serves a single RO (as in Adrian's vision), vs. the business and legal
requirements for supporting an AS that serves a single RO? If we identify
those, then we'll be within the reasonable limits of our charter. I don't
think there are many, if any.

Regarding what an individual would prefer in their lives, I'm guessing they
would prefer a single AS, all other things being equal. But all other things
aren't equal... They might also prefer a single login account in their lives
-- but lots of people, faced with "social" federated login at yet another
website/web app, still choose to create yet another local login instead
because logging in with Facebook gives them a creepy feeling. Many of us at
this table have worked hard to make a new reality possible, so that people
could have the choice of logging in with a "trusted credential" of a certain
type that wouldn't feel creepy but natural instead. And some of us are
working on an even bolder vision, the choice of substituting a "third-party"
outsourced service with a 100% trusted built/run one.

Eve Maler
ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology
Cell +1 425.345.6756 <tel:%2B1%20425.345.6756>  | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter:
@xmlgrrl
Join our ForgeRock.org OpenUMA <http://forgerock.org/openuma/>  community!

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