[Openid-specs-fapi] repudiating non-repudiation?

[Steinar Noem]

Yeah, for instance it depends on the identity proofing process that ties an
identity to the certificate right?
Another thing to be aware of is that "non-repudiation" does not actually
exist in a legal sense. Even qualified certificates are not "definitive
evidence", or a "get out of jail for free" card..


ons. 2. feb. 2022 kl. 14:53 skrev Brian Campbell via Openid-specs-fapi <
openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>:

> "I think that you will find that most digital signature algorithms do not
> provide non-repudiation. It's a common myth." - said by someone much more
> knowledgeable than me in a recent discussion around the HTTP signatures
> work:
> https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1204#issuecomment-634377559
>
> I honestly can't say I fully understand it or the implications. But it
> seemed relevant here given that non-repudiation is mentioned as a goal of
> FAPI 2.0 Advanced.
>
>
>
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>
>
>
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-- 
Vennlig hilsen

Steinar Noem
Partner Udelt AS
Systemutvikler

| steinar at udelt.no | hei at udelt.no  | +47 955 21 620 | www.udelt.no |
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