[Openid-specs-fapi] FAPI certification testing for refresh tokens

Ralph Bragg ralph.bragg at raidiam.com
Mon Jul 1 09:20:19 UTC 2019


It’s a 3 from me.

________________________________
From: Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi-bounces at lists.openid.net> on behalf of n-sakimura via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>
Sent: Monday, July 1, 2019 10:08:16 AM
To: Financial API Working Group List
Cc: n-sakimura; Certification
Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-fapi] FAPI certification testing for refresh tokens

3). If there is a way to show that “policy” thing that Philip mentions, then 2).

From: Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi-bounces at lists.openid.net> On Behalf Of Dave Tonge via Openid-specs-fapi
Sent: Monday, July 1, 2019 3:41 PM
To: Financial API Working Group List <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>
Cc: Dave Tonge <dave.tonge at momentumft.co.uk>; Certification <certification at oidf.org>
Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-fapi] FAPI certification testing for refresh tokens

I vote for option 3.

On Fri, 28 Jun 2019 at 17:32, Joseph Heenan via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>> wrote:
I don’t believe any UK banks support offline_access. I wonder if other ecosystems might.

It sounds like you may be agreeing with me that either ‘3’ or ‘4’ would be acceptable options, is that fair?

Thanks

Joseph




On 28 Jun 2019, at 16:21, Filip Skokan <panva.ip at gmail.com<mailto:panva.ip at gmail.com>> wrote:

If the OP has a custom policy for deciding whether to issue a refresh token you can't always mandate they issue them to the tool which may not fall under that policy. The only thing testable for conformance and interoperability's sake would be if the server indicates offline_access scope and refresh_token grant type support, in which case you can mandate the tester whitelist this grant for the tested client and you can then test section 11 of Core.

Going beyond this would be creating a profile of your own.

S pozdravem,
Filip Skokan


On Fri, 28 Jun 2019 at 17:13, Joseph Heenan <joseph at authlete.com<mailto:joseph at authlete.com>> wrote:
Hi Filip,

Refresh tokens in general.

Specifically some/many UK banks issue them without scope=offline_access. FAPI certification also doesn’t currently require the user info endpoint is supported, though I believe core certification requires this.

(I suspect the desire to issue refresh tokens is related to a desire to not have to support revoking access tokens - i.e. that short lived access tokens that can be refreshed mostly removes the need to ever revoke an access token, but I could be wrong.)

Joseph



On 28 Jun 2019, at 15:41, Filip Skokan <panva.ip at gmail.com<mailto:panva.ip at gmail.com>> wrote:

Hi Joseph,

can you clarify if you're talking about refresh tokens in general or the scope offline_access + prompt consent condition of OIDC?

S pozdravem,
Filip Skokan


On Fri, 28 Jun 2019 at 16:29, Joseph Heenan <joseph at authlete.com<mailto:joseph at authlete.com>> wrote:
Hi FAPI WG,

A question has arisen about exactly how refresh tokens should be tested in the FAPI-RW conformance suite (tests for this are currently being written, a suggestion Dave Tonge originally made as many banks in the UK ecosystem are able to issue refresh tokens, and I presume in some cases not correctly...).

As support of refresh tokens is entirely optional in FAPI, the question is essentially: “what should happen if the AS doesn’t issue a refresh token?”

The options seem to be:

1) The test is marked as passed (I’m not in favour of this option as it may well be that the tester has accidentally registered the clients without the refresh token grant)

2) The test fails if the discovery document indicates the server supports refresh tokens (on the grounds that it indicates that the client has been wrongly configured and if the server supports refresh tokens they conformance suite must be able to test them - note that discovery is also optional in FAPI-RW, though I’m questioning whether this should be the case: https://bitbucket.org/openid/fapi/issues/239/fapi-part-2-should-mention-require - the counter argument is that potentially ASs may support refresh tokens but only for non-FAPI-RW use cases)

3) Same as ‘2’ but make it a warning instead of a failure (essentially suggesting that it may be okay but certificatee should be able to give a good reason why refresh tokens aren’t issued in their server when FAPI-RW is in use)

4) The test is marked as “not testable” or some similar phrase, probably resulting in a similar conversation as for ‘3’.

Does anyone have any thoughts please?

Thanks

Joseph


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