[Openid-specs-fapi] The FAPI Security Model - Under Fire

Joseph Heenan joseph at authlete.com
Mon Feb 26 15:33:19 UTC 2018


Hi Tom,

Under the UK OpenBanking model, the bank is required to make immediate refunds for any unauthorised transactions (and if a TPP was involved and negligent, the bank can then try to reclaim that money from the TPP). The only exception is if the bank suspects fraud or negligence by the user. I believe that setup comes from the EU wide PSD2 requirements (but others know that area better than I do).

How this actually works in practice remains to be seen, as this has only been in place for about 6 weeks.

Joseph


> On 26 Feb 2018, at 15:02, Tom Jones via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net> wrote:
> 
> the user does not authorize to Zelle. It is just a transport protocol. It can either send or request a payment. All the rest is on the user's account using the web browser or the bank app. Theoretically the user could pre-authorize payment requests, but my banks do not do that. Unlike the ACH where pre-auth is common, but not automated.
> 
> The fraud problem is that there are 6 parties to such a transaction (consumer, merchant, PISP, bank, UK gov't, attacker). The only party that does not understand the system is the consumer, who is the only one that bears risk of loss in the UK model. Every other party loses no money no matter what happens. This has been tried before in the UK when then ATMs were introduced. It did not go well for the consumer. http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/banksec.html <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/banksec.html> Trust is an illusion.
> 
> 
> Peace ..tom
> 
> On Sun, Feb 25, 2018 at 11:01 PM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net at gmail.com <mailto:anders.rundgren.net at gmail.com>> wrote:
> On 2018-02-25 16:11, Tom Jones wrote:
> As near as I can tell Zelle is under user control and ok.
> 
> I'm sure Zelle is just fine, my "techie" question is if the bank gets anything tangible from the user's authorization to Zelle.
> 
> 
> The truly evil organization will be the PISP if it is allowed to
> operate on the users’ behalf with contracts of adhesion. 
> 
> Well, this appears to be the master plan in the UK.  FAPI/OAuth is essentially morphing into an enrollment system for *persistent* business relations between three parties.
> 
> This is not common knowledge and may turn out as a source of non-interoperability (at the policy level).
> 
> Other side effects include something the traditional PSPs didn't have to bother with: Authentication of end users.
> 
> 
> Fraud will basically be be legalized.
> 
> The technical capability to perform fraud is more or less a part of most TTPs, be it a CA or a PSP. Trust in services is a combination of regulations, reputation, marketing, and time.
> 
> 
> 
> The one limiting factor, at least so far as xborder flows go, is government control of “hot money”. There are good articles just now on the linkage between kleptocrats and hot money in the Journal of democracy. I thoroughly recommend them to any thoughtful discussion of this threat. I suspect that the last thing governments want is friction free money flows.
> 
> ..Tom's phone
> 
> On Feb 25, 2018, at 12:07 AM, Anders Rundgren via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>> wrote:
> 
> On 2018-02-25 03:44, n-sakimura via Openid-specs-fapi wrote:
> Could you guys please elaborate a little more?
> 
> Note: If this list is exclusively intended for discussing pure technical issues with the specification rather than the environment where it is supposed to used, this message has landed in the wrong forum.
> 
> 
> As far as I understand the decoupled authentication model is indeed used by US TTPs like "Venmo" and "Zelle".
> 
> However, all these systems are proprietary and secret so I'm just guessing here.
> 
> Going back to the UK and EU, the idea is that independent payment providers compete with fees, core features, and user interfaces.  This can only be realized if each of them run a network of their own [1] including authentication of customers.
> 
> This has major implications beyond security.  In theory this concept will foster innovation and competition. In practice it will probably rather lead to fragmentation [2] and after an expected shakeout [3], reduce the number of national players to one or two which is essentially the opposite to the (good) intention.
> 
> The Scandinavian banks separated their Open Banking and Mobile Payment efforts with exceptionally good results (adoption rate) for the latter.
> 
> Cheers,
> Anders
> 
> 1] "Pass-through" services like PISPs offer limited power and flexibility
> 2] All "Apps" behave differently making consumers and merchants unhappy
> 3] The current consolidation among payment providers shows that volume is everything
> 
> Nat Sakimura
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> *From:* Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi-bounces at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-fapi-bounces at lists.openid.net>> on behalf of Tom Jones via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>>
> *Sent:* Sunday, February 25, 2018 4:24:06 AM
> *To:* Financial API Working Group List
> *Cc:* Tom Jones
> *Subject:* Re: [Openid-specs-fapi] The FAPI Security Model - Under Fire
> yeah, that fits the UK business model.
> It wont fly in the US however.
> Peace ..tom
> On Thu, Feb 22, 2018 at 11:53 PM, Anders Rundgren via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net> <mailto:openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>>> wrote:
>     Hi FAPIers,
>     As a curious person I have always wondered how Open Banking/PISP/SCA would combine with Amazon's famous one-click checkout.
>     Various LinkedIn and Slack conversations have revealed the (ugly?) truth.
>     The intention (at least in the UK), is giving OAuth tokens "eternal life" and rather letting PISPs (Amazon is expected to be a one), deal with payer authorization.  This faithfully emulates the "card-on-file" system that powers most US based super providers.
>     Cheers,
>     Anders
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