[Openid-specs-fapi] JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode (#155)
bcampbell at pingidentity.com
Fri Aug 17 17:24:49 UTC 2018
Yeah, I think that captures the general processing flow.
On Fri, Aug 17, 2018 at 8:50 AM Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten at lodderstedt.net>
> Hi Brian,
> > Am 17.08.2018 um 15:39 schrieb Brian Campbell <
> bcampbell at pingidentity.com>:
> > Good point. OIDC Core (
> http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#Security) does not
> discuss this attack angle. From your perspective, what is the typical way
> to detect crafted/modified ID Tokens in the id_token flow?
> > Checking the signature. But if the issuer isn't known or expected,
> don't go trying to find keys for it, just reject the token.
> I would like to summarize the discussion regarding handling of state value
> and response processing.
> From what I understand, the processing would work as follows (assuming the
> „state" is carried in the JWT):
> 1) decrypt JWT using the client's private key - the key is determine by
> the „kid“ header parameter
> 2) obtain „state“ from JWT
> 3) check binding of state value to user agent, if check fails - abort
> 4) obtain „iss" from JWT
> 5) check whether „iss" is known and expected („aud“ could be checked in
> this step as well), if not abort processing
> 6) obtain signing key based on „iss“ and „kid"
> 7) check signature, if signature validation fails - abort processing
> 8) use response parameters
> Does this capture your thoughts correctly?
> Kind regards,
_CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This email may contain confidential and privileged
material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). Any review, use,
distribution or disclosure by others is strictly prohibited. If you have
received this communication in error, please notify the sender immediately
by e-mail and delete the message and any file attachments from your
computer. Thank you._
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Openid-specs-fapi