<div dir="ltr">Franciso's solution solves two problems:<div>1. The verifier does not need to be online to verify the signature.</div><div>2 The verifier does not get the reusable ID from the user, although the public key has the potential for similar tracking capabilities.</div><div>It would be a simple adjustment to privacy laws to prohibit any verifier from sharing any keying material for any reason.</div><div>For a gov't cred there really is no interesting difference between a social ins number and a gov't approved DID.<br clear="all"><div><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><font face="-apple-system, system-ui, system-ui, Segoe UI, Roboto, Helvetica Neue, Fira Sans, Ubuntu, Oxygen, Oxygen Sans, Cantarell, Droid Sans, Apple Color Emoji, Segoe UI Emoji, Segoe UI Symbol, Lucida Grande, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif" color="#38761d"><span style="font-size:14px;background-color:rgb(242,242,242)">Peace ..tom jones</span></font></div></div></div><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Thu, Oct 24, 2024 at 11:52 AM Francisco Corella <<a href="mailto:fcorella@pomcor.com">fcorella@pomcor.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<div><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Hi Orie,</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Thank you for asking if I can propose a solution. I wasn't planning to, I was just reporting a problem. But since you asked I came up with one, which builds on what you propose in the message below.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">To motivate the solution, let me point out that there are two distinct kinds of cryptography: traditional cryptography (the cryptography of academia, the crypto conferences and the Journal of Cryptology) and W3C cryptography.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">One thing I like about W3C cryptography is that it is innovative. It has come up with both good and bad innovations. The solution I'm proposing includes one good innovation and remedies for two bad innovations.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">One bad innovation is verifiable presentations. In traditional cryptography, a credential presentation is a protocol for presenting the credential, not something with a life of its own, signed by a party possible different from the subject. Allowing the presentation to be signed by a party other than the subject creates opportunities for application errors and increases the attack surface, enabling impersonation attacks like the one I described yesterday.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">The remedy to this is what you proposed: a cnf field in the credential. The verificationMethod field in the VP should be deprecated, not just made redundant or optional, since leaving it there would not reduce the attack surface.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">The other bad innovation is burying the public key used to verify the presentation in a DID document, instead of having it explicitly signed by the issuer. That also provides opportunities for application vulnerabilities and increases the attack surface.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">To remedy this I propose using one the good innovations of W3C cryptography: using the hash of a public key instead of the public key itself. I found that idea in the did:peer specification. I propose the use an encoded hash of the public key as the value of the cnf field. When presenting the credential, the subject would send the public key along with the signature, and the verifier would check that the hash of the public key that it receives agrees with the value of the cnf field.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Using the hash of the public key has two advantages over using the public key itself as is done in traditional public key certificates: the hash is shorter, and the private key is protected against post-quantum attacks by an attacker with access to the certificate. This is a valuable innovation with many possible uses, which could be retrofitted from W3C cryptography into traditional cryptography. I've mentioned this to a traditional cryptographer and he was impressed by the potential benefit.</p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> </p><p style="margin:0px;font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">Francisco</p><blockquote style="border-left:2px solid rgb(176,176,183);margin-left:5px;margin-right:0px;padding-left:5px">-----Original message-----<br><strong>From:</strong> Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries><br><strong>Sent:</strong> Wednesday, October 23 2024, 1:47 pm<br><strong>To:</strong> Francisco Corella <<a href="mailto:fcorella@pomcor.com" target="_blank">fcorella@pomcor.com</a>><br><strong>Cc:</strong> Digital Credentials Protocols List <<a href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a>>; Gabe Cohen <gabe@tbd.email>; Veronica Wojnas <<a href="mailto:v.wojnas@gmail.com" target="_blank">v.wojnas@gmail.com</a>>; Sukhi Chuhan <<a href="mailto:sukhpreetchuhan@gmail.com" target="_blank">sukhpreetchuhan@gmail.com</a>><br><strong>Subject:</strong> Re: [Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols] NOT READY --- RE: FW: Working group last call for proposed OpenID4VP Implementer's Draft<br> <div dir="ltr">Then the issue is solved by doing this:<br><br><font face="monospace">{<br> "@context": [<br> "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" target="_blank">https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1</a>"<br> ],<br> "type": [<br> "VerifiablePresentation"<br> ],<br> "verifiableCredential": [<br> {<br> "@context": [<br> "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" target="_blank">https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1</a>",<br> "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" target="_blank">https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1</a>"<br> ],<br> "id": "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://example.com/credentials/1872" target="_blank">https://example.com/credentials/1872</a>",<br> "type": [<br> "VerifiableCredential",<br> "IDCredential"<br> ],<br> "issuer": {<br> "id": "did:example:issuer"<br> },<br> "issuanceDate": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",<br> </font><font face="monospace"><strong>"cnf": { "kid": "</strong></font><span style="font-family:monospace"><strong>did:example:holder" },</strong></span><br><font face="monospace"> "credentialSubject": {<br> <strong>"id": "</strong></font><span style="font-family:monospace"><strong>did:example:holder",</strong></span><br><font face="monospace"> "given_name": "Max",<br> "family_name": "Mustermann",<br> "birthdate": "1998-01-11",<br> "address": {<br> "street_address": "Sandanger 25",<br> "locality": "Musterstadt",<br> "postal_code": "123456",<br> "country": "DE"<br> }<br> },<br> "proof": {<br> "type": "Ed25519Signature2018",<br> "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z",<br> "jws": "eyJhb...JQdBw",<br> "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",<br> "verificationMethod": "did:example:issuer#keys-1"<br> }<br> }<br> ],<br> "id": "ebc6f1c2",<br> "holder": "did:example:holder",<br> "proof": {<br> "type": "Ed25519Signature2018",<br> "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z",<br> "challenge": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",<br> "domain": "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://client.example.org/cb" target="_blank">https://client.example.org/cb</a>",<br> "jws": "eyJhb...IAoDA",<br> "proofPurpose": "authentication",<br> "verificationMethod": "did:example:holder#key-1"<br> }<br>}</font><br><br>Per the W3C VCDM the credential subject id is optional, as is "cryptographic binding" between credentials and subjects / holders using mechanisms like "cnf" or "DIDs".<br><br>Your suggestion is that the error in this example is grounds for not progressing the document, can you propose a solution?<br><br>There are lots of other problems with this example such as being for VCDM v1 (v2 is in progress right now, and including data integrity proofs that have been deprecated Ed25519Signature2018 (<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://w3c-ccg.github.io/lds-ed25519-2018/" target="_blank">https://w3c-ccg.github.io/lds-ed25519-2018/</a>) is now: <a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-di-eddsa/" target="_blank">https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-di-eddsa</a><br><br>I recommend removing the example, or updating it to support version 2.<br><br>Regards,<br><br>OS<br><br><br><br><br> </div> <div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 2:55 PM Francisco Corella <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:fcorella@pomcor.com" target="_blank">fcorella@pomcor.com</a>> wrote:</div><blockquote style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div><div><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">The issue is NOT how you resolve DIDs, nor any other technical details of decentralized identifiers.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">The issue is that there is no relationship between the credential subject and the holder of the presentation that can be cryptographically verified by the relying party.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Francisco</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><blockquote style="border-left:2px solid rgb(176,176,183);margin-left:5px;margin-right:0px;padding-left:5px">-----Original message-----<br><strong>From:</strong> Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries><br><strong>Sent:</strong> Wednesday, October 23 2024, 12:48 pm<br><strong>To:</strong> Digital Credentials Protocols List <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a>><br><strong>Cc:</strong> Gabe Cohen <gabe@tbd.email>; Francisco Corella <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:fcorella@pomcor.com" target="_blank">fcorella@pomcor.com</a>>; Veronica Wojnas <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:v.wojnas@gmail.com" target="_blank">v.wojnas@gmail.com</a>>; Sukhi Chuhan <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:sukhpreetchuhan@gmail.com" target="_blank">sukhpreetchuhan@gmail.com</a>><br><strong>Subject:</strong> Re: [Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols] NOT READY --- RE: FW: Working group last call for proposed OpenID4VP Implementer's Draft<br> <div dir="ltr">The idea with these JSON-LD graph node identifiers, is that you have some document loader that resolves the identifiers to cryptographic material or other credentials.<br><br>So in W3C VCDM where you see:<br><br><font face="monospace">kid: did:example:holder#key-1</font><br><br>You can mentally replace that with:<br><br><font face="monospace">- urn:ietf:params:oauth:ckt:sha-256:SWvYr63zB-WwjGSwQhv53AFSijRKQ72oj63RZp2iU-w<br>- urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:NzbLsXh8uDCcd-6MNwXF4W_7noWXFZAfHkxZsRGC9Xs</font><br><br><font face="arial, sans-serif">And then assume that *somehow* the issuers, holders and verifiers have all agreed to resolve key identifiers to public keys the same way, and that they confirm signatures the same way.<br><br>In terms of "credential binding", you can use the "cnf" claim in W3C VCDM credentials just like you can use it with CWTs / JWTs.<br><br>- </font><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/cwt.xhtml#confirmation-methods" target="_blank">https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt/cwt.xhtml#confirmation-methods</a><br><font face="arial, sans-serif">- </font><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml#confirmation-methods" target="_blank">https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml#confirmation-methods</a><br><br><font face="arial, sans-serif">From this view a "DID URL" aka "JSON-LD graph node identifier for a verification method", is just a special case of "weird looking" kid.<br><br>Notice that "kid" is in both registries as a valid confirmation method.<br><br>I'd suggest removing the DID examples from this specification before publishing or documenting what I have written above in the specification.<br><br>OS</font><br> </div> <div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Oct 23, 2024 at 2:26 PM Francisco Corella via Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a>> wrote:</div><blockquote style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div><div><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">That reference is not in the credential, it's in the presentation. And it is not a reference to the subject of the credential.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Even if the verifier were able to find the public key of the holder in the DID document of the holder,</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">it would no way of verifying cryptographically that the credential was issued to <span style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small">did:example:holder.</span></p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Francisco</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><blockquote style="border-left:2px solid rgb(176,176,183);margin-left:5px;margin-right:0px;padding-left:5px">-----Original message-----<br><strong>From:</strong> Gabe Cohen <gabe@tbd.email><br><strong>Sent:</strong> Wednesday, October 23 2024, 12:01 pm<br><strong>To:</strong> Digital Credentials Protocols List <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a>><br><strong>Cc:</strong> Francisco Corella <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:fcorella@pomcor.com" target="_blank">fcorella@pomcor.com</a>>; Veronica Wojnas <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:v.wojnas@gmail.com" target="_blank">v.wojnas@gmail.com</a>>; Sukhi Chuhan <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:sukhpreetchuhan@gmail.com" target="_blank">sukhpreetchuhan@gmail.com</a>><br><strong>Subject:</strong> Re: [Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols] NOT READY --- RE: FW: Working group last call for proposed OpenID4VP Implementer's Draft<br> <div dir="ltr">There is a reference to it in what you’ve quoted</div><div dir="ltr"> </div><blockquote type="cite" style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr"><span style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small"> "verificationMethod": "did:example:holder#key-1"</span></div></blockquote><div> </div><div dir="ltr">If your implementation understands DIDs then this is a standard way to express referencing key material in a DID Document.</div><div dir="ltr"> </div><div dir="ltr">The examples do need to be updated, however, I would not classify this as a <em>fundamental security flaw</em>. I have an <a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/issues/5" target="_blank">issue to make the W3C VC</a> examples better. </div><div dir="ltr"> </div><div dir="ltr">Gabe</div> <div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Oct 23, 2024 at 11:48:26 AM, Francisco Corella via Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a>> wrote:</div><blockquote type="cite" style="border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;padding-left:1ex" class="gmail_quote"><div><div> </div><div><div><div> </div><div><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Hello Mike,</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Thank you for sending the last call and the current Editor's draft of the OpenID4VP specification.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">I think the draft is not ready because it has a fundamental security flaw.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Section 2 says:</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Cryptographic Holder Binding:<br>Ability of the Holder to prove legitimate possession of a Verifiable Credential by proving control over the same private key during the issuance and presentation. Mechanism might depend on the Credential Format. For example, in jwt_vc_json Credential Format, a Verifiable Credential with Cryptographic Holder Binding contains a public key or a reference to a public key that matches to the private key controlled by the Holder.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">But Section B.1.2.3 has the following example of a verifiable presentation of a verifiable credential:</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">{<br> "@context": [<br> "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" target="_blank">https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1</a>"<br> ],<br> "type": [<br> "VerifiablePresentation"<br> ],<br> "verifiableCredential": [<br> {<br> "@context": [<br> "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1" target="_blank">https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1</a>",<br> "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1" target="_blank">https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/examples/v1</a>"<br> ],<br> "id": "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://example.com/credentials/1872" target="_blank">https://example.com/credentials/1872</a>",<br> "type": [<br> "VerifiableCredential",<br> "IDCredential"<br> ],<br> "issuer": {<br> "id": "did:example:issuer"<br> },<br> "issuanceDate": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",<br> "credentialSubject": {<br> "given_name": "Max",<br> "family_name": "Mustermann",<br> "birthdate": "1998-01-11",<br> "address": {<br> "street_address": "Sandanger 25",<br> "locality": "Musterstadt",<br> "postal_code": "123456",<br> "country": "DE"<br> }<br> },<br> "proof": {<br> "type": "Ed25519Signature2018",<br> "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z",<br> "jws": "eyJhb...JQdBw",<br> "proofPurpose": "assertionMethod",<br> "verificationMethod": "did:example:issuer#keys-1"<br> }<br> }<br> ],<br> "id": "ebc6f1c2",<br> "holder": "did:example:holder",<br> "proof": {<br> "type": "Ed25519Signature2018",<br> "created": "2021-03-19T15:30:15Z",<br> "challenge": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",<br> "domain": "<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://client.example.org/cb" target="_blank">https://client.example.org/cb</a>",<br> "jws": "eyJhb...IAoDA",<br> "proofPurpose": "authentication",<br> "verificationMethod": "did:example:holder#key-1"<br> }<br>}</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">The public key of the holder is "did:example:holder#key-1". There is no reference to it in the verifiable credential, so cryptographic holder binding cannot be verified.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">The root of this problem is that, in a verifiable credential, the signature of the issuer does not cover the public key of the subject.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">I plan to call a session at next week's IIW to discuss this issue.</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Best regards,</p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px"> </p><p style="font-family:Arial,Tahoma,Helvetica,sans-serif;font-size:small;margin:0px">Francisco<br> </p><blockquote style="border-left:2px solid rgb(176,176,183);margin-left:5px;margin-right:0px;padding-left:5px">-----Original message-----<br><strong>From:</strong> Michael Jones via Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a>><br><strong>Sent:</strong> Wednesday, October 23 2024, 7:34 am<br><strong>To:</strong> <a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a> <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a>><br><strong>Cc:</strong> Michael Jones <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:michael_b_jones@hotmail.com" target="_blank">michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</a>><br><strong>Subject:</strong> [Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols] FW: Working group last call for proposed OpenID4VP Implementer's Draft<br> <div><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">FYI</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"> </span></p><div><div style="border-bottom:none;border-left:none;border-right:none;border-top:1pt solid rgb(225,225,225);padding:3pt 0in 0in"><p class="MsoNormal"><strong><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:11pt">From:</span></strong><span style="font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;font-size:11pt"> Openid-specs-ab <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-ab-bounces@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-ab-bounces@lists.openid.net</a>> <strong>On Behalf Of </strong>Michael Jones via Openid-specs-ab<br><strong>Sent:</strong> Wednesday, October 23, 2024 7:31 AM<br><strong>To:</strong> <a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net</a><br><strong>Cc:</strong> Michael Jones <<a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:michael_b_jones@hotmail.com" target="_blank">michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</a>><br><strong>Subject:</strong> [Openid-specs-ab] Working group last call for proposed OpenID4VP Implementer's Draft</span></p></div></div><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p class="MsoNormal">Dear OpenID Connect Working Group,</p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p class="MsoNormal">We would like to get working group consensus that the current OpenID4VP draft is ready to start the Implementer’s draft approval process. Please respond to this e-mail within the next week, by Wednesday, October 30th end of business hours in Pacific Time, saying whether you believe the current draft should proceed or not.</p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The current OpenID4VP document to be reviewed can be found here: <a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://openid.github.io/OpenID4VP/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-wg-draft.html" target="_blank">https://openid.github.io/OpenID4VP/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-wg-draft.html</a>.</p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p class="MsoNormal">The details of the Implementer’s Draft approval process can be found here: <a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://openid.net/wg/resources/approving-specifications/" target="_blank">https://openid.net/wg/resources/approving-specifications/</a>. This e-mail is about the first bullet point on this list, which is sometimes called Working Group Last Call. Following that, there’s a 45-day Foundation-wide review, followed by a 7-day voting period. (The poll itself will actually open 7 days before the end of the Foundation-wide review ends.) If all goes smoothly, the voting will hopefully start on Monday, 16th December.</p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p class="MsoNormal">As shared on the working group calls, completing this Implementer’s Draft process promptly is an important step in obtaining IPR commitments for the specification, thereby enabling the DCP working group to adopt it. This will allow the DCP WG to hopefully publish a final specification by the end of March for inclusion into the EUDI implementing acts. We hope to get implementers’ feedback on this draft over the next few months so we can continue to perfect the specification before it becomes final.</p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"> -- Mike (writing as working group chair)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"> </span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt">P.S. Thanks to Joseph Heenan for drafting most of the text above!</span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11pt"> </span></p></div><pre>--
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</pre></blockquote></div></div></div></div><div><div>--<br>Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols mailing list<br><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a><br><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols" target="_blank">https://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols</a></div></div></blockquote></div></blockquote></div></div>--<br>Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols mailing list<br><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="mailto:Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net" target="_blank">Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols@lists.openid.net</a><br><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols" target="_blank">https://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols</a></blockquote></div> <div> </div><span class="gmail_signature_prefix">-- </span><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><p dir="ltr" style="margin-bottom:0pt;margin-top:0pt"> </p><p dir="ltr" style="margin-bottom:0pt;margin-top:0pt;padding:10pt 0pt"><span><strong>ORIE STEELE</strong><br><span style="background-color:transparent;color:rgb(32,18,77);font-family:Arial;font-size:10pt">Chief Technology Officer</span><br><span style="background-color:transparent;color:rgb(32,18,77);font-family:Arial;font-size:8pt">www.transmute.industries</span></span></p><p dir="ltr" style="margin-bottom:0pt;margin-top:0pt;padding:0pt 0pt 10pt"><span><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://transmute.industries" target="_blank"><img height="22" width="96" src="https://ci3.googleusercontent.com/mail-sig/AIorK4xqtkj5psM1dDeDes_mjSsF3ylbEa5EMEQmnz3602cucAIhjLaHod-eVJq0E28BwrivrNSBMBc"></a></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div> <div> </div><span class="gmail_signature_prefix">-- </span><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><p dir="ltr" style="margin-bottom:0pt;margin-top:0pt"> </p><p dir="ltr" style="margin-bottom:0pt;margin-top:0pt;padding:10pt 0pt"><span><strong>ORIE STEELE</strong><br><span style="background-color:transparent;color:rgb(32,18,77);font-family:Arial;font-size:10pt">Chief Technology Officer</span><br><span style="background-color:transparent;color:rgb(32,18,77);font-family:Arial;font-size:8pt">www.transmute.industries</span></span></p><p dir="ltr" style="margin-bottom:0pt;margin-top:0pt;padding:0pt 0pt 10pt"><span><a title="This external link opens in a new window" href="https://transmute.industries" target="_blank"><img height="22" width="96" src="https://ci3.googleusercontent.com/mail-sig/AIorK4xqtkj5psM1dDeDes_mjSsF3ylbEa5EMEQmnz3602cucAIhjLaHod-eVJq0E28BwrivrNSBMBc"></a></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div>
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