[Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols] WGLC for OpenID for Verifiable Presentations Final

Wed Apr 23 16:34:47 UTC 2025

Dear Mirko,

thanks a lot for your mail,. You seemingly forget the information spread by
the chairs so especially Torsten & Kristina but also by you that OIDF works
on standards to be used within the eiDAS ecosystem and with this aim is
according to its own statements (see chairs) in close collaboration with
the European Commission.

Regarding ETSI: You may forget that its working worldwide as you can see on
the website: https://www.etsi.org/about. Especially the ETSI EN on
signatures and certificates are used worldwide.

Please do not mix up standardization organizations and regulation. The
regulation is exactly what we focus on here in the discussion.

legally and practically you are wrong:

1. the IA on Art. 5b eIDAS defines that only following options for
disclosur policies on RP Access certificates possible: no one, allow list,
Root of Trust

   - As it´s a final list, there`s no option for your attestation based
   approach in Europe
   - So great that you checked your idea with technical experts - but
   strongly recommend that you proof it legally in case your idea shall work
   in Europ

2. According to Art. 5b eIDAS as well as its IA the Relying Party needs to
identify at Registrar. means the Registrar knows if it´s a bank, doctor or
SPRIND. So you are legally wrong again. As the Registrar knows and gets the
information about kind of Relying Party, the registrar can out this
information in the RP Access Certificate. As IA on Art. 5b does not forbid
this (in comparison to your idea) - it´s no issue
As the RP already needs to use the Access Certificate your approach only
creates additional complexity within the EUDI/eIDAS ecosystem as RP needs
Access Certificate (which has to be x509 by law!) + attestations

However, if OID4VP and your preferred approach on Relying Party
Authorization is not aimed for eIDAS ecosystem I strongly recommend to
mention this explicitly in the scope of the standard - this would help
users & implementers to assess its applicability for the EUDI Wallet.

3. Your claim "And this is also not the way the European Commission wants
to go via forcing QTSPs for everything! Member States that want to use
QTSPs can do so, others can avoid it" is misleading. Nobody spoke about
using QTSP for this . only to reuse a European Standard for the Access
certificate. Maybe you read my mail again

Recommend you go deeper in the subject how values like "Bank", "doctor" or
similar can be added to x509 and easily proven. We already do this with
x509 worldwide without the need of an attestation.

So you are technically wrong again and mix up the subject.

;Long story short: Within the eIDAS Ecosystem your approach only leads to
additional effort and is legally impossible - better unlawful or illegal.
If OIDF aims to use OID4VP in its current version for eiDAS Ecosystem
strongly recommend to go the step to proof the legal applicability to eIDAS
2.0.

I offer to explain it to you in personal meeting.

BTW: I never mentioned that you agreed to my claims but that we discussed
it ;-)

As the approach is illegal I hold up my opposition to move current draft to
public review.

PS: Recommend you read and understand first before you argue and assume
about subjects which were not mentioned by anybody in the discussion - or
are you the Donald Trump of SPRIND?

Best
Steffen

On Wed, Apr 23, 2025 at 1:00 PM Mirko Mollik <mirko.mollik at eudi.sprind.org>
wrote:

> Dear Steffen,
>
> Please do not mix up different topics here. You seem to forget that OIDF
> is building standards that are focused to be used world wide, not with the
> primary focus like it’s done with ETSI and CEN. I already explained on
> Tom’s Issue on GitHub that from a European perspective the latest changes
> in spec are fine to be aligned with the requirements from eIDAS and GDPR.
> We can implement all requirements for Authentication and Authorization. The
> approach was already challenged multiple times with security and privacy
> experts across Europe, and they like the approach.
>
> Also your second argument „the registrar knows this“, is wrong. It’s not
> enforced by the implementing acts to handle this and it’s up to the member
> states how to do this. And this is also not the way the European Commission
> wants to go via forcing QTSPs for everything! Member States that want to
> use QTSPs can do so, others can avoid it.
>
> Long story short: I never agreed with Steffen on his claim and I am open
> to discuss with others about potential gaps in the protocol that we need to
> fix in the future.
>
> #rough consensus
>
> Cheers
>
> P.S. don’t argue like the person on your mentioned slide pls
>
> -
> Mirko Mollik
>
> Identity Architect (EUDI-Wallet-Projekt) mirko.mollik at eudi.sprind.org
>
> SPRIND GmbH
>
> BUNDESAGENTUR FÜR SPRUNGINNOVATIONEN
> FEDERAL AGENCY FOR DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION
> Lagerhofstraße 4, 04103 Leipzig
>
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> Disclaimer
>
> Am 23.04.2025 um 11:45 schrieb steffen schwalm via
> Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols <
> openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols at lists.openid.net>:
>
> Dear all,
>
> as briefly discussed with Mirko: The following approach defined in Slid 12
> fpr the document
> https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1s-MM27j4ZxACf0ecuVBGbuj8o4C5kr9g62jXeby0wso/edit?pli=1#slide=id.g3105e024338_0_7
> is IMHO legally wrong acc. to the Implementing Act. The IA defines: no
> policy, allow list or root of trust not an Attribute based access control.
>
> With the background that embedded policies well-known (see signature
> validation policy), any RP must be listed and identified by Registrar
> anyway. Means the Registrar already has the identity and the property
> "bank", "doctor", "Municipality Buxtehude". If this property is written in
> the Access Certificate it can be proven by the wallet when RP requests
> PID/EAA data. If the correct property e.g. "Bank" given that request is
> proven correctly. The Root of Trust would be (QTSP--> QEAA) --> Access
> Certificate --> Registrar. As those lists already exist e.g.banking
> supervision authority, Medical Association etc. it seems not comprehensible
> to create new complexitites especially as the access certificate is already
> x509.
> This is already possible with existing x509 and reusing the standards like
> ETSI EN 319 411 family,.
>
> And before the discussions comes: The issue here is not similar to W3CVCDM
> that there might be no standard for authorization of RP - we already have
> them.
>
> Long Story short: I support Tom and also oppose to move OID4VP to public
> review.
>
> Best
> Steffen
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 23, 2025 at 10:26 AM steffen schwalm <
> schwalm.steffen at googlemail.com> wrote:
>
>> Joseph:
>>
>> As OIDF according to its own statements aims to define specifications in
>> support of EUDI Wallet your statement "  given many things are out of
>> scope for OID4VP and defined by local ecosystem requirements/laws" is
>> highly dangerous. If OID4VP aims for EUDI any risk of legal breach as Tom
>> assumes shall be avoided.
>>
>> means: if you believe that "OID4VP can also be used in a way that is
>> compliant with such laws" --> exactly this way shall be defined as the only
>> possible one to be in compliance with GDPR, eIDAS etc. Would be typical
>> approach we know from ETSI, CEN, ISO.
>>
>> Currently looking at the mails I support Tom in his doubts.
>>
>> Beside this I oppose against to bring OID4VP in current version in next
>> step: DCQL only requires to write query per credential format which is
>> weird - in comparison to presentation exchange. Recommend to open the door
>> for presentation exchange as optional possibility.
>>
>> Best
>> Steffen
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 23, 2025 at 12:39 AM Joseph Heenan via
>> Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols <
>> openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols at lists.openid.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Tom
>>>
>>> To repeat what I added to on the issue a few days ago,
>>> https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/issues/333#issuecomment-2816774542 :
>>>
>>> I've read back through this issue. There seem to be a number of
>>> questions I've asked Tom that I've not obviously got answers to, such as
>>> "To try and clarify: you agree that user consent is happening, your doubt
>>> is to whether the consent is sufficiently informed?". Being unable to
>>> narrow down exactly what Tom believes the problem is or isn't is
>>> significantly hampering figuring out if there's a problem that needs to be
>>> solve in the specification or not.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think we've replied to every point Tom has raised, with the possible
>>> exception of not fully replying to this one:
>>>
>>>
>>> Digital identity wallets must ascertain the identity of Verifiers and
>>> determine whether these Verifiers possess the necessary authorisation or
>>> obligation to request Verifiable Credentials (VCs) or claims.
>>> I don't see how OID4VP provides that - all i see is a URL that the user
>>> must decide whether to trust.
>>>
>>>
>>> I already explained that OID4VP provides for this via
>>> https://openid.github.io/OpenID4VP/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-wg-draft.html#name-client-identifier-prefix-an (for
>>> example, x509_san_dns defined there does not require the user to declare
>>> whether they trust a URL or not, it can be PKI certs that assert a trusted
>>> name for the verifier etc) but it's perhaps also worth sharing that the
>>> "possess the necessary authorisation or obligation to request Verifiable
>>> Credentials (VCs) or claims." part is being solved in an EU specific way,
>>> there was a presentation about this at the recent IIW:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1s-MM27j4ZxACf0ecuVBGbuj8o4C5kr9g62jXeby0wso/edit#slide=id.g34994030800_0_349
>>>
>>>
>>> My understanding of the current situation:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    1. Tom believes that OID4VP can be used in ways that are not
>>>    compliant with laws such as EU GDPR / EUDI wallet regulations (a point that
>>>    I believe there is agreement on, given many things are out of scope for
>>>    OID4VP and defined by local ecosystem requirements/laws)
>>>    2. Tom doesn't like the way verifier authentication was done at the
>>>    California hackathon.
>>>    3. Everyone (except for Tom?) seems to believes OID4VP can also be
>>>    used in a way that is compliant with such laws
>>>
>>>
>>> Is this a correct summary?
>>>
>>> (Mirko also added a comment with more detail on how this would work in
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> Joseph
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Apr 2025, at 11:35, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> i do not believe the spec is ready.
>>> see https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/issues/333
>>>
>>> Peace ..tom jones
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Apr 12, 2025 at 2:12 PM Joseph Heenan via
>>> Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols <
>>> openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols at lists.openid.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Dear DCP Working Group Members,
>>>>
>>>> As discussed on the Friday working group call we would like to get WG
>>>> consensus that the OpenID4VP draft is ready to start the final
>>>> specification approval process.
>>>>
>>>> Please respond to this email within the next 7 days, by end of Sunday
>>>> 20th April, whether you believe the draft should proceed to the public
>>>> review or not.
>>>>
>>>> The OpenID4VP document to be reviewed can be found here:
>>>> https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0-26.html
>>>>
>>>> There are a couple of normative changes that we discussed during the
>>>> working group meeting on Friday to work on during working group last call:
>>>>
>>>> 1. revamp vp formats: https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/pull/500
>>>>
>>>> 2. Specifies value matching for mdocs via a reference to cbor-to-json:
>>>> https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/pull/538
>>>>
>>>> 3. Remove references to ISO 18013-7 to avoid confusion due to it using
>>>> OID4VP ID2:  https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/issues/519
>>>>
>>>> 4. Remove anoncreds for now (hoping to add it back in 1.1) due to lack
>>>> of implementation experience with DCQL etc:
>>>> https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/pull/539
>>>>
>>>> We’d also expect some editorial/non-normative changes during WGLC.
>>>>
>>>> We also discussed scheduling a meeting to talk about the sd-jwt vcld
>>>> pr: https://github.com/openid/OpenID4VP/pull/459 (a separate email
>>>> about this will follow shortly.)
>>>>
>>>> If there are other topics working group members think need to be
>>>> handled before the specification moves to final please reply to this email
>>>> with details.
>>>>
>>>> This is very much just a step on the journey, and it is likely that
>>>> comments will arrive during the 60 day review period that the working group
>>>> chooses to fix before the voting period starts.
>>>>
>>>> The details of the specification approval process can be found here:
>>>> https://openid.net/wg/resources/approving-specifications/.
>>>>
>>>> This email is about the first bullet point on this list "Obtain working
>>>> group consensus to propose foundation-wide approval of the draft
>>>> specification", which is often called Working Group Last Call (WGLC).
>>>> The following steps are to start a 60-day Foundation-wide review,
>>>> followed by the 7 day voting period (the poll itself will open 7 days
>>>> before the end of the Foundation-wide review ends).
>>>>
>>>> Kindest Regards,
>>>> Editors & Chairs
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols mailing list
>>>> Openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols at lists.openid.net
>>>>
>>>> https://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols
>>>>
>>>
>>> --
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>>>
>>> https://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-digital-credentials-protocols
>>>
>> --
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