[OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
Mike Jones
Michael.Jones at microsoft.com
Sat Feb 28 00:54:51 UTC 2015
I approve of the creation of this working group with this charter.
________________________________
From: Adam Dawes<mailto:adawes at google.com>
Sent: 2/27/2015 11:22 AM
To: John Bradley<mailto:ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>
Cc: Chuck Mortimore<mailto:cmortimore at salesforce.com>; Mike Jones<mailto:Michael.Jones at microsoft.com>; John Ehrig<mailto:jehrig at inventures.com>; Andrew Nash<mailto:andrew at confyrm.com>; openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>; Ashish Jain<mailto:ashishjain at vmware.com>; Nat Sakimura<mailto:sakimura at gmail.com>; aatoc at googlegroups.com<mailto:aatoc at googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
We had our weekly meeting today and everyone was okay with the Trust Framework addition. We also made an update to the language around privacy considerations. Here is the updated text:
1) Working Group name:
Abuse and Account Take-Over Coordination Working Group
2) Purpose
The goal of AATOC is to provide data sharing schemas, privacy recommendations and protocols to:
* Share information about important security events in order to thwart attackers from leveraging compromised accounts from one Service Provider to gain access to accounts on other Service Providers (mobile or web application developers and owners).
* Enable users and providers to coordinate in order to securely restore accounts following a compromise.
Internet accounts that use email addresses or phone numbers as the primary identifier for the account will be the initial focus.
3) Scope
The group will define:
* Security events
These are events – whether directly authentication-related or occurring at another time in the user flow – that take place on one service that could also have security implications on other Service Providers. The group will develop a taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event.
* Privacy Implications
Sharing security information amongst providers has potential privacy implications for both end users and service providers. These privacy implications must be considered against both (a) applicable regulations, policies, and the principles of user notice, choice and consent, and (b) the recognized benefits of protecting users’ accounts and data from abuse. The group will consider ways to address such potential privacy implications when defining mechanisms to handle the various security events and recommend best practices for the industry.
* Communications mechanisms
Define bindings for the use of an existing transport protocol defined elsewhere.
* Event schema
Define a schema describing relevant events and relationships to allow for dissemination between interested and authorized parties.
* Trust Frameworks
Define at least one model for the conditions under which information would be shared.
* Account recovery mechanisms
Standardized mechanism(s) to allow providers to signal that a user has regained control of an account, or allow a user to explicitly restore control of a previously compromised account, with or without direct user involvement.
Out of scope:
Determining the account quality/reputation of a user on a particular service and communicating that to others.
Definition of APIs and underlying mechanisms for connecting to, interacting with and operating centralized databases or intelligence clearinghouses when these are used to communicate security events between account providers.
4) Proposed Deliverables
The group proposes the following Non-Specification deliverables:
Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema
* A taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event and its relationships to other relevant data, events or indicators.
Security Event Privacy Guidelines
A set of recommendations on how to minimize the privacy impact on users and service providers while improving security, and how to provide appropriate privacy disclosures, labeling and access control guidelines around information in the Security Event Schema.
Trust Framework
A trust framework defining roles and responsibilities of parties sharing user security event information
The group proposes the following Specification deliverables:
Communications Mechanisms
Define bindings for the event messages to an already existing transport protocol to promote interoperability of sending event information to another Service Provider. This will allow a Service Provider to implement a single piece of infrastructure that would be able to send or receive event information to any other service provider.
Order of Deliverables
The group will work to produce the Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema before beginning work on the Communications Mechanism or Trust Framework.
5) Anticipated audience or users
* Service Providers who manage their own account systems which require an email address or phone number for registration.
* Account and email providers that understand key security events that happen to a user’s account.
* Identity as a Service (IDaaS) vendors that manage account and authentication systems for their customers.
* Users seeking to regain control of a compromised account.
6) Language
English
7) Method of work:
E-mail discussions on the working group mailing list, working group conference calls, and face-to-face meetings from time to time.
8) Basis for determining when the work is completed:
Rough consensus and running code. The work will be completed once it is apparent that maximal consensus on the draft has been achieved, consistent with the purpose and scope.
Background information
Related work:
* RFC6545 Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
* RFC6546 Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS
* RFC6684 Guidelines and Template for Defining Extensions to the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
* draft-ietf-mile-rolie Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange
* ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls
* ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information technology — Security techniques — Information security incident management
Proposers
* Adam Dawes, Google
* Mark Risher, Google
* Trent Adams, Paypal
* George Fletcher, AOL
* Andrew Nash, Confyrm
* Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
* John Bradley, Ping Identity
* Henrik Biering, Peercraft
Anticipated contributions:
“Security event reporting between Service Providers 1.0” under the OpenID Foundation’s IPR Policy<http://openid.net/intellectual-property/>.
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 10:36 PM, Adam Dawes <adawes at google.com<mailto:adawes at google.com>> wrote:
I'm resubmitting back under the name of AATOC since Linked In has already executed an IPR with that name as well as adding the Trust Framework deliverable.
AATOC Charter
1) Working Group name:
Abuse and Account Take-Over Coordination Working Group (AATOC Working Group)
2) Purpose
The goal of AATOC is to provide data sharing schemas, privacy recommendations and protocols to:
* Share information about important security events in order to thwart attackers from leveraging compromised accounts from one Service Provider to gain access to accounts on other Service Providers (mobile or web application developers and owners).
* Enable users and providers to coordinate in order to securely restore accounts following a compromise.
Internet accounts that use email addresses or phone numbers as the primary identifier for the account will be the initial focus.
3) Scope
The group will define:
* Security events
These are events – whether directly authentication-related or occurring at another time in the user flow – that take place on one service that could also have security implications on other Service Providers. The group will develop a taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event.
* Privacy Implications
Sharing security information amongst providers has potential privacy implications for both end users and service providers. These privacy implications must be balanced against the recognized benefits of protecting users’ accounts and data from abuse. The group will consider ways to optimize this balance when defining mechanisms to handle the various security events and recommend best practices for the industry.
* Communications mechanisms
Define bindings for the use of an existing transport protocol defined elsewhere.
* Event schema
Define a schema describing relevant events and relationships to allow for dissemination between interested and authorized parties.
* Trust Frameworks
Define at least one model for the conditions under which information would be shared.
* Account recovery mechanisms
Standardized mechanism(s) to allow providers to signal that a user has regained control of an account, or allow a user to explicitly restore control of a previously compromised account, with or without direct user involvement.
Out of scope:
Determining the account quality/reputation of a user on a particular service and communicating that to others.
Definition of APIs and underlying mechanisms for connecting to, interacting with and operating centralized databases or intelligence clearinghouses when these are used to communicate security events between account providers.
4) Proposed Deliverables
The group proposes the following Non-Specification deliverables:
Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema
* A taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event and its relationships to other relevant data, events or indicators.
Security Event Privacy Guidelines
A set of recommendations on how to minimize the privacy impact on users and service providers while improving security, and how to provide appropriate privacy disclosures, labeling and access control guidelines around information in the Security Event Schema.
Trust Framework
A trust framework defining roles and responsibilities of parties sharing user security event information
The group proposes the following Specification deliverables:
Communications Mechanisms
Define bindings for the event messages to an already existing transport protocol to promote interoperability of sending event information to another Service Provider. This will allow a Service Provider to implement a single piece of infrastructure that would be able to send or receive event information to any other service provider.
Order of Deliverables
The group will work to produce the Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema before beginning work on the Communications Mechanism or Trust Framework.
5) Anticipated audience or users
* Service Providers who manage their own account systems which require an email address or phone number for registration.
* Account and email providers that understand key security events that happen to a user’s account.
* Identity as a Service (IDaaS) vendors that manage account and authentication systems for their customers.
* Users seeking to regain control of a compromised account.
6) Language
English
7) Method of work:
E-mail discussions on the working group mailing list, working group conference calls, and face-to-face meetings from time to time.
8) Basis for determining when the work is completed:
Rough consensus and running code. The work will be completed once it is apparent that maximal consensus on the draft has been achieved, consistent with the purpose and scope.
Background information
Related work:
* RFC6545 Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
* RFC6546 Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS
* RFC6684 Guidelines and Template for Defining Extensions to the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
* draft-ietf-mile-rolie Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange
* ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls
* ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information technology — Security techniques — Information security incident management
Proposers
* Adam Dawes, Google
* Mark Risher, Google
* Trent Adams, Paypal
* George Fletcher, AOL
* Andrew Nash, Confyrm
* Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
* John Bradley, Ping Identity
* Henrik Biering, Peercraft
Anticipated contributions:
“Security event reporting between Service Providers 1.0” under the OpenID Foundation’s IPR Policy<http://openid.net/intellectual-property/>.
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 2:06 PM, John Bradley <ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>> wrote:
You can start joining the Friday calls now.
We need to finalize the charter before people need to worry about signing the WG IPR.
Sent from my iPhone
On Feb 26, 2015, at 4:56 PM, Chuck Mortimore <cmortimore at salesforce.com<mailto:cmortimore at salesforce.com>> wrote:
Our incident response team want's to participate. Should we just wait for the mailing list, or is there a way to get working on the agreement?
On Thu, Feb 26, 2015 at 8:30 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones at microsoft.com<mailto:Michael.Jones at microsoft.com>> wrote:
I’d hold off posting it until the working group has been created. Given that the intent is clear, I’m OK with accepting the agreement as-is, but would defer to others if they’d prefer that it be revised before being posted.
Out of curiosity, who was the agreement from?
From: specs-council [mailto:openid-specs-council-bounces at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council-bounces at lists.openid.net>] On Behalf Of John Ehrig
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2015 7:00 AM
To: Adam Dawes; Andrew Nash
Cc: John Bradley; Nat Sakimura; Ashish Jain; openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>; aatoc at googlegroups.com<mailto:aatoc at googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
Hi All,
I have already received a contribution agreement for this WG (under the “old” name, however) (see attached). Can we accept it under the old name., should I go ahead and post it to the website now, or should I wait until the WG is actually approved?
Please let me know.
Thanks!
From: specs-council [mailto:openid-specs-council-bounces at lists.openid.net] On Behalf Of Adam Dawes
Sent: Thursday, February 26, 2015 1:06 AM
To: Andrew Nash
Cc: John Bradley; openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>; Ashish Jain; Nat Sakimura; aatoc at googlegroups.com<mailto:aatoc at googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: [OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
Okay, I've revised the charter, with a new name, USESC (I couldn't fathom losing the "O" in AATOC). It doesn't have quite the ring but it's a bit more general which is useful since I think what will be produced will have uses beyond abuse and account takeovers. I've also included a deliverable on trust frameworks.
Here it is:
USESC Charter
1) Working Group name:
User Security Event Sharing and Coordination Working Group (USESC Working Group)
2) Purpose
The goal of USESC is to provide data sharing schemas, privacy recommendations and protocols to:
• Share information about important security events related to user accounts in order to thwart attackers from leveraging compromised accounts from one Service Provider to gain access to accounts on other Service Providers (mobile or web application developers and owners).
• Enable users and providers to coordinate in order to securely restore accounts following a compromise.
Internet accounts that use email addresses or phone numbers as the primary identifier for the account will be the initial focus.
3) Scope
The group will define:
• Security events
These are events – whether directly authentication-related or occurring at another time in the user flow – that take place on one service that could also have security implications on other Service Providers. The group will develop a taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event.
• Privacy Implications
Sharing security information amongst providers has potential privacy implications for both end users and service providers. These privacy implications must be balanced against the recognized benefits of protecting users’ accounts and data from abuse. The group will consider ways to optimize this balance when defining mechanisms to handle the various security events and recommend best practices for the industry.
• Communications mechanisms
Define bindings for the use of an existing transport protocol defined elsewhere.
• Event schema
Define a schema describing relevant events and relationships to allow for dissemination between interested and authorized parties.
• Trust Frameworks
Define at least one model for the conditions under which information would be shared.
• Account recovery mechanisms
Standardized mechanism(s) to allow providers to signal that a user has regained control of an account, or allow a user to explicitly restore control of a previously compromised account, with or without direct user involvement.
Out of scope:
Determining the account quality/reputation of a user on a particular service and communicating that to others.
Definition of APIs and underlying mechanisms for connecting to, interacting with and operating centralized databases or intelligence clearinghouses when these are used to communicate security events between account providers.
4) Proposed Deliverables
The group proposes the following Non-Specification deliverables:
Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema
• A taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event and its relationships to other relevant data, events or indicators.
Security Event Privacy Guidelines
A set of recommendations on how to minimize the privacy impact on users and service providers while improving security, and how to provide appropriate privacy disclosures, labeling and access control guidelines around information in the Security Event Schema.
The group proposes the following Specification deliverables:
Communications Mechanisms
Define bindings for the event messages to an already existing transport protocol to promote interoperability of sending event information to another Service Provider. This will allow a Service Provider to implement a single piece of infrastructure that would be able to send or receive event information to any other service provider.
Order of Deliverables
The group will work to produce the Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema before beginning work on the Communications Mechanism.
5) Anticipated audience or users
• Service Providers who manage their own account systems which require an email address or phone number for registration.
• Account and email providers that understand key security events that happen to a user’s account.
• Identity as a Service (IDaaS) vendors that manage account and authentication systems for their customers.
• Users seeking to regain control of a compromised account.
6) Language
English
7) Method of work:
E-mail discussions on the working group mailing list, working group conference calls, and face-to-face meetings from time to time.
8) Basis for determining when the work is completed:
Rough consensus and running code. The work will be completed once it is apparent that maximal consensus on the draft has been achieved, consistent with the purpose and scope.
Background information
Related work:
• RFC6545 Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
• RFC6546 Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS
• RFC6684 Guidelines and Template for Defining Extensions to the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
• draft-ietf-mile-rolie Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange
• ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls
• ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information technology — Security techniques — Information security incident management
Proposers
• Adam Dawes, Google
• Mark Risher, Google
• Trent Adams, Paypal
• George Fletcher, AOL
• Andrew Nash, Confyrm
• Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
• John Bradley, Ping Identity
• Henrik Biering, Peercraft
Anticipated contributions:
“Security event reporting between Service Providers 1.0” under the OpenID Foundation’s IPR Policy<http://openid.net/intellectual-property/>.
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 5:37 PM, Andrew Nash <andrew at confyrm.com<mailto:andrew at confyrm.com>> wrote:
Trent,
we (Confyrm) have started work on a number of aspects of a trust framework in conjunction with Tom Smedinghoff as part of the work we did with the Uk Govt and the NSTIC pilot - still early but hopefully will bootstrap some of the work here
--Andrew
On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 11:00 PM, 'Adam Dawes' via Abuse and ATO Coordination <aatoc at googlegroups.com<mailto:aatoc at googlegroups.com>> wrote:
+aatoc-list
For name, I agree with Nat's suggestion of 'Abuse and Account Take Over Coordination Work Group (AATOC Work Group)'. This just prevents a name change for everyone as well as the mailing list mechanics.
@mike, I think your suggestions about defining trust frameworks also make sense. Do you have any good examples of where this has been done? Will need to discuss this with the rest of the group but in our discussion of transport, there have been some implicit trust framework concepts at play. In the end, I think there may be different models about with whom info is shared. This will depend on the specific data we define, the quality of data that service providers can share, and the relevant privacy policies of those providers.
thanks,
AD
On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 7:13 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com<mailto:sakimura at gmail.com>> wrote:
While we are in the title, in view of the recent executive order http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari, we might suggest including the name "Information Sharing and analysis", e.g., AATISAC.
2015?2?25?(?)?11:59 John Bradley <ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com<mailto:ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>>:
That is a different WG outside of the OIDF;)
On Feb 24, 2015, at 9:40 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com<mailto:sakimura at gmail.com>> wrote:
Simplicity wins, but does not it sound like the WG is creating a protocol to take over accounts ;-) ?
2015-02-25 11:25 GMT+09:00 Ashish Jain <ashishjain at vmware.com<mailto:ashishjain at vmware.com>>:
I’m not objecting…merely suggesting that referring it as Account Takeover WG is simpler
From: Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com<mailto:sakimura at gmail.com>>
Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 at 6:09 PM
To: Ashish Jain <ashishjain at vmware.com<mailto:ashishjain at vmware.com>>
Cc: Adam Dawes <adawes at google.com<mailto:adawes at google.com>>, "openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>" <openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>>
Subject: Re: [OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
I am fine with ATO WG as well. My objection was that the name had the Group in it, which is not a defined word in OpenID Process, so the WG name would become AATOC Group WG, which is repeating "Group" and awkward. It is just an editorial stuff.
Are you objecting to the first A and the last C of AATOC?
2015-02-25 10:59 GMT+09:00 Ashish Jain <ashishjain at vmware.com<mailto:ashishjain at vmware.com>>:
I understand the need to be precise but ATO WG can probably convey the same message.
From: Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com<mailto:sakimura at gmail.com>>
Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 at 4:56 PM
To: Adam Dawes <adawes at google.com<mailto:adawes at google.com>>
Cc: "openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>" <openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>>
Subject: Re: [OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
Dear Specs Council members,
It looks generally fine, with one friendly amendment:
Change the title of the working group from:
Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Group
to:
Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Working Group
as "Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Group Working Group" is a bit awkward.
I am fine with putting it as just "Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination" as well, since there is a precedence for it.
Could any specs council member respond early in this thread if you have any objection or friendly amendment. We have been a bit slack lately that we have been relying on two weeks limit to execute a charter, but we should be able to act more quickly.
Cheers,
Nat
2015-02-24 19:02 GMT+09:00 Adam Dawes <adawes at google.com<mailto:adawes at google.com>>:
I would like to form a new work group, AATOC. Here is our proposed charter:
AATOC Charter
1) Working Group name:
Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Group (AATOC)
2) Purpose
The goal of AATOC is to provide data sharing schemas, privacy recommendations and protocols to:
• Share information about important security events in order to thwart attackers from leveraging compromised accounts from one Service Provider to gain access to accounts on other Service Providers (mobile or web application developers and owners).
• Enable users and providers to coordinate in order to securely restore accounts following a compromise.
Internet accounts that use email addresses or phone numbers as the primary identifier for the account will be the initial focus.
2) Scope
The group will define:
• Security events
These are events – whether directly authentication-related or occurring at another time in the user flow – that take place on one service that could also have security implications on other Service Providers. The group will develop a taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event.
• Privacy Implications
Sharing security information amongst providers has potential privacy implications for both end users and service providers. These privacy implications must be balanced against the recognized benefits of protecting users’ accounts and data from abuse. The group will consider ways to optimize this balance when defining mechanisms to handle the various security events and recommend best practices for the industry.
• Communications mechanisms
Define bindings for the use of an existing transport protocol defined elsewhere.
• Event schema
Define a schema describing relevant events and relationships to allow for dissemination between interested and authorized parties.
• Account recovery mechanisms
Standardized mechanism(s) to allow providers to signal that a user has regained control of an account, or allow a user to explicitly restore control of a previously compromised account, with or without direct user involvement.
Out of scope:
Determining the account quality/reputation of a user on a particular service and communicating that to others.
Definition of APIs and underlying mechanisms for connecting to, interacting with and operating centralized databases or intelligence clearinghouses when these are used to communicate security events between account providers.
4) Proposed Deliverables
The group proposes the following Non-Specification deliverables:
Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema
• A taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to express relevant information about a security event and its relationships to other relevant data, events or indicators.
Security Event Privacy Guidelines
A set of recommendations on how to minimize the privacy impact on users and service providers while improving security, and how to provide appropriate privacy disclosures, labeling and access control guidelines around information in the Security Event Schema.
The group proposes the following Specification deliverables:
Communications Mechanisms
Define bindings for the event messages to an already existing transport protocol to promote interoperability of sending event information to another Service Provider. This will allow a Service Provider to implement a single piece of infrastructure that would be able to send or receive event information to any other service provider.
Order of Deliverables
The group will work to produce the Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema before beginning work on the Communications Mechanism.
5) Anticipated audience or users
• Service Providers who manage their own account systems which require an email address or phone number for registration.
• Account and email providers that understand key security events that happen to a user’s account.
• Identity as a Service (IDaaS) vendors that manage account and authentication systems for their customers.
• Users seeking to regain control of a compromised account.
6) Language
English
7) Method of work:
E-mail discussions on the working group mailing list, working group conference calls, and face-to-face meetings from time to time.
8) Basis for determining when the work is completed:
Rough consensus and running code. The work will be completed once it is apparent that maximal consensus on the draft has been achieved, consistent with the purpose and scope.
Background information
Related work:
• RFC6545 Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
• RFC6546 Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS
• RFC6684 Guidelines and Template for Defining Extensions to the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
• draft-ietf-mile-rolie Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange
• ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information security controls
• ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information technology — Security techniques — Information security incident management
Proposers
• Adam Dawes, Google
• Mark Risher, Google
• Trent Adams, Paypal
• George Fletcher, AOL
• Andrew Nash, Confyrm
• Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
• John Bradley, Ping Identity
• Henrik Biering, Peercraft
Anticipated contributions:
“Security event reporting between Service Providers 1.0” under the OpenID Foundation’s IPR Policy<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__openid.net_intellectual-2Dproperty_&d=AwMFaQ&c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs&r=PDGu4NI-duocVzLKrMLVZV9ccYh2Q-1cXto7c2DRReM&m=his8oMG2sVamzBa3dQLPovSTmI9fUVGF3mbIZ4ZzISQ&s=yV7iQ-h1QNIAyTmfXm6S6vIszebI2q_snUSkFyjxlkg&e=>.
--
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__nat.sakimura.org_&d=AwMFaQ&c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs&r=PDGu4NI-duocVzLKrMLVZV9ccYh2Q-1cXto7c2DRReM&m=his8oMG2sVamzBa3dQLPovSTmI9fUVGF3mbIZ4ZzISQ&s=jmKQL3OD_c7eJXduzdJt5OJefY8ZjNiYCoAm8g-7oOA&e=>
@_nat_en
--
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/<https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__nat.sakimura.org_&d=AwMFaQ&c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs&r=PDGu4NI-duocVzLKrMLVZV9ccYh2Q-1cXto7c2DRReM&m=dibzrL00q20lgLcDv94EYh8Ums_bAaYivHuqDQgNfSI&s=jq4oX-tF55oVVtUOW6sW0RsihIhuUzSlJVyRWCVyAhQ&e=>
@_nat_en
--
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en
--
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