[OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
Adam Dawes
adawes at google.com
Wed Feb 25 07:00:40 UTC 2015
+aatoc-list
For name, I agree with Nat's suggestion of 'Abuse and Account Take Over
Coordination Work Group (AATOC Work Group)'. This just prevents a name
change for everyone as well as the mailing list mechanics.
@mike, I think your suggestions about defining trust frameworks also make
sense. Do you have any good examples of where this has been done? Will need
to discuss this with the rest of the group but in our discussion of
transport, there have been some implicit trust framework concepts at play.
In the end, I think there may be different models about with whom info is
shared. This will depend on the specific data we define, the quality of
data that service providers can share, and the relevant privacy policies of
those providers.
thanks,
AD
On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 7:13 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com> wrote:
> While we are in the title, in view of the recent executive order
> http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/executive-order-promoting-private-sector-cybersecurity-information-shari,
> we might suggest including the name "Information Sharing and analysis",
> e.g., AATISAC.
> 2015年2月25日(水)、11:59 John Bradley <ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>:
>
> That is a different WG outside of the OIDF;)
>>
>> On Feb 24, 2015, at 9:40 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Simplicity wins, but does not it sound like the WG is creating a protocol
>> to take over accounts ;-) ?
>>
>> 2015-02-25 11:25 GMT+09:00 Ashish Jain <ashishjain at vmware.com>:
>>
>>> I’m not objecting…merely suggesting that referring it as Account
>>> Takeover WG is simpler
>>>
>>> From: Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com>
>>> Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 at 6:09 PM
>>> To: Ashish Jain <ashishjain at vmware.com>
>>> Cc: Adam Dawes <adawes at google.com>, "
>>> openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net" <
>>> openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>
>>>
>>> Subject: Re: [OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
>>>
>>> I am fine with ATO WG as well. My objection was that the name had the
>>> Group in it, which is not a defined word in OpenID Process, so the WG name
>>> would become AATOC Group WG, which is repeating "Group" and awkward. It is
>>> just an editorial stuff.
>>>
>>> Are you objecting to the first A and the last C of AATOC?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2015-02-25 10:59 GMT+09:00 Ashish Jain <ashishjain at vmware.com>:
>>>
>>>> I understand the need to be precise but ATO WG can probably convey
>>>> the same message.
>>>>
>>>> From: Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com>
>>>> Date: Tuesday, February 24, 2015 at 4:56 PM
>>>> To: Adam Dawes <adawes at google.com>
>>>> Cc: "openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net" <
>>>> openid-specs-council at lists.openid.net>
>>>> Subject: Re: [OIDFSC] AATOC Working Group Charter
>>>>
>>>> Dear Specs Council members,
>>>>
>>>> It looks generally fine, with one friendly amendment:
>>>>
>>>> Change the title of the working group from:
>>>> Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Group
>>>>
>>>> to:
>>>> Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Working Group
>>>>
>>>> as "Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Group Working Group" is a
>>>> bit awkward.
>>>> I am fine with putting it as just "Abuse and Account Takeover
>>>> Coordination" as well, since there is a precedence for it.
>>>>
>>>> Could any specs council member respond early in this thread if you have
>>>> any objection or friendly amendment. We have been a bit slack lately that
>>>> we have been relying on two weeks limit to execute a charter, but we should
>>>> be able to act more quickly.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>> Nat
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 2015-02-24 19:02 GMT+09:00 Adam Dawes <adawes at google.com>:
>>>>
>>>>> I would like to form a new work group, AATOC. Here is our proposed
>>>>> charter:
>>>>>
>>>>> AATOC Charter
>>>>> 1) Working Group name:
>>>>>
>>>>> Abuse and Account Takeover Coordination Group (AATOC)
>>>>>
>>>>> 2) Purpose
>>>>> The goal of AATOC is to provide data sharing schemas, privacy
>>>>> recommendations and protocols to:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Share information about important security events in order to
>>>>> thwart attackers from leveraging compromised accounts from one Service
>>>>> Provider to gain access to accounts on other Service Providers (mobile or
>>>>> web application developers and owners).
>>>>> - Enable users and providers to coordinate in order to securely
>>>>> restore accounts following a compromise.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Internet accounts that use email addresses or phone numbers as the
>>>>> primary identifier for the account will be the initial focus.
>>>>> 2) Scope
>>>>> The group will define:
>>>>>
>>>>> - Security events
>>>>> These are events – whether directly authentication-related or
>>>>> occurring at another time in the user flow – that take place on one service
>>>>> that could also have security implications on other Service Providers. The
>>>>> group will develop a taxonomy of security events and a common set of
>>>>> semantics to express relevant information about a security event.
>>>>>
>>>>> - Privacy Implications
>>>>> Sharing security information amongst providers has potential
>>>>> privacy implications for both end users and service providers. These
>>>>> privacy implications must be balanced against the recognized benefits of
>>>>> protecting users’ accounts and data from abuse. The group will consider
>>>>> ways to optimize this balance when defining mechanisms to handle the
>>>>> various security events and recommend best practices for the industry.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Communications mechanisms
>>>>> Define bindings for the use of an existing transport protocol
>>>>> defined elsewhere.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Event schema
>>>>> Define a schema describing relevant events and relationships to
>>>>> allow for dissemination between interested and authorized parties.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> - Account recovery mechanisms
>>>>>
>>>>> Standardized mechanism(s) to allow providers to signal that a user has
>>>>> regained control of an account, or allow a user to explicitly restore
>>>>> control of a previously compromised account, with or without direct user
>>>>> involvement.
>>>>> Out of scope:
>>>>> Determining the account quality/reputation of a user on a particular
>>>>> service and communicating that to others.
>>>>>
>>>>> Definition of APIs and underlying mechanisms for connecting to,
>>>>> interacting with and operating centralized databases or intelligence
>>>>> clearinghouses when these are used to communicate security events between
>>>>> account providers.
>>>>>
>>>>> 4) Proposed Deliverables
>>>>> The group proposes the following Non-Specification deliverables:
>>>>>
>>>>> Security Event and Account Lifecycle Schema
>>>>>
>>>>> - A taxonomy of security events and a common set of semantics to
>>>>> express relevant information about a security event and its relationships
>>>>> to other relevant data, events or indicators.
>>>>>
>>>>> Security Event Privacy Guidelines
>>>>> A set of recommendations on how to minimize the privacy impact on
>>>>> users and service providers while improving security, and how to provide
>>>>> appropriate privacy disclosures, labeling and access control guidelines
>>>>> around information in the Security Event Schema.
>>>>>
>>>>> The group proposes the following Specification deliverables:
>>>>>
>>>>> Communications Mechanisms
>>>>> Define bindings for the event messages to an already existing
>>>>> transport protocol to promote interoperability of sending event information
>>>>> to another Service Provider. This will allow a Service Provider to
>>>>> implement a single piece of infrastructure that would be able to send or
>>>>> receive event information to any other service provider.
>>>>>
>>>>> Order of Deliverables
>>>>> The group will work to produce the Security Event and Account
>>>>> Lifecycle Schema before beginning work on the Communications Mechanism.
>>>>>
>>>>> 5) Anticipated audience or users
>>>>>
>>>>> - Service Providers who manage their own account systems which
>>>>> require an email address or phone number for registration.
>>>>> - Account and email providers that understand key security events
>>>>> that happen to a user’s account.
>>>>> - Identity as a Service (IDaaS) vendors that manage account and
>>>>> authentication systems for their customers.
>>>>> - Users seeking to regain control of a compromised account.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 6) Language
>>>>> English
>>>>>
>>>>> 7) Method of work:
>>>>>
>>>>> E-mail discussions on the working group mailing list, working group
>>>>> conference calls, and face-to-face meetings from time to time.
>>>>>
>>>>> 8) Basis for determining when the work is completed:
>>>>>
>>>>> Rough consensus and running code. The work will be completed once it
>>>>> is apparent that maximal consensus on the draft has been achieved,
>>>>> consistent with the purpose and scope.
>>>>>
>>>>> Background information
>>>>> Related work:
>>>>>
>>>>> - RFC6545 Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
>>>>> - RFC6546 Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)
>>>>> Messages over HTTP/TLS
>>>>> - RFC6684 Guidelines and Template for Defining Extensions to the
>>>>> Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF)
>>>>> - draft-ietf-mile-rolie Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator
>>>>> Exchange
>>>>> - ISO/IEC 27002:2013 Information technology — Security techniques
>>>>> — Code of practice for information security controls
>>>>> - ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information technology — Security techniques
>>>>> — Information security incident management
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Proposers
>>>>>
>>>>> - Adam Dawes, Google
>>>>> - Mark Risher, Google
>>>>> - Trent Adams, Paypal
>>>>> - George Fletcher, AOL
>>>>> - Andrew Nash, Confyrm
>>>>> - Nat Sakimura, Nomura Research Institute
>>>>> - John Bradley, Ping Identity
>>>>> -
>>>>>
>>>>> Henrik Biering, Peercraft
>>>>>
>>>>> Anticipated contributions:
>>>>> “Security event reporting between Service Providers 1.0” under the OpenID
>>>>> Foundation’s IPR Policy
>>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__openid.net_intellectual-2Dproperty_&d=AwMFaQ&c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs&r=PDGu4NI-duocVzLKrMLVZV9ccYh2Q-1cXto7c2DRReM&m=his8oMG2sVamzBa3dQLPovSTmI9fUVGF3mbIZ4ZzISQ&s=yV7iQ-h1QNIAyTmfXm6S6vIszebI2q_snUSkFyjxlkg&e=>
>>>>> .
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__nat.sakimura.org_&d=AwMFaQ&c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs&r=PDGu4NI-duocVzLKrMLVZV9ccYh2Q-1cXto7c2DRReM&m=his8oMG2sVamzBa3dQLPovSTmI9fUVGF3mbIZ4ZzISQ&s=jmKQL3OD_c7eJXduzdJt5OJefY8ZjNiYCoAm8g-7oOA&e=>
>>>> @_nat_en
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__nat.sakimura.org_&d=AwMFaQ&c=Sqcl0Ez6M0X8aeM67LKIiDJAXVeAw-YihVMNtXt-uEs&r=PDGu4NI-duocVzLKrMLVZV9ccYh2Q-1cXto7c2DRReM&m=dibzrL00q20lgLcDv94EYh8Ums_bAaYivHuqDQgNfSI&s=jq4oX-tF55oVVtUOW6sW0RsihIhuUzSlJVyRWCVyAhQ&e=>
>>> @_nat_en
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>> @_nat_en
>>
>>
>>
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