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Hi all,<br>
<br>
see replies inline.<br>
<br>
regards,<br>
Torsten.<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Am 21.10.2013 18:23, schrieb George
Fletcher:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Comments in line...<br>
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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 10/21/13 12:28 AM, Mike Jones
wrote:<br>
</div>
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<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Replies are
inline. Some of these are questions to the working group,
so </span><span style="color:red">everyone, please read
them</span><span style="color:#1F497D">.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">
-- Mike<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #B5C4DF
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext">From:</span></b><span
style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma","sans-serif";color:windowtext">
Torsten Lodderstedt [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net">mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Friday, October 18, 2013 1:16 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mike Jones<br>
<b>Cc:</b> <a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net">openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net</a>;
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:board@openid.net">board@openid.net</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Re: [Openid-specs-ab] First Release
Candidates for final OpenID Connect specifications<o:p></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in">Hi all,<br>
<br>
@Mike: first of all let me thank you for taking the burden
and rework the whole document structure. I think the new
structure is a major leap forward for OpenID Connect.<br>
<br>
I focused my review on the new core specification. Please
find my comments below. <br>
<br>
I won't attend IIW but will attend IETF-88. So, if needed,
we can talk through my comments there.<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
Torsten.<br>
<br>
1. Introduction<br>
<br>
I would suggest to a reference to RFC 6749 in the first
sentence. It probably also makes sense to explicitly point
out that the reader is expected to be familiar with RFC 6749
and RFC 6750 as well as other IETF I-Ds (notably JOSE, JWT
and JWT Assertion Profile).<br>
<br>
1.3. Overview<br>
The flow description is a good starting point for readers. I
would suggest to add the following information in this
section:<br>
<br>
- OpenID Connect authentication is basically an extension to
the standard OAuth authorization process. This extension is
defined for most OAuth grant types.<br>
- Clients wishing to acquire identity information indicate
this by sending the scope value "openid" as part of the
authorization request parameters. (There are much more
parameters used to control the process but this is the "main
switch".)<br>
- Such a client is also called relying party (RP). An
authorization server also supporting OpenID Connect is
called OpenID Provider (OP). <br>
<br>
Adding this information will help the reader to understand
the way connect utilizes/integrates into OAuth. <br>
<br>
I would also suggest to move the definition (syntax and
contents) of the ID Token here and make it section 1.4
because this is THE core concepts used throughout the
specification. It's introduction in section 2.1.3.6 is to
late (in my opinion) because it is cited roughly 20 times in
previous sections.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">What do
people think of defining the ID Token earlier, and in a
higher-level section? I think Torsten is probably right
about this.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I had similar thoughts (I'm only through section 2.3 so far) as
concepts like 'audience' are mentioned in text before the ID Token
is defined. This would be confusing for someone who isn't familiar
with the whole overall spec.<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2. Authentication<br>
"The Authorization Code Flow is suitable for Clients that
can securely maintain a Client Secret between themselves and
the Authorization Server ..." - this is confusing since
public clients can use the code as well. The key benefits of
this grant type in my opinion are:<br>
- AS _can_ authenticate clients<br>
- AS _can_ return refresh tokens<br>
- simplest way for web application backends to acquire
tokens<br>
That's why is best suited for web applications and native
apps. <br>
<br>
Proposal:<br>
"The Authorization Code Flow is appropriate for web
applications and native apps as it allows to authenticate
clients and obtain refresh tokens whereas the implicit flow
does not support these features."<br>
Or just remove the assessment of OAuth grant types and leave
it to the implenentors to carry out their assessment.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Torsten, I’m
curious what your objection to the statement “</span>The
Authorization Code Flow is suitable for Clients that can
securely maintain a Client Secret between themselves and the
Authorization Server ...<span style="color:#1F497D">” is. I
say that, because unless the client can keep the
client_secret a secret, client impersonation is possible.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I know that we are using the code flow for native clients (which
can't really protect the secret) specifically because of the
refresh_token capability. In the mobile environment we don't want
users to have to continually authorize the app and I don't want to
enable long lived access_tokens. Is client impersonation possible
in this case? Absolutely, so we manage access to scopes
accordingly. This native app case is also one of the drivers of
the 'client instance' registration flow so that impersonation is
on a per client basis and not a client class.<br>
<br>
If we identify the client impersonation case in the security
considerations, then maybe we could just point to it here. I do
like the inclusion of native apps in the set of clients where the
code flow makes sense.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Do you see security considerations beyound RFC 6749 and RFC 6819? I
would like to omit further duplication of existing text. <br>
<br>
<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.1. Authentication using the Authorization Code Flow<br>
<br>
OLD: "This provides the benefit of not exposing the Access
Token to the Resource Owner ..."<br>
<br>
The same indeed holds for the ID Token, which is more
important from a security perspective.<br>
<br>
NEW: "This provides the benefit of not exposing the Access
Token and the ID Token to the Resource Owner ..." <br>
NEW (alternative): "This provides the benefit of not
exposing any Token to the Resource Owner ..." <br>
<br>
2.1.1. Authorization Code Flow Steps<br>
<br>
OLD: "8. Client validates the tokens and retrieves the
End-User's subject identifier."<br>
<br>
I assume the client is supposed to validate the ID token,
only?<br>
<br>
NEW: "8. Client validates the ID token and retrieves the
End-User's subject identifier." <br>
<br>
2.1.2.1. Authorization Request<br>
<br>
"When the Client wishes to access a Protected Resource and
the End-User Authorization has not yet been obtained, the
Client prepares an Authorization Request to the
Authorization Endpoint" - Why is this relevent in this
context? I suggest to remove this sentence.<br>
<br>
"An Authorization Request is a message sent from an RP to
the OP's Authorization Endpoint. It is an extended OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] Authorization Request. Section 4.1.1 and 4.2.1 of
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] define the OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Request parameters." - Why Authorization Request? Shouldn't
this be called an "Authentication Request"?<br>
<br>
"Communication with the Authorization Endpoint MUST utilize
TLS. See Section 15.17 for more information on using TLS.<br>
Authorization Servers MUST support the use of the HTTP GET
and POST methods defined in RFC 2616 [RFC2616] at the
Authorization Endpoint.Clients MAY use the HTTP GET or POST
methods to send the Authorization Request to the
Authorization Server. If using the HTTP GET method, the
request parameters are serialized using URI Query String
Serialization, perSection 12.1. If using the HTTP POST
method, the request parameters are serialized using Form
Serialization, per Section 12.2." <br>
<br>
Seems to be standard OAuth stuff, I suggest to remove it. <span
style="color:#1F497D"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Yes, some of
the spec repeats standard OAuth stuff. Particularly for
security related information, such as the requirement to
use TLS, etc., it was thought to be better to repeat it.
Repeating the HTTP POST stuff, etc. is just a convenience
to the reader. Obviously if we say something that
conflicts with OAuth, that’s a problem…</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I'm ok with leaving the text in the spec. Having to constantly
switch specs to try and understand something is problematic for
developers. The normative text is still OAuth2, but having the
text in the doc is helpful (at least for me).<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
just a general statement: redundencies may serve the reader but may
lead to inconsistencies.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in">- redirect_uri
Parameter <br>
<br>
"This URI MUST exactly match one of the redirect_uris
registered for the Client" - Why is the redirect_uri
validation more restrictive than <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2.2">http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2.2</a>?<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">The
redirect_uri validation is more restrictive than</span> <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2.2">http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2.2</a>
<span style="color:#1F497D">to make it simpler and thereby
increase the chance of it being done correctly. (Doing
this wrong has been the biggest source of OAuth security
problems that I’m aware of.)</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I understand the security implications of not doing an exact
match... my only real concern here is that our implementation will
not be compliant because I don't know that we will stop allowing
some form of regex matches in order to ease the development
environments. When things get to production we tend to move to
exact matches, but not always.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I share George's concerns. Our OpenID implementation IS A OAuth AS
complying to the requirements given in RFC 6749. I see two ways to
comply to the more restrictive Connect requirements: <br>
- restrict the URL matching for all clients (OIDC and pure OAuth)<br>
- implement different behavior depending on the actual request
parameters (scope value "openid")<br>
<br>
None of these options look appealing to me. <br>
<br>
BTW: Exact matching restricts the aiblity of the client to manage
its state. Generally, I think URL matching is a security measure
primarily relevant for public clients. For confidential client,
client impersonation is prevented by authentication. <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
"When using this flow, the redirection URI MAY use the http
scheme, provided that the Client Type is confidential, as
defined in Section 2.1 of OAuth 2.0; otherwise, it MUST use
the https scheme" - This, surprisingly enough, is relaxed in
comparison to <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.5">http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.5</a>.<br>
<br>
RFC 6749 states: "Authorization codes operate as plaintext
bearer credentials, used to verify that the resource owner
who granted authorization at the authorization server is the
same resource owner returning to the client to complete the
process. Therefore, if the client relies on the
authorization code for its own resource owner
authentication, the client redirection endpoint MUST require
the use of TLS."<br>
<br>
Why is Connect, in this particular case, less restrictive
than OAuth?<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">John, can you
speak to why we’re allowing http redirect_uri values when
apparently OAuth doesn’t?</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I had some questions on this point as well. I believe the thinking
is that since the client is protecting the secret and the code is
sent to the /token endpoint with client authentication, even if
someone was able to hijack the code value they couldn't exchange
it for the access (and possibly refresh) tokens. If we are trying
to make things simpler, then just moving all of it to TLS makes
sense. To me, the only exception is localhost. <br>
</blockquote>
<br>
The attacker could inject the authorization code into the same
application as used by the victim in order to impersonate her/him. <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
- nonce Parameter <br>
<br>
"One method to achieve this is to store a random value as a
signed session cookie, and pass the value in the nonce
parameter. In that case, the nonce in the returned ID Token
can be compared to the signed session cookie to detect ID
Token replay by third parties." - I would recommend to move
this text into an "implementation note" section<br>
<br>
id_token_hint Parameter - "Previously issued ID Token passed
to the Authorization Server .." issued by the AS being
requested? or any AS? I assume by the same AS<br>
NEW: "ID Token previously issued by this Authorization
server to the client ..."<br>
<br>
"... it SHOULD return a login_required error." - Does this
mean the OP shall try to authenticate the user account
identified by the ID token and refuses authentication
otherwise? This sounds more like a requirement than a hint.
<br>
<br>
"When possible, an id_token_hint SHOULD be present when
prompt=none is used and an invalid_request error MAY be
returned if it is not; however, the server SHOULD respond
successfully when possible, even if it is not present." -
Why is the login hint recommended for this prompt value?
checkid_immediate in OpenID 2.0 worked very well w/o a hint?<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Can someone
please answer this one?</span><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.1.2.2. Authorization Request Validation<br>
<br>
"3. If the sub (subject) Claim is requested with a specific
value for the ID Token ...." The meaning of the text is
unclear to me. How is a specific sub value requested? by the
login_hint or the id_token_hint?<br>
<br>
"As specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], Authorization Servers
SHOULD ignore unrecognized request parameters.<br>
<br>
If the Authorization Server encounters any error, it MUST
return an error response."<br>
<br>
Standard OAuth stuff, I recommend to remove it.<br>
<br>
2.1.2.4. Authorization Server Obtains End-User
Consent/Authorization<br>
<br>
"When permitted by the request parameters used, this MAY be
done through an interactive dialogue with the End-User ..."
- What if the parameters do not allow for an interactive
dialogue, e.g. prompt==none? I assume an error response with
return code consent_required or interaction_required is
appropriate. I would prefer interaction_required because to
RP does not need to know more. <br>
<br>
2.1.2.5. Authorization Successful Response<br>
<br>
This is a vanilla OAuth 2.0 response, right? I would suggest
to just say so.<br>
<br>
BTW: This piece of text is not applicable to the code grant
type: "This specification only describes OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Token Usage [RFC6750]. The OAuth 2.0 response parameter
token_type MUST be set to Bearer unless another Token Type
has been negotiated with the Client." <span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">I don’t
understand this comment, since a token_type value is
returned from the Token Endpoint.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
That's correct. But 2.1.2.5 talks about the response from the
authorization endpoint. As the example in the same section
illustrates, it just returns the code along with a state parameter.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.1.3. Tokens Endpoint<br>
<br>
"Clients MUST use the HTTP POST method to make requests to
the Token Endpoint. Request parameters are added using Form
Serialization, per Section 12.2. The Token Endpoint MUST
support the use of the HTTP POST method defined in RFC 2616
[RFC2616] at the Token Endpoint.<br>
<br>
Communication with the Token Endpoint MUST utilize TLS. See
Section 15.17 for more information on using TLS.<br>
<br>
All Token Endpoint responses that contain tokens, secrets,
or other sensitive information MUST include the following
HTTP response header fields and values: ..."<br>
<br>
This seems to be standard OAuth stuff. I recommend to remove
it.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.1.3.1. Token Request<br>
<br>
"To obtain an ID Token, Access Token, or Refresh Token, the
Client MUST authenticate to the Token Endpoint using the
authentication method registered for its client_id, as
described in Section 8 ..." - At this point the reader is
not familiar with the different authentication methods
supported by an OpenID OP. I therefore suggest to move the
client authentication section before the authentication
section (e.g. make it a section 1.5).<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">What do
people think of this suggestion? I understand that it
makes logical sense, but if you read Section 8, it
introduces a bunch of stuff that would interrupt the flow
of just understanding how the Code Flow works.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I agree. I don't think we should put all the different client
authentication options early in the spec. It might make sense to
introduce the concept so that readers at least understand what
'client authentication' means. This might work for the ID Token
concept as well.<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.1.3.2. Token Request Validation<br>
<br>
The whole sections seems to re-phrase standard OAuth stuff.
I recommend to remove it. <br>
<br>
2.1.3.3. Token Successful Response<br>
<br>
"Servers SHOULD support OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
[RFC6750] for interoperability" - I think this topic is
better covered in the MTI section.<br>
<br>
"the following parameters MUST be included in the response
if the grant_type value is authorization_code and the
Authorization Request scope parameter contains openid:" -
Seems to be redundant since this whole section is about
exactly this use case. I recommend to remove this text. Same
holds true for the following text<br>
<br>
"An id_token MUST be returned when the grant_type value is
authorization_code and MAY be returned when other grant
types are used."<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">The sentence
above is definitely not “standard OAuth stuff”, as it adds
the requirement to return the ID Token.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I do think it is a little confusing regarding when id tokens are
returned and when not. For example, a response_type of 'code
token' will still return an id token, but only when the code is
exchanged for the requested tokens. This is because an OpenID
Connect authentication request MUST contain 'openid' is the list
of scopes requested. If you don't remember this it can get
confusing.<br>
<br>
I do agree that the scope of 'openid' and returned 'id_token' are
NOT standard OAuth and need to be called out.<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.1.3.6. ID Token<br>
<br>
That's the key elements of OpenID Connect! As already
stated, I recommend to move the (full) description of its
content and syntax to section 1 (section 1.4). I think this
will facilitate readability. The validation rules should
stay in the sections of the respective grant types.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">I was
thinking of making it 2.1.2 – putting it before the
Authorization Endpoint stuff. What do others think? It’s
not really introduction or overview stuff – it’s part of
the meat of the specification.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
From an overview perspective, I do think that having something in
section 1 makes sense. It's the key feature of OpenID Connect. I
don't think it needs to have all the syntax, but the core concepts
would be helpful. Something to give context to the reader as they
read the rest of the spec.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
2.1. is good <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.1.3.7. ID Token Validation<br>
<br>
"1. If the Client has provided an
id_token_encrypted_response_alg parameter during
Registration, decrypt the ID Token using the key pair
specified during Registration." - text depends on dynamic
registration and should therefore be generalized. <br>
NEW: "1. If the ID Token is encrypted, the Client first
decrypts it using the key agreed upon with the authorization
server."<br>
<br>
"5. If the id_token is received via direct communication
between the Client and the Token Endpoint, the TLS server
validation MAY be used to validate the issuer in place of
checking the token signature. The Client MUST validate the
signature of all other ID Tokens according to JWS [JWS]
using the algorithm specified in the alg parameter of the
JWT header." - text seems rather generic. As this is about
the code flow, the ID token is received via direct
communication, so the text can be simplified.<br>
NEW: "5. Since the ID token is received via direct
communication, the TLS server validation MUST be used to
validate the issuer in place of checking the token
signature."<br>
<br>
Steps 6-8 can be removed.<br>
<br>
2.1.3.8. Access Token Validation<br>
<br>
I would recommend to add the text from section 2.2.2.9.
because this is the first point where the concept is used.<br>
<br>
a_hash validation is mentioned. What's about c_hash
validation?<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">As I
understand it, the c_hash is only needed for hybrid flows,
in which the ID Token is returned in a fragment. That’s
why it’s introduced there. Do others agree with this
decision?</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
If we separate out the description and syntax of the id_token,
then all capabilities should be defined. Otherwise, I'm ok with
introducing the required elements when they are needed. Now if
most AS are going to include c_hash even when it's not required
(as in the code flow) then it would make sense to add it as
OPTIONAL in the code flow description.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
But doesn't the same hold true for the at_hash. I would assume it is
only used in the fragment-based flows (e.g. token id_token). If
thats true and there is no need to check the AT at all, I would
therefore suggest to remove 2.1.3.8..<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.2. Authentication using the Implicit Flow<br>
<br>
"...which may expose them to the Resource Owner and other
applications that have access to the Resource Owner's
User-Agent." - I recommend to add: "In contrast to the
authorization code flow, this requires additional security
mechanisms (described below) to detect falsified ID tokens."<br>
<br>
2.2.2.1. Authorization Request<br>
see comments regarding redirect_uri and nonce for section
2.1.2.1<br>
<br>
2.2.2.2 - 2.2.2.4 - I recommend to state in section 2.2.2
that those steps are performed in the same manner as for the
code flow and to remove these section?<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">These are
here to keep the structure of the sections parallel with
2.1.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
2.2.2.5. Authorization Successful Response<br>
<br>
access_token Parameter - "Access Token for the UserInfo
Endpoint." - In contrast to section 2.1.3.3, this section
also described standard OAuth response parameters. I don't
think this is needed. Moreover, the term "User Info" is used
before it is really introduced. In my opinion,
authentication should not talk about user info. The access
token returned as part of the authentication result might
suited for interactions with any protected resource,
including user info. <br>
<br>
2.2.2.7. Redirect URI Fragment Handling<br>
<br>
This section needs a bit more of context and description.
While the introduction of 2.2 states: "The Implicit Flow is
mainly used by Clients implemented in a browser using a
scripting language", this section suddenly _requires_ the
client to send data to a web server ("The Client MUST
provide ...").<br>
<br>
First of all, I don't understand the MUST.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">This could
become “The Client needs to implement…”.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
For native clients, I'm not sure the client needs to send data to
a web server at all. The connection with a web back is only true
for clients implemented in a browser (correct)? So we can restrict
the 'implicit flow' to browser based clients that do not implement
any browser plugins, or we should relax the MUST as with a native
or desktop client, you can capture the redirect before it's loaded
into the webkit view and process it locally.<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in">Second, a
description is needed of the different patterns, scripting
clients vs. scripted frontends of server-based
web-application (here the implicit grant offers better
performance and scalability at the cost of a more complex
client implementation. Therefore, implementation advices are
given. <br>
<br>
I also think this section should be part of an
"implementation note" section.<br>
<br>
2.2.2.11. ID Token Validation<br>
<br>
Text around signature validation should be moved from
2.1.3.7 to this section as it is required for the implicit
grant (in contrast to code).<br>
<br>
2.3. Authentication using the Hybrid Flow<br>
<br>
2.3.2.2.-2.3.2.4. can be removed<br>
<br>
2.3.2.5. Authorization Successful Response<br>
<br>
Again, I would recommend to focus on additional response
parameters, as in section 2.1.3.3<br>
<br>
2.3.2.7. Redirect URI Fragment Handling<br>
<br>
see comment at section 2.2.2.7<br>
<br>
I think 2.3.3.1.-2.3.3.9 can be removed - Instead it should
be stated that for the hybrid flow client and AS must
conform to ALL requirements for code and implicit. <span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">These are
here to keep the structure of the sections parallel with
2.1.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in">3. Initiating
Login from a Third Party<br>
<br>
I assume this is mainly intended to support OP initiated
logins? I don't think it deserves a top-level section. I
would recommend to make it part of the Authentication
section.<br>
<br>
"The Client MAY optionally register [OpenID.Registration] an
initiate_login_uri that can be used by the Authorization
Server or another party to initiate a login for an End-User
at the Client." I assume this feature shall also be
supported by OPs w/o dynamic registration? I therefore
suggest to move this text to the dynamic registration spec.
Instead one could state: "The approach utilized by the 3rd
party or the OP to determine the client's respective URL is
out-of-scope of this document."<br>
<br>
Generally, I don't think any meta data element registered
via dynamic registration or discovered via OpenID Discovery
should be specified/mentioned in the core spec. I think the
core function must work w/o both functions in place.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">I agree that
it shouldn’t be mentioned in a way that implies or states
that Discovery or Registration are required. That being
said, we’ve tried to point people to the relevant
Discovery & Registration parameters where they’re
relevant to help implementers more easily grasp the bigger
picture.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
I like the pointers to the other specs. I agree that we should
make it clear that these specs are NOT required for the core spec
to work.<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
+1<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite"> <br>
I'll have to stop here as I haven't finished my detailed reading
of the spec.<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
George<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
4. Claims<br>
<br>
"This section specifies how the Client can obtain Claims
about the End-User ..." claims about the authentication
process are supported as well.<br>
NEW: "This section specifies how the Client can obtain
Claims about the End-User and the authentication process ...<br>
<br>
4.1. Requesting Claims using Scope Values<br>
<br>
This is an extension to the authentication part, it should
be specified that way. For example, there is no need to
specify the use of the scope value "openid" again. IMHO it
suffices to say that clients may request access to user data
by adding more scope values in conjunction with "openid".<br>
<br>
4.2. Standard Claims<br>
<br>
I think this section should be the first section as it
describes standard claims on a conceptual level and which
ways exist for a client to retrieve them. <span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">This seems
reasonable. Do others agree with this reordering?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
4.3. UserInfo Endpoint<br>
<br>
I think this section should be merged with Section 4.1 as
the scope values defined there control access to this
resource, only. <span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Disagree,
since 4.5 (Requesting Claims using the "claims" Request
Parameter) also controls the access to this resource.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
That's certainly true :-) I neverless feel the current location "in
between" is not optimal. Would it make sense to start this chapter
with a 4.2, followd by a description of the user info endpoint and
cover scopes and claims afterwards? <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
4.4. Requesting Claims Locales with the "claims_locales"
Request Parameter<br>
<br>
I would suggest to move this either before 4.1. or after
4.5. as it seems to be orthogonal to the functions described
there.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">If we move
the Standard Claims to 4.1, I agree that this could
logically become 4.2<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
4.6. Claim Types<br>
<br>
This seems to be out of order because after a description of
how a client may allocate claims to ID token and user info,
this section again exclusively talks about UserInfo. Is it
really the intention to support aggregated and distributed
claims at the User Info endpoint, only? If so I recommend to
move this section before 4.4. Otherwise, please state that
such claims can be provided in the ID Token as well.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Fair point.
While I understand the general argument that this might
apply to the ID Token as well, from a practical matter,
they’re only likely to ever be used with UserInfo claims.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
The spec should clearly spell that out.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
How is a aggregated or distributed claim requested by a
client? <span style="color:#1F497D"> <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">It’s up to
the OP when and whether to provide them – not up to the RP
to ask. I’ll try to make that clearer.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
5. Passing Request Parameters as JWTs<br>
<br>
I would suggest to move this topic into another document.
The features described here allow implementors to achieve
higher security levels and may reduce the request size but I
consider them beyond the scope of a core document.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">We considered
moving lots of things out to separate documents, but in
the end, decided that things would be easier for
developers to understand if we avoided a proliferation of
documents.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
Sorry, I cannot accept this statement. This is the first version of
a consolidated document, which pretends to be THE core document of
OpenID Connect. Who decided based on what data/information/stats
that everything needs to be in a single spec? And why weren't
registration and discovery also included?<br>
<br>
What are developers supposed to better understand that way? As an
implementor I still have a hard time to understand what is really
relevant for me in order to implement a compliant OpenID Connect OP.
And I don't think signed request objects belong into this category.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
6. Self-Issued OpenID Provider<br>
<br>
How mature is the concept? How many implementations exist?
Is this really part of a core specification or rather an
extension for mobile/personal devices? I would opt for
making this section a separate document.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Same response
as for 5. And yes, there are implementations.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
Same response as for 5. Additionally: You didn't not answer my
question regarding maturity of this module. Given there are a couple
of notes starting "The OpenID Foundation plans ..." it appears to me
there is some way to go until it will be mature. Who did actually
implement this feature?<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
6.2. Self-Issued OpenID Provider Registration<br>
<br>
"When using a Self-Issued OP, the Client is deemed to have
registered with the OP and obtained following Client
Registration Response." - Does this mean dynamic
registration is required for self-issued ID providing?<br>
<br>
7. Subject Identifier Types<br>
<br>
This section is completely about discovery and registration
- it should go there, consequently.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">No, it’s
about core functionality – the meaning of the subject
claim in the ID Token.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
The section starts as follows: "The OpenID Provider's Discovery
document SHOULD list its supported identifier types in the
subject_types_supported element ..." - This is not about discovery?<br>
<br>
Further: According to 2.1.3.6, the meaning of the sub claim is
"Subject identifier. A locally unique and never reassigned
identifier within the Issuer for the End-User, which is intended to
be consumed by the Client, e.g., 24400320 or
AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4. It MUST NOT exceed 255
ASCII characters in length. The sub value is a case sensitive
string."<br>
<br>
Seems the client does not need to know about "pairwise identifiers".
Furthermore, I didn't find any other place in this spec, which
refers to identifier types (e.g. request parameters). So why do you
think this is core functionality?<br>
<br>
I think this is an aspect of the OP's implementation. It may be
relevant to actually setup a client_id at an OP, but that's Dynamic
Registration. <br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
8. Client Authentication<br>
<br>
This section provides fundamental information about the
client authentication methods supported/introduced by OpenID
Connect. I would suggest to move it into section 1 (e.g.
section 1.5).<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Section 1 is
for introductory material – not specifying requirements.
We could move it earlier, if you feel that it’s
warranted. Where would like you like it to go, other than
Section 1?</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
Section 2, before the description of the authentication flows.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
"During Client Registration, the RP (Client) MAY register an
authentication method. " I assume all client authentication
methods shall work even if the OP does not support dynamic
registration. Consequently, this text must be replaced by a
general description of what methods are supported and how
the OP is supposed to determine the right method for a
particular client.<br>
<br>
OLD: "During Client Registration, the RP (Client) MAY
register an authentication method. If no method is
registered, the default method of client_secret_basic MUST
be used."<br>
NEW: "OpenID connect supports the authentication methods
listed below. The authorization server determines the
authentication method to be used in a particular
authorization transaction based on the client_id. The way
client and authorization server negotiate the authentication
method is out of scope of this specification."<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Actually, the
Authorization Server advertises what methods it supports
and the Client chooses the method it uses from among that
set.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
If discovery and registration are supported by that particular OP.
Since this is not a MTI requirement, the core should avoid to create
contradicting impressions and focus on documenting the relevant
concepts and assumptions. <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
9. Signatures and Encryption<br>
<br>
Most of this section talks about discovery and dynamic
registration - it should go there, consequently.<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Things like
key rollover are Core functionality. The references to
the discovery and registration parameters are there to aid
developers in understanding the bigger pictures. The use
of them is optional. (If you believe that the text isn’t
clear on this, please propose specific language changes to
clarify this.)</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
I would suggest to add the following sentence to the introduction of
section 9: "This specification assumes that the Client and OpenID
Provider negotiate algorithms to sign and encrypt data before
actually starting an authentication flow. Normally Discovery and
Dynamic Registration are utilized for that purpose, other mechanisms
MAY be used as well."<br>
<br>
I repeat my suggestion the rest of the text, as all values are
specified in Discovery and Dynamic Registration and only relevant
for OPs supporting the respective features. <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
I think the core spec needs MTI algorithms and clear
definition when signatures are required. In my opinion,
there are two use cases:<br>
- Login via implicit grant<br>
- azp - Login at another AS via ID token<br>
<br>
In both cases, Signing ID Tokens with RSA SHA-256 could be
good baseline. This could be documented in the ID Tokens
section or the MTI section.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">14.1
(Mandatory to Implement Features for All OpenID Providers)
already does specify RS256 as MTI. Is there something
else you want us to say in this regard?<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
9.3.1. Rotation of Asymmetric Signing Keys<br>
<br>
Isn't this an implementation note?<span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><span
style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">No, it’s
normative</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
To me the introduction "Rotation of signing keys can be accomplished
with the following approach." sounds like an implementation note.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in">10. Offline
Access<br>
<br>
Given the description (" that grants access to the
End-User's UserInfo Endpoint ..."), I would say this text
can go to the User Info section. <br>
<br>
11. Using Refresh Tokens<br>
<br>
I think this should go to the authentication section (2.4?),
as it describes usage of the refresh token grant type in the
Connect context.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">It’s optional
functionality, whereas Authentication is not. Connect
implementations do not need to support refresh tokens.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
I don't get your argument. Our apps use the code grant type for
initial login and refresh tokens to sub-sequently login and obtain
fresh tokens/data. So from my perspective, esp. from the perspective
of mobile apps, refresh tokens are in the same way relevant for
authentication than all other grant types. <br>
<br>
Furthermore: Refresh tokens are in the same optional as nearly all
other grant types. For example, Connect implementations do not need
to support the hybrid flows.<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
11.2. Refresh Successful Response<br>
<br>
"If an ID Token is returned as a result of a token refresh
request ..." - Can't we specify the conditions under which
an ID token is returned? Otherwise, an interoperable client
does not know what to expect or how to control the outcome
of this request. For the standard authentication flow,
presence of the scope value "openid" is the trigger. I would
suggest to use the same logic for the refresh token grant
type.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">The refresh
functionality is outside the scope of the spec. The
current language is there to place constraints on what it
needs to do, if supported.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
if it is out of scope then please remove it. The current text leaves
large gaps, which will cause interop problems. <br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
14. Implementation Considerations<br>
<br>
I would suggest to move MTI requirements to another document
as it refers to nearly every document of the OpenID Connect
suite. For the core document, I would suggest to (at most)
specify the MTI requirements for closed systems, only:<br>
- code flow extension<br>
- prompt<br>
- display<br>
- language<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">The logic
behind the current organization is that specifying both
the closed and open MTI requirements in one place makes
them easier for developers to understand.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
One place does not nessecarily mean the core document, right?<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
14.1. Mandatory to Implement Features for All OpenID
Providers<br>
<br>
"Signing ID Tokens with RSA SHA-256" - I think, in Berlin,
we agreed to not require signatures for simple, static
setups using authz code. We agreed to move this to the MTI
section for dynamic OPs.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Actually,
what we agreed was to allow signing to be optional for the
Code flow, provided the client registers saying that it
wants “none”. This is now in the spec.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
14.5. Compatibility Notes<br>
<br>
Isn't such information better covered on the working group
page. Such information typically change more often than the
specification itself.<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Developers
are more likely to read the spec than other working group
pages. Again this is there for developer convenience, to
help them understand the whole context as easily as
possible.</span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<br>
Which evidences is your statement based on?<br>
<br>
<blockquote cite="mid:526554F9.1030406@aol.com" type="cite">
<blockquote
cite="mid:4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B168042967394377E08131@TK5EX14MBXC286.redmond.corp.microsoft.com"
type="cite">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left:.5in"><br>
14.6. Related Specifications and Implementer's Guides<br>
<br>
same here<span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D">Same answer.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
</div>
<br>
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