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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Hi Torsten,<br>
<br>
Thanks for the response! I agree with your assessment. <br>
<br>
A couple other tweaks I've been considering...<br>
1. using short-lived tokens instead of one-time use (though I
agree one-time-use tokens are better)<br>
2. specify the re-direct URL as part of the refresh_token request
<br>
-- I think it's legal to profile the token endpoint this way,
RFC 6749 says that the AS must ignore unrecognized parameters. If
I define a profile that supports additional parameters then they
aren't unexpected. Is that valid? :)<br>
-- basically the URL is meta-data for the client2web scope and
must be supplied in order to get the token<br>
-- put the re-direct URL in the client2web token (either
directly or via server session). This protects any replay
attemptes from being able to change the redirect endpoint<br>
3. all requests to the the OP endpoint are SSL (to protect the
token as much as possible)<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
George<br>
<br>
</font>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 1/3/13 6:46 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt
wrote:<br>
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Hi George,<br>
<br>
we have similar use cases.<br>
<br>
- I doubt the standard OpenId connect messages would be
appropriate here. The app, which started the process, is not
supposed to receive the login response. And the portal the user
wants to access in the newly spawned user agent typically
initiates it own login request. This renders at least the
following parameters (if not the whole scheme) useless for this
use case:<br>
* response_type<br>
* scope<br>
* redirect_uri<br>
* nonce<br>
<br>
- I'm also unsure whether id tokens would add any benefit over
"plain old" access tokens.<br>
<br>
- In my opinion, it makes sense to more or less stick to your
original design. I would use an access token with a special scope
to secure the process. The client could sent this access token to
a bootstrap endpoint exposed by the OP (or its web/sso part to be
more precisely). So in this case, the web/sso part of the OP is
the resource server consuming this access token. <br>
- In order to support this use cases, I would issue a
(long-living) refresh token to the native app, which can in turn
be used to acquire access tokens for SSO session boostrapping (or
any other access token as well). <br>
- It might be advisable to make access tokens for this use case
one time use in order to reduce the risk if such an (login) access
token is leaked.<br>
- I would assume that the URL the user agent shall be redirected
to is the landing page of one of the other RPs linked to the
particular OP. So the request could refer to one of them.<br>
<br>
best regards,<br>
Torsten.<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Am 02.01.2013 20:59, schrieb George
Fletcher:<br>
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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">I'm trying to define
the best way to accomplish the following scenario using the
latest OpenID Connect / OAuth2 specs.<br>
</font>
<blockquote><font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Basically,
one of our currently supported APIs is something we call
'client2web' which allows a client with a long lived token
(think OAuth2 token with offline_access) to construct a
signed URL (signing mechanism based on OAuth1) to load into
a browser. The 'client2web' API endpoint processes the
requests by first validating the signature, and then
validating the passed "access_token" to determine the user.
If everything validates correctly, the AS/OP constructs a
new web session for the user and redirects the browser to
the requested destination (one of the signed URL parameters)
setting authentication session cookies in the process.</font><br>
<br>
<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">A few other features
of this process. The access_token is an encrypted blob, and
the signing secret is unique to each authorization where the
user authenticates with their password (i.e. the signing
secret is a function of the password). Also, the RP to which
the browser is redirected can determine the identity of the
user in the browser by making an AJAX API call back to the
AS (note that this has negative security ramifications).</font><br>
<br>
<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">The two main use
cases for the above scenario are desktop based application
and/or mobile apps (all more or less fall into the native
apps category).</font><br>
</blockquote>
<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif"><br>
So, in OpenID Connect, an id_token can be passed as a hint to
the OP, but that's about all I could find that the OP allows
as it relates to the "client" providing an assertion for the
user. Assuming the native app starts with OpenID Connect, then
it could save the id_token and present it later... though I
don't believe that works well for really long lived tokens.<br>
<br>
I was thinking that it might make sense to allow an id_token
to be constructed from an access_token via an endpoint at the
OP (token endpoint, grant=refresh_token&...) and then pass
the id_token in the normal OpenID Connect flow. Sort of an STS
flow... exchange access_token for id_token. The privilege of
doing so would require an explicit scope so that the user
could consent to this behavior by the native app.<br>
<br>
Problems with this approach are...<br>
* in the normal OpenID Connect flow that contains an id_token
as a hint, the id_token is compared against browser cookies to
determine if the user and session are the same. In this case
there wouldn't be any browser cookies to compare against. <br>
* using the callback_url as the redirect URL causes
registration problems (native app has to register the web app
as one of it's callback urls)<br>
* using the callback_url as the redirect URL forces all RPs to
have a special endpoint that can handle OpenID Connect
semantics. In our case, I really want the OP to just set
browser cookies and let the RP figure out who the user is
(e.g. implicit flow with prompt=none).<br>
<br>
Does anyone else have this use case and/or interested is
defining a standard way to do it? I have a few ideas:)<br>
<br>
Thanks,<br>
George</font> <br>
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