Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.

n-sakimura@nri.co.jp

Ping Identity

ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com

Microsoft

mbj@microsoft.com

Google

breno@google.com

Salesforce

cmortimore@salesforce.com

Illumila

ejay@mgi1.com

OpenID Connect 1.0 is a simple identity layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 protocol. It allows Clients to verify the identity of the End-User based on the authentication performed by an Authorization Server, as well as to obtain basic profile information about the End-User in an interoperable and RESTful manner. OpenID Connect Implicit Client Profile is a profile of the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 Specification that is designed to be easy to read and implement for basic web-based Relying Parties using the OAuth implicit grant type. OpenID Providers should consult the Standard specification. This profile omits implementation and security considerations for OpenID Providers.

OpenID Connect Implicit Client Profile is a profile of the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 Specification that is designed to be easy to read and implement for basic web-based Relying Parties using the OAuth implicit grant type. See the OpenID Connect Basic Client Profile specification for a related profile for basic web-based Relying Parties using the OAuth code grant type. OpenID Providers and non web-based applications should consult the Standard specification. This profile omits implementation and security considerations for OpenID Providers.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in . Throughout this document, values are quoted to indicate that they are to be taken literally. When using these values in protocol messages, the quotes MUST NOT be used as part of the value.

This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0. This specification also defines the following terms: Application requiring Claims from an OpenID Provider Service capable of providing Claims to a Relying Party Piece of information about an Entity that a Claims Provider asserts about that Entity Server that can return Claims about an Entity Human Resource Owner Something that has a separate and distinct existence and that can be identified in a context. An End-User is one example of an Entity Information that (a) can be used to identify the natural person to whom such information relates, or (b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked to a natural person to whom such information relates. Identifier that identifies the Entity to a Relying Party that cannot be correlated with the Entity's PPID at another Relying Party JSON Web Token (JWT) that contains Claims about the authentication event Entity that issues a set of Claims. HTTPS URL that acts as a verifiable identifier for an Issuer Protected resource that, when presented with an Access Token by the Client, returns authorized information about the End-User represented by the corresponding Authorization Grant

Authorization Requests can follow one of two paths; the Implicit Flow or the Authorization Code Flow. The Authorization Code Flow is suitable for Clients that can securely maintain a Client Secret between themselves and the Authorization Server whereas, the Implicit Flow is suitable for Clients that cannot. Clients that do not support TLS MUST use the Authorization Code Flow to prevent the interception of Access Tokens. The OpenID Connect Implicit Client Profile only documents Clients using the Implicit Flow. OpenID Providers MUST support both flows. Clients wanting to use the Authorization Code Flow and OpenID Providers should consult the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 Specification.

OpenID Connect Clients use scope values as defined in 3.3 of OAuth 2.0 to specify what access privileges are requested for Access Tokens. The scopes associated with Access Tokens determine what resources will be available when they are used to access OAuth 2.0 protected endpoints. For OpenID Connect, scopes can be used to request that specific sets of information be made available from the UserInfo Endpoint, and to request an ID Token. OAuth 2.0 allows additional scope values to be specified, as extensions. This specification describes only the scope values used by OpenID Connect. OpenID Connect defines the following scope values: REQUIRED. Informs the Authorization Server that the Client is making an OpenID Connect request. If the openid scope value is not present, the request MUST NOT be treated as an OpenID Connect request. This scope value requests access to the user_id Claim at the UserInfo Endpoint. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests that access to the End-User's default profile Claims at the UserInfo Endpoint be granted by the issued Access Token. These claims are: name, family_name, given_name, middle_name, nickname, preferred_username, profile, picture, website, gender, birthday, zoneinfo, locale, and updated_time. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests that access to the email and email_verified Claims at the UserInfo Endpoint be granted by the issued Access Token. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests that access to the address Claim at the UserInfo Endpoint be granted by the issued Access Token. OPTIONAL. This scope value requests that access to the phone_number Claim at the UserInfo Endpoint be granted by the issued Access Token. Multiple scopes MAY be requested by creating a space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII scope values. In some cases, the End-User will be given the option to have the OpenID Provider decline to provide some or all information requested by Clients. To increase new account activation, a Client may elect to only request a subset of the information available from the UserInfo Endpoint.

The following is a non-normative example of a scope Request.

The Implicit Flow consists of the following steps: Client prepares an Authorization Request containing the desired request parameters. Client sends a request to the Authorization Server. Authorization Server authenticates the End-User. Authorization Server obtains the End-User Consent/Authorization. Authorization Server sends the End-User back to the Client with an Access Token and ID Token.

When the Client wishes to access a Protected Resource, and the End-User Authorization has not yet been obtained, the Client prepares an Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint. The scheme used in the Authorization Endpoint URL MUST be HTTPS. Clients MAY construct the request using the HTTP GET or the HTTP POST method as defined in RFC 2616. If using the HTTP GET method, the parameters are serialized using Query String Serialization. If using the HTTP POST method, the request parameters are added to the HTTP request entity-body using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by . This profile further constrains the following request parameters: It MUST include token and id_token, as a space delimited list. This requests that both an Access Token and an ID Token be returned in the URL fragment of the response. Other REQUIRED parameters in the request include the following: The OAuth 2.0 Client Identifier. It MUST include openid as one of the space delimited ASCII strings. OPTIONAL scope strings of profile, email, address, and phone are also supported. A redirection URI where the response will be sent. This MUST be pre-registered with the provider. The request MAY contain the following OPTIONAL and sometimes REQUIRED parameters: A string value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is passed through unmodified to the ID Token. One method to achieve this is to store a random value as a signed session cookie, and pass the value in the nonce parameter. In that case, the nonce in the returned ID Token is compared to the signed session cookie to detect ID Token replay by third parties. RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used to maintain state between the request and the callback; serves as a protection against XSRF attacks. An ASCII string value that specifies how the Authorization Server displays the authentication and consent user interface pages to the End-User. The following values are supported: The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a full user-agent page view. If the display parameter is not specified this is the default display mode. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a popup user-agent window. The popup user-agent window SHOULD be 450 pixels wide and 500 pixels tall. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a device that leverages a touch interface. The Authorization Server MAY attempt to detect the touch device and further customize the interface. The Authorization Server SHOULD display authentication and consent UI consistent with a "feature phone" type display. A space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII string values that specifies whether the Authorization Server prompts the End-User for reauthentication and consent. The possible values are: This value informs the Authorization Server that it MUST NOT display any authentication or consent user interface pages. An error is returned if the End-User is not already authenticated or the Client does not have pre-configured consent for the requested scopes. This can be used as a method to check for existing authentication and/or consent. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User for reauthentication. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User for consent before returning information to the Client. The Authorization Server MUST prompt the End-User to select a user account. This allows a user who has multiple accounts at the Authorization Server to select amongst the multiple accounts that they may have current sessions for. The prompt parameter can be used by the Client to make sure that the End-User is still present for the current session or to bring attention to the request. If this parameter contains none with any other value, an error is returned.

The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request URL (with line wraps for display purposes only):

Having constructed the Authorization Request, the Client sends it to the Authorization Endpoint. This MAY happen via HTTPS redirect, hyperlinking, or any other secure means of directing the User-Agent to the URL.

Following is a non-normative example using HTTP redirect (with line wraps for display purposes only):

The authorization server authenticates the resource owner to make sure that the consent is obtained from the right party. The exact method of how the authentication is performed is out of scope of this specification.

The Authorization Server obtains an authorization decision, for the requested scopes. This can done by presenting the End-User with a dialogue that allows the End-User to recognize what he is consenting to and obtain his consent or by establishing consent via other means (for example, via previous administrative consent). The openid scope grants the RP access to the user identifier of the authenticated End-User of the session. All other scopes are optional. It is up to the OpenID Provider to determine if an error should be returned in the case of the End-User declining to authorize scopes other than openid.

Once the authorization is determined, the Authorization Server returns a successful response or an error response.

If the Resource Owner grants the access request, the Authorization Server issues an Access Token and delivers it to the Client by adding the following parameters to the fragment component of the redirection URI using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined in Section 4.2.2 of OAuth 2.0 and OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices. In the Implicit Flow, the entire response is returned in the fragment component of the redirect URL, as defined in 4.2.2 of OAuth 2.0 REQUIRED. The Access Token for the UserInfo Endpoint. REQUIRED. The value MUST be "bearer" REQUIRED. The ID Token. REQUIRED if the state parameter is present in the client Authorization Request. Clients MUST verify that the state value is equal to the exact value of state parameter in the Authorization Request. OPTIONAL. The expiration time in seconds of the Access Token. The Client can then use the Access Token to access protected resources at Resource Servers.

The following is a non-normative example (with line wraps after the second line for the display purposes only):

If the End-User denies the authorization or the End-User authentication fails, the Authorization Server MUST return the error authorization response as defined in 4.2.2.1 of OAuth 2.0. No other parameters SHOULD be returned.

The client must provide a way for the user agent to parse the fragment encoded response and POST it to the web server client for validation. The following is an example of a JavaScript file that a Client might host at its redirect_uri. This is loaded by the redirect from the Authorization Server. The fragment is parsed and then sent by POST to a URI that will validate the information received.

Following is a non-normative example of a Redirect URI response: // First, parse the query string var params = {}, postBody = location.hash.substring(1), regex = /([^&=]+)=([^&]*)/g, m; while (m = regex.exec(postBody)) { params[decodeURIComponent(m[1])] = decodeURIComponent(m[2]); } // And send the token over to the server var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); // using POST so query isn't logged req.open('POST', 'https://' + window.location.host + '/catch_response', true); req.setRequestHeader('Content-Type', 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'); req.onreadystatechange = function (e) { if (req.readyState == 4) { if (req.status == 200) { // If the response from the POST is 200 OK, redirect the user window.location = 'https://' + window.location.host + '/redirect_after_login' } // if the OAuth response is invalid, generate an error message else if (req.status == 400) { alert('There was an error processing the token') } else { alert('Something other than 200 was returned') } } }; req.send(postBody);]]>

The ID Token is a security token that contains Claims about the authentication event and other requested Claims. The ID Token is represented as a JSON Web Token (JWT). The ID Token is used to manage the authentication event and user identifier and is scoped to a particular Client via the aud (audience) and nonce Claims. The following Claims are REQUIRED within the ID Token: REQUIRED. The Issuer Identifier for the Issuer of the response. REQUIRED. A locally unique and never reassigned identifier within the Issuer for the End-User, which is intended to be consumed by the Client. e.g. 24400320 or AItOawmwtWwcT0k51BayewNvutrJUqsvl6qs7A4. It MUST NOT exceed 255 ASCII characters in length. REQUIRED. This member identifies the audience that this ID Token is intended for. It MUST be the OAuth 2.0 client_id of the Client. REQUIRED. Type Integer. Identifies the expiration time on or after which the ID Token MUST NOT be accepted for processing. The processing of this parameter requires that the current date/time MUST be before the expiration date/time listed in the value. Implementers MAY provide for some small leeway, usually no more than a few minutes, to account for clock skew. The value is number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. See RFC 3339 for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular. REQUIRED. Type Integer. The iat (issued at) Claim identifies the time at which the JWT was issued. The value is number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the desired date/time. See RFC 3339 for details regarding date/times in general and UTC in particular. A string value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is passed through unmodified from the Authorization Request to the ID Token. If present in the ID Token, clients MUST verify that the nonce Claim value is equal to the value of the nonce parameter sent in the Authorization Request. If present in the Authorization Request, Authorization Servers MUST include a nonce Claim in the ID Token with the Claim value being the nonce value sent in the Authorization Request. Use of the nonce is REQUIRED when using the implicit flow and OPTIONAL when using the code flow. If the ID Token is issued with an access_token in an implicit flow, this is REQUIRED. The value is produced by base64url encoding the left-most half of the hash created by hashing the access_token with the SHA-2 family hash algorithm of the same length as the hash used in the alg parameter of the JWS header. For instance, if the alg is HS256, hash access_token with SHA-256, then take the left-most 128 bits and base64url encode them. Additional optional claims may be present in the ID Token. ID Tokens MUST be signed using JWS and OPTIONALLY both signed and encrypted using JWS and JWE respectively, thereby providing authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, and optionally, confidentiality. Clients MUST directly validate the ID Token per ID Token Verification.

To verify the validity of ID Token in the Authorization Response, the Client MUST do the following: The Client MUST validate that the client_id in the aud (audience) Claim is one it has registered for the Issuer identified by the value in the iss (issuer) Claim. The ID Token MUST be rejected if the value of aud (audience) is not valid for the Issuer. The Client MUST verify the signature of the ID Token according to JWS using the algorithm specified in the alg parameter of the JWT header. The alg value SHOULD be RS256. Validation of tokens using other signing algorithms is described in the OpenID Connect Messages specification. The Client MUST use the signing key provided in Discovery by the Issuer. The Issuer must exactly match the value of the iss (issuer) Claim. The current time MUST be less than the value of the exp Claim. The iat Claim may be used to reject tokens that were issued too far away from the current time, limiting the amount of time that nonces must be stored to prevent attacks. The acceptable range is Client specific. The value of the nonce Claim MUST be checked to verify that it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authorization Request. The Client SHOULD check the nonce value for replay attacks. The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific. If the acr Claim was requested, the Client SHOULD check that the asserted Claim Value is appropriate. The meaning and processing of acr Claim Values is out of scope for this specification. If the auth_time Claim was requested, the Client SHOULD check the value and request re-authentication if it determines too much time has elapsed since the last user authentication.

To obtain the additional attributes and tokens, the Client makes a GET or POST request to the UserInfo Endpoint. UserInfo Endpoint Servers MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. The UserInfo Endpoint Server MUST support TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 and/or TLS 1.0 and MAY support other transport-layer mechanisms with equivalent security. NOTE: The UserInfo Endpoint response is not guaranteed to be about the Interactive user identified by the user_id element of the ID Token. The user_id Claim in the UserInfo Endpoint response MUST exactly match the user_id Claim in the ID Token, before using additional UserInfo Endpoint Claims.

Clients MAY send requests with the following parameters to the UserInfo Endpoint to obtain further information about the End-User. The UserInfo Endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource that complies with the OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens specification. As such, the Access Token SHOULD be specified via the HTTP Authorization header. REQUIRED. The Access Token obtained from an OpenID Connect Authorization Request. This parameter MUST only be sent using one method through either the HTTP Authorization header or a form-encoded HTTP POST body parameter. REQUIRED. The schema in which the data is to be returned. The only defined value is openid. This identifier is reserved. It MUST be ignored by the endpoint when the openid schema is used.

The following is a non-normative example:

If the requested schema is openid, the response MUST return a JSON object that contains the full set or subset of Claims that are defined below. Additional Claims (not specified below) MAY also be returned. If a Claim is not returned, that Claim Name SHOULD be omitted from the JSON object representing the Claims; it SHOULD NOT be present with a null or empty string value. The members MAY be represented in multiple languages and scripts. To specify the languages and scripts, BCP47 language tags MUST be added to each member names delimited by a #, e.g., family_name#ja-Kana-JP for expressing Family Name in Katakana in Japanese, which is commonly used to index and represent the phonetics of the Kanji representation of the same represented as family_name#ja-Hani-JP. Member Type Description user_id string REQUIRED Identifier for the End-User at the Issuer. name string End-User's full name in displayable form including all name parts, ordered according to End-User's locale and preferences. given_name string Given name or first name of the End-User. family_name string Surname or last name of the End-User. middle_name string Middle name of the End-User. nickname string Casual name of the End-User that may or may not be the same as the given_name. For instance, a nickname value of Mike might be returned alongside a given_name value of Michael. preferred_username string Shorthand name that the End-User wishes to be referred to at the RP, such as janedoe or j.doe. This value MAY be any valid JSON string including special characters such as @, /, or whitespace. This value MUST NOT be relied upon to be unique by the RP. (See .) profile string URL of the End-User's profile page. picture string URL of the End-User's profile picture. website string URL of the End-User's web page or blog. email string The End-User's preferred e-mail address. This value MUST NOT be relied upon to be unique by the RP. (See .) email_verified boolean True if the End-User's e-mail address has been verified; otherwise false. gender string The End-User's gender: Values defined by this specification are female and male. Other values MAY be used when neither of the defined values are applicable. birthday string The End-User's birthday, represented as a date string in MM/DD/YYYY format. The year MAY be 0000, indicating that it is omitted. zoneinfo string String from zoneinfo time zone database. For example, Europe/Paris or America/Los_Angeles. locale string The End-User's locale, represented as a BCP47 language tag. This is typically an ISO 639-1 Alpha-2 language code in lowercase and an ISO 3166-1 Alpha-2 country code in uppercase, separated by a dash. For example, en-US or fr-CA. As a compatibility note, some implementations have used an underscore as the separator rather than a dash, for example, en_US; Implementations MAY choose to accept this locale syntax as well. phone_number string The End-User's preferred telephone number. E.164 is RECOMMENDED as the format of this Claim. For example, +1 (425) 555-1212 or +56 (2) 687 2400. address JSON object The End-User's preferred address. The value of the address member is a JSON structure containing some or all of the members defined in . updated_time string Time the End-User's information was last updated, represented as a RFC 3339 datetime. For example, 2011-01-03T23:58:42+0000.

Following is a non-normative example of such a response:

The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return Claims in JSON format unless a different format was specified during OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0. The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return a content-type header to indicate which format is being returned. The following are accepted content types: Content-Type Format Returned application/json plain text JSON object application/jwt JSON Web Token (JWT)

The components of a physical mailing address. Implementations MAY return only a subset of the fields of an address, depending upon the information available and the End-User's privacy preferences. For example, the country and region might be returned without returning more fine-grained address information. Implementations MAY return just the full address as a single string in the formatted sub-field, or they MAY return just the individual component fields using the other sub-fields, or they MAY return both. If both variants are returned, they SHOULD be describing the same address, with the formatted address indicating how the component fields SHOULD be combined. The full mailing address, formatted for display or use with a mailing label. This field MAY contain newlines. This is the Primary Sub-Field for this field, for the purposes of sorting and filtering. The full street address component, which may include house number, street name, PO BOX, and multi-line extended street address information. This field MAY contain newlines. The city or locality component. The state, province, prefecture or region component. The zip code or postal code component. The country name component.

The user_id claim is the only claim that a client can rely upon to be stable, since the user_id claim MUST be locally unique and never reassigned within the Issuer for a particular End-User, as described in . Therefore, the only guaranteed unique identifier for a given End-User is a combination of the Issuer's identifier and the user_id claim; other fields such as preferred_username and email MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers for a given End-User. All other claims carry no such guarantees across different issuers in terms of stability over time or uniqueness across users, and Issuers are permitted to apply local restrictions and policies. For instance, an Issuer MAY re-use a given preferred_username or email address claim across different End-Users at different points in time, and the claimed preferred_username or email address for a given End-User MAY change over time.

When an error condition occurs, the UserInfo Endpoint returns an Error Response as defined in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens. In addition to the error codes defined in Section 3.1 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Tokens, this specification defines the following error codes: The requested schema is invalid or unsupported.

There is a special issuer "https://self-issued.me" that indicates a user is using a personal IdP that is issuing self signed id_token.

If the input identifier contains the domain self-issued.me, dynamic discovery is not performed. The following static configuration values are used.

Note: OpenID Foundation may consider hosting a domain https://self-issued.me/ which returns the above static configuration file so that the client would not need any special treatment of the self issued IdP.

When dealing with the Self Issued IdP, the Client is deemed to have registered with the IdP and obtained following Client Registration Response. The redirect_uri of the Client. 0. Note: OpenID Foundation may consider hositng an endpoint https://self-issued.me/registration/1.0/ that returns the static response as above so that the Client may not need to perform any special processing for a Self Issued IdP.

The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization Endpoint with the following REQUIRED parameters. REQUIRED. id_token. REQUIRED. redirect_uri of the client. Note that since it is same as the redirect_uri, redirect_uri is not required to be sent in the request. REQUIRED. Supported scope desicribed in the previous section. It MUST include openid. Other parameters MAY be sent. Note that the user clames are returned in the id_token. The entire URL MUST NOT exceed 2048 bytes.

Following is a non-normative example (with line wraps for display purposes only):

Self Issued Identity Provider Response will be the same as the normal implicit flow response apart from the fact that the iss claim is https://self-issued.me and user cliams are returned in id_token. Since it is an implicit flow reponse, the response parameters will be returned in fragment.

To verify the validity of ID Token in the Authorization or Token Endpoint Response, the Client MUST do the following: The Client MUST validate that the value of the iss (issuer) Claim is https://self-isued.me. If iss contains a diffrent value, it MUST be validated according to ID Token Verification. The Client MUST validate that the value of the aud (audience) Claim is the value of the redirect_uri that the client sent in the authentication request. The Client MUST verify the signature of the ID Token according to JWS using the algorithm specified in the alg parameter of the JWT header, using the key in the user_jwk claim. The key is in JWK format. The alg value SHOULD be the default of RS256. It may also be ES256. The Client MUST validate that the user_id value is a base64url encoded binary SHA256 hash of the concatination of the value of mod and exp of the user_jwk. The current time MUST be less than the value of the exp Claim. The iat Claim may be used to reject tokens that were issued too far away from the current time, limiting the amount of time that nonces must be stored to prevent attacks. The acceptable range is Client specific. If a nonce value was sent in the Authorization Request, a nonce Claim MUST be present and its value of the checked to verify that it is the same value as the one that was sent in the Authorization Request. The Client SHOULD check the nonce value for replay attacks. The precise method for detecting replay attacks is Client specific.

The following is a non-normative example of a base64url decoded self issued id_token. Note that the line wraps are for display purpose only:

Some OpenID Connect installations can use a pre-configured set of OpenID Providers and/or Relying Parties. In those cases, it may not be necessary to support dynamic discovery of information about identities or services or dynamic registration of Clients. However, if installations choose to support unanticipated interactions between Relying Parties and OpenID Providers that do not have pre-configured relationships, they SHOULD accomplish this by implementing the facilities defined in the OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0 and OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0 specifications.

In order to serialize the parameters using the query string serialization, the Client constructs the string by adding the parameters and values to the query component using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by .

Following is a non-normative example of such serialization:

Parameters and their values are form serialized by adding the parameter names and values to the entity body of the HTTP request using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format as defined by . Form serialization is typically used in HTTP POST requests.

Following is a non-normative example of such serialization:

Processing some OpenID Connect messages requires comparing values in the messages to known values. For example, the Claim Names returned by the UserInfo Endpoint might be compared to specific Claim Names such as user_id. Comparing Unicode strings, however, has significant security implications. Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings MUST be performed as specified below: Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode code points. Unicode Normalization MUST NOT be applied at any point to either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared against. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a Unicode code point to code point equality comparison. In several places, this specification uses space delimited lists of strings. In all such cases, only the ASCII space character (0x20) MAY be used for this purpose.

For security considerations, refer to the OpenID Connect Standard 1.0 Specification.

The UserInfo response typically contains Personally Identifiable Information. As such, End-User consent for the release of the information for the specified purpose SHOULD be obtained at or prior to the authorization time in accordance with relevant regulations. The purpose of use is typically registered in association with the redirect_uri. Only necessary UserInfo data SHOULD be stored at the Client and the Client SHOULD associate the received data with the purpose of use statement. The Resource Server SHOULD make the UserInfo access log available to the End-User so that the End-User can monitor who accessed his data. To protect the End-User from a possible correlation among Clients, the use of a Pairwise Pseudonymous Identifier (PPID) as the user_id SHOULD be considered.

This document makes no requests of IANA.

markdavis@google.com

ken@unicode.org

Facebook Microsoft Microsoft Independent Facebook International Organization for Standardization International Organization for Standardization International Telecommunication Union Public Domain Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identiity Microsoft Illumila Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Microsoft Ping Identity Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Microsoft Ping Identity Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Microsoft RTFM, Inc. Cisco Systems, Inc. Google, Inc. Google, Inc. Facebook Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Ping Identity Microsoft Google Salesforce

The OpenID Community would like to thank the following people for the work they've done in the drafting and editing of this specification. Andreas Akre Solberg (andreas.solberg@uninett.no), UNINET Anthony Nadalin (tonynad@microsoft.com), Microsoft Axel Nennker (axel.nennker@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom Breno de Medeiros (breno@gmail.com), Google Casper Biering (cb@peercraft.com), Peercraft Chuck Mortimore (cmortimore@salesforce.com), Salesforce David Recordon (dr@fb.com), Facebook Edmund Jay (ejay@mgi1.com), Illumila George Fletcher (george.fletcher@corp.aol.com), AOL Hideki Nara (hideki.nara@gmail.com), Takt Communications John Bradley (ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com), Ping Identity Johnny Bufu (jbufu@janrain.com), Janrain Justin Richer (jricher@mitre.org), Mitre Luke Shepard (lshepard@fb.com), Facebook Michael B. Jones (mbj@microsoft.com), Microsoft Nat Sakimura (n-sakimura@nri.co.jp), Nomura Research Institute, Ltd. Nov Matake (nov@matake.jp), Independent Pamela Dingle (pdingle@pingidentity.com), Ping Identity Paul Tarjan (pt@fb.com), Facebook Roland Hedberg (roland.hedberg@adm.umu.se), Independent Ryo Ito (ryo.ito@mixi.co.jp), mixi, Inc. Torsten Lodderstedt (t.lodderstedt@telekom.de), Deutsche Telekom

Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenID Foundation. The OpenID Foundation (OIDF) grants to any Contributor, developer, implementer, or other interested party a non-exclusive, royalty free, worldwide copyright license to reproduce, prepare derivative works from, distribute, perform and display, this Implementers Draft or Final Specification solely for the purposes of (i) developing specifications, and (ii) implementing Implementers Drafts and Final Specifications based on such documents, provided that attribution be made to the OIDF as the source of the material, but that such attribution does not indicate an endorsement by the OIDF. The technology described in this specification was made available from contributions from various sources, including members of the OpenID Foundation and others. Although the OpenID Foundation has taken steps to help ensure that the technology is available for distribution, it takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this specification or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. The OpenID Foundation and the contributors to this specification make no (and hereby expressly disclaim any) warranties (express, implied, or otherwise), including implied warranties of merchantability, non-infringement, fitness for a particular purpose, or title, related to this specification, and the entire risk as to implementing this specification is assumed by the implementer. The OpenID Intellectual Property Rights policy requires contributors to offer a patent promise not to assert certain patent claims against other contributors and against implementers. The OpenID Foundation invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents, patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to practice this specification.

[[ To be removed from the final specification ]] -02 Added preferred_username claim under profile scope Added ID Token section to describe required claims Added section on claim stability -01 Removed claims_in_id_token scope value, per decision on June 15, 2012 special working group call -00 Initial version, based upon Basic Client specification version -17 Renamed from Basic Client to Implicit Client, per issue #567 Changed verified to email_verified, per issue #564 Removed Check ID Endpoint and added ID token signature verification text, per issue #570 Changed client.example.com to client.example.org, per issue #251 Added claims_in_id_token scope definition to Basic and Implicit, per issue #594 Use standards track version of JSON Web Token spec (draft-ietf-oauth-json-web-token)