[Openid-specs-ab] aud & azp

Nat Sakimura sakimura at gmail.com
Tue Aug 11 01:02:52 UTC 2015


We discussed this a bit during our call today.

azp really should have been in JWT.
The existence of azp indicates it is an assertion for something and not
really an ID Token for the authentication purpose.



2015-08-11 9:24 GMT+09:00 Justin Richer <jricher at mit.edu>:

> I agree with Brian’s reading on this, and our client software actually
> enforces this when it’s checking things.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Aug 10, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampbell at pingidentity.com>
> wrote:
>
> It's not totally clear what the spec allows or prescribes, which is where the
> issue for errata <https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/issues/973/>
> originates. And there seems, from the last call anyway
> <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs-ab/Week-of-Mon-20150803/005637.html>,
> to be a lack of agreement about what the intent actually was.
>
> It's my belief that the client id of the RP/client that made the
> authentication request should always be represented in the aud of the
> returned ID Token.
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 12:51 PM, Preibisch, Sascha H <
> Sascha.Preibisch at ca.com> wrote:
>
>> Just to make sure that I got it right:
>>
>>    - it is possible that a JWT does not include the client_id (neither
>>    in “aud" nor in “azp") of the client who has sent the request, correct?
>>
>> If I am wrong I may misunderstood your text Brian and would be happy for
>> some clarification.
>>
>> Thanks, Sascha
>>
>> From: Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net> on
>> behalf of Brian Campbell <bcampbell at pingidentity.com>
>> Date: Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 5:47 AM
>> To: Mike Jones <Michael.Jones at microsoft.com>
>> Cc: "<openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>" <
>> openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>
>> Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-ab] aud & azp
>>
>> Sure, https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/issues/973/
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 5:13 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones at microsoft.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks for bringing this up, Brian.  Could you file this as an issue
>>> against the “errata” deliverable and the core spec at
>>> https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/issues?status=new&status=open?  We
>>> should talk about this on tomorrow morning’s working group call.  After you
>>> do, I’ll add the following as a comment on the issue…
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think the problematic language is “the Client” in the statement below:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If an azp (authorized party) Claim is present, the Client SHOULD verify
>>> that its client_id is the Claim Value.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The problem is that the azp Client can be different than the requesting
>>> client.  It’s the azp Client that needs to do this validation step, not the
>>> requesting client.  Do people agree with this?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>                                                                 -- Mike
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Openid-specs-ab [mailto:openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net]
>>> *On Behalf Of *Brian Campbell
>>> *Sent:* Wednesday, August 05, 2015 10:11 AM
>>> *To:* <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>
>>> *Subject:* [Openid-specs-ab] aud & azp
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I find the text around azp and aud to be rather unclear and I think
>>> there's a potential item for errata in it somewhere.
>>>
>>> From the definition of "aud" in JWT
>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7519%23section-4.1.3&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7ca97947375f324b13278508d29db9ea16%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=UgVDJXRprGpK9ESVc5UcfRhoeVyqF4FqAreai1hKE%2b8%3d>
>>> and its use in Connect's ID Token
>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fopenid.net%2fspecs%2fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html%23IDToken&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7ca97947375f324b13278508d29db9ea16%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=UqyFRA5dyeXsDvmbmwVJeZWrboUbFWN%2bR9OpJpvIG0c%3d>
>>> (relevant spec text is copied below), it seems that that the client id of
>>> the client/RP that made the authentication request has to be one of the
>>> values, or the only value, of the "aud" claim in the ID Token. That's
>>> logical and consistent and provides reliable and interoperable guidance to
>>> implementers about producing and consuming the ID Token. I think that the
>>> client id of the RP/client that made the authentication request should
>>> always be represented in the aud of the returned ID Token.
>>>
>>> The text around "azp" in the ID Token section
>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fopenid.net%2fspecs%2fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html%23IDToken&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7ca97947375f324b13278508d29db9ea16%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=UqyFRA5dyeXsDvmbmwVJeZWrboUbFWN%2bR9OpJpvIG0c%3d>
>>> and the ID Token Validation section
>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=+http%3a%2f%2fopenid.net%2fspecs%2fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html%23IDTokenValidation&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7ca97947375f324b13278508d29db9ea16%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=LrFoSF%2bqjC75ilCneT3yFXJ30Nu8nu%2fbsj5LiEKJkus%3d>
>>> seems to maybe suggest something different, however. Like perhaps that the
>>> client id of the RP/client that made the authentication request could, in
>>> some totally unspecified circumstance, be the value of the azp claim and
>>> that the aud would not identify that client as an intended recipient. Am I
>>> misinterpreting things? I hope so because that seems like it'd be fragile
>>> from an interop perspective and is certainly more cumbersome for general
>>> JWT libraries to support.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4.1.3
>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2ftools.ietf.org%2fhtml%2frfc7519%23section-4.1.3&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7ca97947375f324b13278508d29db9ea16%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=UgVDJXRprGpK9ESVc5UcfRhoeVyqF4FqAreai1hKE%2b8%3d>
>>>
>>>  4.1.3.  "aud" (Audience) Claim
>>>
>>>    The "aud" (audience) claim identifies the recipients that the JWT is
>>>    intended for.  Each principal intended to process the JWT MUST
>>>    identify itself with a value in the audience claim.  If the principal
>>>    processing the claim does not identify itself with a value in the
>>>    "aud" claim when this claim is present, then the JWT MUST be
>>>    rejected.  In the general case, the "aud" value is an array of case-
>>>    sensitive strings, each containing a StringOrURI value.  In the
>>>    special case when the JWT has one audience, the "aud" value MAY be a
>>>    single case-sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value.  The
>>>    interpretation of audience values is generally application specific.
>>>    Use of this claim is OPTIONAL.
>>>
>>>
>>> from http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDToken
>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fopenid.net%2fspecs%2fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html%23IDToken&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7ca97947375f324b13278508d29db9ea16%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=UqyFRA5dyeXsDvmbmwVJeZWrboUbFWN%2bR9OpJpvIG0c%3d>
>>>
>>>   ...
>>>
>>>   aud
>>>
>>> REQUIRED. Audience(s) that this ID Token is intended for. It MUST
>>> contain the OAuth 2.0 client_id of the Relying Party as an audience
>>> value. It MAY also contain identifiers for other audiences. In the general
>>> case, the aud value is an array of case sensitive strings. In the
>>> common special case when there is one audience, the aud value MAY be a
>>> single case sensitive string.
>>>
>>>   ...
>>>
>>>   azp
>>>
>>> OPTIONAL. Authorized party - the party to which the ID Token was issued.
>>> If present, it MUST contain the OAuth 2.0 Client ID of this party. This
>>> Claim is only needed when the ID Token has a single audience value and that
>>> audience is different than the authorized party. It MAY be included even
>>> when the authorized party is the same as the sole audience. The azp
>>> value is a case sensitive string containing a StringOrURI value.
>>>
>>>   ...
>>>
>>> from
>>> http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDTokenValidation
>>> <https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3a%2f%2fopenid.net%2fspecs%2fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html%23IDTokenValidation&data=01%7c01%7cMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7ca97947375f324b13278508d29db9ea16%7c72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7c1&sdata=ko0MzMkFxNMQmWPYs%2fPYGgMvPE2m%2bhuj4vIUBIwyz1M%3d>
>>>
>>>   Clients MUST validate the ID Token in the Token Response in the
>>> following manner:
>>>
>>> ...
>>> 4. If the ID Token contains multiple audiences, the Client SHOULD verify
>>> that an azp Claim is present.
>>> ...
>>> 5. If an azp (authorized party) Claim is present, the Client SHOULD
>>> verify that its client_id is the Claim Value.
>>> ...
>>> 8 If the JWT alg Header Parameter uses a MAC based algorithm such as
>>> HS256, HS384, or HS512, the octets of the UTF-8 representation of the
>>> client_secret corresponding to the client_id contained in the aud
>>> (audience) Claim are used as the key to validate the signature. For MAC
>>> based algorithms, the behavior is unspecified if the aud is multi-valued or
>>> if an azp value is present that is different than the aud value.
>>> The current time MUST be before the time represented by the exp Claim.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
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-- 
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en
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