[Openid-specs-ab] Transient Client Secret Extension for OAuth

Nat Sakimura sakimura at gmail.com
Mon Jul 29 07:07:08 UTC 2013


Hi Brian,

inline:

2013/7/29 Brian Campbell <bcampbell at pingidentity.com>

> IMHO, invalid_grant is the proper error response code, not invalid_client.
>

I have thought a bit about that when I was writing it down.
invalid_grant is concerned about the token which has been previously
issued.
invalid_client is concerned about the client authentication.
In the initial path, I had it as invalid_grant, then, I thought - well, it
is the client
authentication that is failing when the client has provided invalid tcs.
The code is correct. It is the client authentication which is going wrong,
is it not?


>
> Along the same lines, I'd like to see it named something more like
> "message correlation id" rather than anything involving client secret.
>

The name "message correlation identifier" does not convey the nature of the
parameter, which is the high entropy credential for the client. Just for
the sake of the correlation, it does not have to have a high entropy. Thus,
I have chosen the name.


>
> This is a general OAuth problem and I believe the solution should be
> general too. Thus, at least the base definition of the parameter(s) should
> not require discovery or rely on any of the Connect documents.
>

OAuth generally does not need discovery. However, this spec really needs
it, at least in one form or another.
I have thought of making a new file but then that would amount to having
the client hit those discovery endpoints twice.
I did not want the duplicate situation that resulted in the dynamic client
registration. That's why I am referring OpenID Connect.
OpenID Connect originated the Discovery and Registration. On the hind site,
even registration should have been referring OpenID Connect documents
instead of duplicating. At least, that's how academic papers work :-)

Another idea is to have the metadata come back in the token response.
I actually prefer this. It increases the server traffic a bit, though.

The way it works is this.
Instead of doing the discovery and caching it at the client, the client
finds the server capability from the token endpoint reference. For this,
the server includes something like:

"meta": {
   "tcs_supported":true;
}

You guys know that I like this idea because then I would have a stub to put
link relationship there as well.
Do you like the idea? If so, I can update the draft in this manner.
Well, perhaps I should anyways.

Thanks for pointing out.

Best,

Nat




>
>
> On Sun, Jul 28, 2013 at 9:39 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> As some of you knows, passing the code securely to a native app on iOS
>> platform is next to impossible. Malicious application may register the same
>> custom scheme as the victim application and hope to obtain the code, whose
>> success rate is rather high.
>>
>> We have discussed about it during the OpenID Conenct Meeting at IETF 87
>> today, and I have captured the discussion in the form of I-D. It is pretty
>> short and hopefully easy to read.
>>
>> You can find it at:
>>
>> https://bitbucket.org/Nat/drafts/src/
>>
>> Comments are welcome.
>>
>> --
>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>> @_nat_en
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Openid-specs-ab mailing list
>> Openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net
>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-ab
>>
>>
>


-- 
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
Chairman, OpenID Foundation
http://nat.sakimura.org/
@_nat_en
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