[Openid-specs-ab] Lite Draft 8

Johnny Bufu jbufu at janrain.com
Fri Aug 19 02:15:54 UTC 2011


On 11-08-18 03:09 PM, Breno de Medeiros wrote:
> We may want to write a theoretical protocol that requires HTTPs.
>
> It's unlikely people will be able to login to their favorite news site
> using it. My guess is that this will be extensively used in non-HTTPs
> contexts, unless it fails altogether as a spec.
>
> Planning for success means that while we strongly encourage HTTPs, we
> should have mitigation measures for non-HTTPs case.

What's the leakage scenario when the ID token is used only once with the 
check session endpoint and not directly as the cookie value?

Johnny

> On Thu, Aug 18, 2011 at 15:05, Anthony Nadalin<tonynad at microsoft.com>  wrote:
>> In the current draft only 3.2.2 mentions HTTPS and does not state that it's mandatory
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net [mailto:openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net] On Behalf Of Johnny Bufu
>> Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2011 2:56 PM
>> To: Breno de Medeiros
>> Cc: openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net
>> Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-ab] Lite Draft 8
>>
>>
>> On 11-08-18 02:41 PM, Breno de Medeiros wrote:
>>> There's also a concern with HTTPs support (or lack thereof by some
>>> clients). An id_token that is used as a session cookie and leaks
>>> through an unprotected channel can presumably cause less damage than a
>>> full access_token might.
>>
>> Which parts of the protocol are not required to use HTTPS?
>>
>>> Regardless of HTTPs support, it's usually a good idea to treat cookies
>>> and API access tokens as different beasts for security reasons, and
>>> the id_token is functionally a session cookie for the client.
>>
>> The single token would be used one time as an access token for the check session API/endpoint, and the response from there as the actual cookie value/session identifier. Would this now be ok?
>>
>> Johnny
>>
>>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2011 at 13:47, John Bradley<ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>    wrote:
>>>> One of the early design decisions was to not mess with the access tokens people are currently using.
>>>>
>>>> I originally wanted to make the access token a JWT so that a single token could be used for both.
>>>>
>>>> The arguments against that were breaking existing API and a desire by people who do want to pass scope inside the token to separate the delegated access scopes from the session management info.
>>>> They didn't want both in the same token.
>>>>
>>>> Changing to a single token effects session management and the rest of the specs, that is a huge change.
>>>>
>>>> John
>>>> On 2011-08-18, at 3:46 PM, Johnny Bufu wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11-08-16 04:31 PM, John Bradley wrote:
>>>>>> The two tokens have potentially different scopes and lifetimes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are good reasons for separating resource authorization from session authentication.
>>>>>
>>>>> An OAuth token is, conceptually, an identifier for a grant that the server keeps in its database.
>>>>>
>>>>> Rather than emitting two different tokens, the server could associate the two grants with a single token, and service it differently based on the endpoint the token is presented at:
>>>>> - the sorter-lived, one-time use grant for the check session
>>>>> endpoint
>>>>> - the longer-lived, multiple-use grant for the userinfo endpoint
>>>>>
>>>>> This single token would be a short identifier, not a heavy(er) JWT, suitable for lite clients.
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11-08-17 07:35 PM, John Bradley wrote:
>>>>>> We did discuss using a JWT for the access token so that it could do
>>>>>> double duty.
>>>>>> Some people like Sales Force have existing code for there access
>>>>>> tokens so they don't want to change that.
>>>>>> Another issue is token size, making the session token carry all of
>>>>>> the scope information for the user-info and other endpoints may
>>>>>> make the token too large to be practical.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It would also be more complicated for the RP to get right, than
>>>>>> keeping the session and access grant tokens separate.
>>>>>
>>>>> Full clients wanting a signed JWT for optimization could indicate this in the authorization request. There shouldn't be much of a problem for servers to use the JWT as an identifier / access token for the userinfo grant, but full-clients' life should be made easier by including an equivalent but shorter userinfo access token in the JWT payload.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Thoughts on this proposal? I'd like to find out if I missed anything that would prevent it from covering the use-cases I've seen brought up on the list recently.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Johnny
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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