[Openid-specs-ab] OpenID Provider Commands - proposed WG specification

Thu Jan 23 14:52:16 UTC 2025

Hi Vladimir

By "enterprise app" are you referring to internal apps, or a B2B SaaS app?
Internal apps can have direct access to the directory in many cases, so I'm
assuming you are referring to B2B SaaS apps.

In my experience, an app needs to have a robust DB of user data. The OP
knows when the data changes, so can push to the RP whenever there is a
change, To ensure there the data is in sync in case a command was missed or
something, the OP occasionally can send a tenant_audit command to ensure
the RP has what the OP thinks it should have.

On Thu, Jan 23, 2025 at 8:43 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov / Connect2id via
Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:

> Hi Dick, hi Aaron,
>
> If I were an enterprise app developer, having an "account" and "tenant"
> resource hosted and managed for me by the OP would seem like a great
> convenience. I'd be able to cache the account and tenant data in my app,
> but that would not be so critical (as when data is received via commands),
> because whenever I need to, I'd be able to call upon an authoritative
> resource at the OP. If my app misses a command, that would seem to be less
> of an issue. A simple GET of the OP resource would always give me the
> correct current state and account data.
>
> Aaron, yes, an OP resource would require an access token. I haven't
> thought through that. Could the signed JWT for the state change be used as
> some form of authorisation?
>
> The "account" and "tenant" data look similar to the UserInfo resource we
> currently have in OIDC. With an added crucial feature, to communicate state
> changes from OP to RP.
>
> Vladimir
> On 16/01/2025 19:50, Dick Hardt via Openid-specs-ab wrote:
>
> Adding to Aaron's comments.
>
> The account and tenant information is all managed by the OP, and the OP
> knows when it changes, so the OP knows when to push the changes to the RP.
> Telling the RP to pull the data seems inefficient, and this approach allows
> the RP to be passive and receive data when it changes.
>
> But perhaps I am missing something in our suggestions. Can you elaborate
> on why you are suggesting that and what the advantages might be?
>
> Related: Karl and I have pondered how can the RP tell the OP it wants the
> metadata again. One approach would be the OP provides that functionality in
> its RP management console.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2025 at 2:27 PM Aaron Parecki via Openid-specs-ab <
> openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:
>
>> Vladimir, I understand the thought behind this suggestion, but I think it
>> only adds unnecessary complexity.
>>
>> The value of this draft comes from leveraging the existing relationship
>> and configuration between the RP and IdP, namely that the RP is necessarily
>> already configured to validate signed ID tokens, and this draft builds on
>> that to send signed tokens with the same signing key so that there isn't
>> another credential to configure and maintain.
>>
>> Alternatively, making the RP fetch the data means forcing the RP to
>> maintain an access token, defining an API request and response vocabulary,
>> defining endpoint discovery for the API, etc, much more work on both ends
>> for little benefit.
>>
>> Aaron
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 16, 2025 at 4:00 AM Vladimir Dzhuvinov / Connect2id via
>> Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Dick, Karl, hi.
>>>
>>> Interesting draft.
>>>
>>> I'm wondering whether the messaging and the overall architecture could
>>> be simplified by sending simple "state changed" JWTs from OP to RP. Instead
>>> of "command+data" JWTs.
>>>
>>>    - The "account" and "tenant" are protected resources at the OP.
>>>
>>>    - The "account" and "tenant" resources have a clearly designated
>>>    current state / status, e.g. "active".
>>>
>>>    - If the state changes the OP sends a "state changed" JWT.
>>>
>>>    - The RP can always check / poll the resource (for changes, or if it
>>>    suspects a missed JWT). Cache headers could be used to hint when to recheck.
>>>
>>>    - The resource may provide a history of the changes.
>>>
>>>
>>>    -
>>>
>>>
>>> Vladimir Dzhuvinov
>>>
>>> On 15/01/2025 14:29, Dick Hardt via Openid-specs-ab wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello WG (and chairs)
>>>
>>> Karl (cc'ed) and I have been working on a new protocol that complements
>>> OpenID Connect for an OP to centrally manage account lifecycles at RPs. We
>>> have also defined an Unauthorize Command which undoes whatever actions an
>>> RP did in a previous OpenID Connect login -- useful if an OP suspects an
>>> account or device had been compromised -- instructs an RP to "kill all the
>>> sessions and tokens"
>>>
>>> We contribute the IP in the attached HTML and Markdown files to the
>>> OpenID Foundation per the Foundations IPR.
>>>
>>> We have a FAQ as a note at the top, that I am including below for your
>>> convenience.
>>>
>>> We hope this work is of interest to others in the WG, and that together
>>> we can improve the security posture of implementers.
>>>
>>> /Dick & Karl
>>>
>>> *1. How does SCIM compare to OpenID Provider (OP) Commands?*
>>>
>>> The SCIM protocol is a general purpose protocol for a client to manage
>>> resources at a server. When the SCIM protocol is used between an IdP and an
>>> RP, the schema is defined by the RP. The resources managed are in the
>>> context of the RP Tenant in a multi-tenant RP. Any extensions to the schema
>>> are defined by the RP. This provided an interoperable protocol to manage RP
>>> resources. OpenID Provider Commands are an extension of a user Account
>>> created by OpenID Connect. It uses the same identity Claims that the OP
>>> issues for the user. It uses the same token Claims, and is verified the
>>> same way. OpenID Provider Commands are issued in the context of the OP
>>> Tenant in a multi-tenant OP.
>>>
>>> *2. How do Shared Signals / RISC compare to OpenID Provider Commands?*
>>>
>>> Shared Signals and RISC are events that one party is sharing with
>>> another party. The actions a receiving party takes upon receiving a signal
>>> are intentionally not defined. The actions taken by the RP when receiving
>>> an OpenID Provider Command is specified. This gives an OP control over the
>>> Account at the RP.
>>>
>>> *3. Are OpenID Provider Commands a replacement for SCIM, Shared Signals,
>>> or RISC?*
>>>
>>> No. These standards are deployed by organizations that have complex
>>> requirements, and these standards meet there needs. Most OP / RPs do not
>>> deploy any of these standards, as the implementation complexity is not
>>> warranted. OpenID Provider Commands are designed to build on OpenID
>>> Connect, allowing RPs using OpenID Connect an easy path to offer OPs a
>>> standard API for security and lifecycle operations.
>>>
>>> *4. Why are there only groups? Why not roles and entitlements?*
>>>
>>> OpenID Provider Commands are used to project the Tenant data managed
>>> centrally by the OP. Groups are a common term used by OPs to manage a
>>> collection of Accounts. The terms roles and entitlements tend to be RP
>>> specific. Generally, groups from the OP will be mapped to roles and/or
>>> entitlements that are RP specific, at the RP.
>>>
>>>
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