[Openid-specs-ab] Is authorize endpoint required in 'SSO for Mobile'? was: [External Sender] Re: Spec Call Notes 18-Nov-24
George Fletcher
george.fletcher at capitalone.com
Wed Nov 27 15:08:45 UTC 2024
Hi Brock,
Generally, yes. It should be possible to use the OAuth 2.0 for First Party
Apps to obtain the device secret by specifying the "device_sso" scope which
identifies that a device_secret should be returned from the token endpoint.
Of course, the OAuth 2.0 for First-Party Applications wasn't even an idea
when this spec was started. That said, given the spec is just at the
implementers draft stage, updating it to current times makes sense...
though it will likely introduce breaking changes for those who have already
implemented the spec. That might not matter too much if the implementations
are local to a first party environment.
Thanks,
George
On Wed, Nov 27, 2024 at 9:12 AM Brock Allen <brockallen at gmail.com> wrote:
> Thanks George.
>
> I'd also like to see some clarification in this document if the authorize
> endpoint is required to be used.
>
> What I mean is that what seems most important in this spec is the results
> from the token endpoint, and there are different ways a client might get
> results from the token endpoint (and not just by using the authorize
> endpoint). For example, the up and coming "OAuth 2.0 for First Party
> Clients" defines a way for a client to obtains results from the token
> endpoint. Could that flow (without using the authorize endpoint) then get a
> "device_secret", and then use that in another client app or on a different
> device to login via "OpenID Connect Native SSO for Mobile Apps"?
>
> Thanks.
>
> -Brock
>
> On 11/27/2024 8:55:44 AM, George Fletcher via Openid-specs-ab <
> openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:
> So I'd like to open the topic of updating the spec to not require the
> id_token or at least drastically reduce the dependence on the id_token in
> the flows.
>
> I'm very happy to work on those changes and produce an updated draft. I
> know some feel we don't need the spec at all but for those who've
> implemented it, or are interested in the work, is this a good path to
> pursue?
>
> Thanks,
> George
>
> On Tue, Nov 19, 2024 at 3:17 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov / Connect2id via
> Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:
>
>> When we implemented Native SSO we found the ID token to be redundant in
>> the token exchange step.
>>
>> The device_secret "token" can be made to include everything that the ID
>> token has, plus more if necessary. Thus the device_secret was entirely
>> sufficient to determine the SSO subject and what other properties were
>> necessary for the native session, such as the device session expiration and
>> the ACR of the original user authentication.
>>
>> I tend to agree that sometimes customers can't be demanding enough with
>> specs that bring cool new features. And just the opposite when the spec
>> does nothing significant, other than going to markedly improve their
>> security, long term. I just said to myself, I some of them are reading this.
>>
>> I think the self-help strategy to stay sane at this job - and that
>> includes on the customer front - is to produce specs that are consistently
>> & conceptually simple, easy to implement and fit the landscape of
>> surrounding specs. This is what feels bad and demoralises - having to
>> implement specs that conflict with one another or break previous guidance.
>> Then the acrobatics to explain and justify that to customers.
>>
>>
>> Vladimir Dzhuvinov
>>
>> On 19/11/2024 19:19, Brian Campbell via Openid-specs-ab wrote:
>>
>> Finding things in the archives is not easy (for me anyway) but here's one
>> historical account of my prior push-back on progressing Native SSO
>> https://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs-ab/2022-September/009376.html
>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs-ab/2022-September/009376.html__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIwOP8F1E$>
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 18, 2024 at 5:53 PM Michael Jones via Openid-specs-ab <
>> openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Spec Call Notes 18-Nov-24
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> George Fletcher
>>>
>>> Nat Sakimura
>>>
>>> Mike Jones
>>>
>>> Brian Campbell
>>>
>>> David Waite
>>>
>>> Tom Jones
>>>
>>> Aaron Parecki
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Native SSO spec
>>>
>>> https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/pull-requests/742
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/pull-requests/742__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIQtja1Hk$>
>>>
>>> Mike will review and merge if it looks OK
>>>
>>> There are 8 open issues for Native SSO - 3 to be closed
>>> by the PR above
>>>
>>> Brian questioned whether we should be taking this to
>>> final or not
>>>
>>> Given that it may not be the best
>>> practice for doing this
>>>
>>> He said that we could make it a blog post
>>>
>>> George asked if there is another best practice that we
>>> should document instead
>>>
>>> He observed that no one has proposed a
>>> better way
>>>
>>> Mike said that Okta has implemented, so we should
>>> involve them
>>>
>>> Yahoo has implemented it, Vladimir has
>>> implemented it
>>>
>>> George said that there's value in documenting these
>>> things
>>>
>>> He wanted the working group to weigh in
>>> to improve it, which they have
>>>
>>> Mike observed that we're also doing first-party app work
>>> in the OAuth WG
>>>
>>> (Aaron joined the call at this point)
>>>
>>> Mike asked about Okta implementing the Native SSO spec
>>>
>>> George said that Okta had extended it
>>> for a cross-device case in a prototype
>>>
>>> Aaron said that it's available as an API
>>>
>>>
>>> https://developer.okta.com/docs/guides/configure-native-sso/main/
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://developer.okta.com/docs/guides/configure-native-sso/main/__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIKkdTIj8$>
>>>
>>> Aaron said that Google has deployed a similar thing
>>>
>>> George said that he wrote this down so
>>> others could understand how to achieve what Google has
>>>
>>> Brian really dislikes the use of ID Tokens as hints and
>>> with different validation rules
>>>
>>> Brian said that that a sometimes problem with publishing
>>> specs is customers will see it and ask for it to be implemented
>>>
>>> We should be cognizant of that
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Mobile work
>>>
>>> George mused about whether we want to do any additional
>>> mobile-related work
>>>
>>> Mike asked what the MODRNA WG is doing now
>>>
>>> People on the call didn't know
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Bitbucket Issues
>>>
>>>
>>> https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/issues?status=new&status=open&status=submitted&is_spam=!spam
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/issues?status=new&status=open&status=submitted&is_spam=!spam__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIl9tvU48$>
>>>
>>> No new issues
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Working Group GitHub Repositories
>>>
>>> We now have four working group GitHub repositories:
>>>
>>> 1. https://github.com/openid/federation
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/federation__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kICqMvs5A$>
>>>
>>> 2. https://github.com/openid/federation-extended-listing
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/federation-extended-listing__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kI5gKr-Ao$>
>>>
>>> No issues or PRs
>>>
>>> Implementations requested
>>>
>>> 3. https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIpxyRY3A$>
>>>
>>> 14 open issues
>>>
>>> Many of the early ones
>>> record things that were in pre-adopted versions of the spec
>>>
>>>
>>> https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/39
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/39__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kITErbkb8$>
>>> Authorized Credential within OpenID4VP metadata using Duckle
>>>
>>> Mike will review
>>>
>>>
>>> https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/40
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/40__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIv4NA8x8$>
>>> Trust Marks examples
>>>
>>> The examples seem
>>> reasonable
>>>
>>>
>>> https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/41
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/41__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIrMFRf9I$>
>>> Complex Trust Marks examples
>>>
>>> What's the motivation
>>> for these examples?
>>>
>>>
>>> https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/42
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/federation-wallet/issues/42__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIjUMqFGc$>
>>> Trust Mark with Intended Usage
>>>
>>> ditto
>>>
>>> 4. https://github.com/openid/rp-metadata-choices
>>> <https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://github.com/openid/rp-metadata-choices__;!!FrPt2g6CO4Wadw!IZf3UY-vBkVT-mEDYe6n1IUKwyjYi-VeluMtz_F5Lzadweo4tTxROsj8r5bqiQp7AnKDl_7D3ky0JFu68e27qHMC0oeRX9kIGYgdnsI$>
>>>
>>> No issues or PRs
>>>
>>> Mike knows of work to do due to the
>>> discussion on the list after the spec was contributed
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Nat pointed out that we need to update the repository
>>> page for the WG to list all the repositories
>>>
>>> Mike agreed to take the action to do that
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OpenID4VP
>>>
>>> It's currently in the 45-day foundation-wide review as a
>>> proposed Implementer's Draft
>>>
>>> Tom asked about user consent with credential presentation
>>>
>>> Mike suggested that if he has objections to the spec
>>> that he put them in issues
>>>
>>> Then the objections are actionable
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Openid-specs-ab mailing list
>>> Openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net
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>>>
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