[Openid-specs-ab] [External Sender] Two questions on Native SSO draft
Vladimir Dzhuvinov
vladimir at connect2id.com
Fri Feb 9 09:41:25 UTC 2024
Hi George,
It would be really helpful to have the clarification in pt 2 in the
spec. I have received questions of the "how does this native SSO compare
to web SSO" kind on multiple occasions in the past. This will aid
adoption because people will now have a clear picture in their mind
where the security properties of native SSO stand in relation to web
based SSO (which by now should be well known and understood).
Vladimir
On 08/02/2024 17:20, George Fletcher via Openid-specs-ab wrote:
> Comments inline...
>
> On Wed, Feb 7, 2024 at 8:19 PM Nat Sakimura via Openid-specs-ab
> <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:
>
> Hi
>
> (Mainly to George)
>
> While reading the Native SSO draft, I stumbled on the following
> questions. If you could clarify them, it would be helpful.
>
> 1) Device secret seems to be a token that is returned from the
> token endpoint. Would it not be more appropriate to be called
> device_token or something?
>
> The name device_secret came from an IIW session where I asked about
> naming. Yes it is a token, issued by the authorization server and it
> is intended to be "secret" between that device instance and the
> Authorization server. I'm not sure changing the name at this time
> would be good given the number of deployed implementations.
>
> 2) Is there any provision that assures the user of Native App 1
> and Native App 2 is the same?
>
> Within the specification, there isn't any check. If we think about SSO
> from a web perspective, there would not likely be a check of user
> identity during the SSO flow. We consider use of the same device
> instance as sufficient proof that the user is the same. If Native App
> 2 requires an "identity proof" it could do it's own say faceID
> challenge before engaging the Native SSO spec. So I think this is
> possible outside of the current spec.
>
> I could probably add something to the security considerations section
> if you think that would be useful.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Nat Sakimura
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