[Openid-specs-ab] ITP and OIDC session issues

[David Waite]

Just a FYI, SFAuthenticationSession is deprecated in iOS 12, for ASWebAuthenticationSession <https://developer.apple.com/documentation/authenticationservices/aswebauthenticationsession?language=objc>. As far as I can tell (without installing a beta on my phone) it is functionally equivalent, just externalized from the SafariServices package into the new AuthenticationServices package.

It was talked about at https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2018/204/ <https://developer.apple.com/videos/play/wwdc2018/204/> (28’36" in)

-DW

P.S. Is that four different mechanisms across 5 major versions? Good thing there are libraries to help with this.


> On Jun 6, 2018, at 1:18 PM, Mike Jones <michael.jones at microsoft.com> wrote:
> 
> For what it’s worth, the OpenID community successfully engaged with Apple last year to prevent them from breaking SSO when iOS 11 was released.  Apple added the SFAuthenticationSession API in response to the feedback provided.  It’s probably possible for us to engage to prevent breakage again if there’s a clear problem definition and ask.
>  
>                                                        -- Mike
>  
> From: Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net> On Behalf Of Vittorio Bertocci via Openid-specs-ab
> Sent: Wednesday, June 6, 2018 12:05 PM
> To: David Waite <david at alkaline-solutions.com>
> Cc: openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net
> Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-ab] ITP and OIDC session issues
>  
> Thanks David.
> 
> Unfortunately server side session isn't an option for the JS SDK use case, where the app might not have a backend (and even if it does, enlisting it to acquire and renew tokens to be used by the JS frontend would entail adding legs to the protocol).
> 
> About your conversation with Apple: would you be able to keep the list updated on what you learn from them? I would be happy to join the conversation and articulate the SDK use case, if that helps.
> 
> Use of iFrames for renewing tokens has never been trouble free (the zones in IE Brock mentioned in a different branch, disabled 3rd party cookies etc) but this change would make the problem far more ubiquitous, to the point that standard workarounds (don;t disable 3rd party cookies; etc) will go from controversial to unfeasible.
> 
> Thx
> 
> V.
> 
>  
> On 6/6/18 10:58 AM, David Waite wrote:
> Hi Vittorio, 
>  
> Yes, Apple seems to be further moving from a model where all state is isolated not just on the origin of the content, but segmented on both the top-level URL bar location and the remote origin, e.g. a (local location, remote location) pair.
>  
> They had this blog post about the change: https://webkit.org/blog/8311/intelligent-tracking-prevention-2-0/ <https://webkit.org/blog/8311/intelligent-tracking-prevention-2-0/>
>  
> The option to prompt the user for storage access that apple has provided should only prompt once per site (hopefully), but can only be triggered once the user has interacted with that site, e.g. clicked on the iframe. So prompting is likely not only a bad UX from prompting, but would require the user to interact with a component that isn’t providing obvious value.
>  
> The RFC is for the session access API that they have implemented above, prompting the user and requiring user interaction to use.
>  
> Hopefully it is not too self-serving to note that the DTVA proposal uses back-end API to coordinate session management, so it should not be affected by this change.
>  
>  
> As a second point, I reached out to the web evangelist at Apple for clarification on how federated login sites can avoid being classified as tracking under ITP. In particular, it seems a fully transparent SSO (without user interaction with the IDP site) may cause the IDP to be classified, at which point future redirects for SSO will get a (RP, IDP) segmented state, with the user appearing unauthenticated and the browser looking like a unique browser. 
>  
> There are a lot of technical, security, and user knowledge/empowerment reasons to always have an IDP interaction on SSO, but it is a behavior that a lot of deployments strive very hard to avoid.
>  
> -DW
> 
> 
> On Jun 6, 2018, at 9:53 AM, Vittorio Bertocci via Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>> wrote:
>  
> Hi all,
> We have been having issues with renewing tokens via invisible iFrame in our Javascript SDKs in the latest version of Safari - and yesterday's news about ITP 2.0 seem to suggest that the new default on Apple devices will be equivalent to disabling 3rd party cookies, which AFAIK breaks OIDC session management... and/or start displaying dialogs warning the user that they are being tracked at every operation.
> ·        Did anyone else experience similar issues?
> ·        What are the WG's thoughts about whether this calls for a revision of how session works in OIDC?
> ·        There is one RFC for WebKit that could provide an alternative location for the session, detailed here <https://github.com/whatwg/html/issues/3338>. Did anyone consider it? Any insights?
> If the issue is confirmed, that will make use of OIDC session and related token renewal machinery unfeasible on Macs, iPhones and iPads. And without official guidance, that will likely spur a cottage industry of custom solutions. I hope we can come up with guidance that addresses the problem before that happens.
> Thanks in advance for your insights
> V. 
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