[Openid-specs-ab] jku and x5u

[John Bradley]

Yes for what we are doing. However JOSE needs to support more trust models than Connect.

On 2013-04-02, at 6:54 PM, Tim Bray <tbray at textuality.com> wrote:

> From where I sit, the most obvious thing to do is look at the issuer claim, resolve ${issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration, extract the jwk-url claim, fetch the jwk, and validate using that.  For the kind of consumer/internet stuff we do, wouldn't that nearly always be the right choice?
> 
> -T
> 
> 
> On Tue, Apr 2, 2013 at 11:48 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig at gmx.net> wrote:
> Hi Tim,
> 
> There are three ways to shuffle keys around:
> 
> * per value: you include the key in the message
> * per reference: you include a pointer to the key (e.g., a URL)
> * out-of-band: here you just give the key a name without telling where to find it.
> 
> Needless to say that you have to be careful with all three mechanisms when it comes to security.
> 
> You are already thinking about a complete use case that goes beyond what these header parameters by itself are able to answer.
> 
> Ciao
> Hannes
> 
> 
> 
> On 04/02/2013 09:35 PM, Tim Bray wrote:
> Sorry, I’m probably failing to understand because I’m a crypto moron,
> but if I want to use keys to validate a JWT allegedly from example.com
> <http://example.com>, I’m not going to believe anything in the JWT until
> I’ve checked using example.com <http://example.com>’s keys, so why
> 
> should I believe the JWT’s assertion about where to get the keys to
> validate it?  -T
> 
> 
> On Tue, Apr 2, 2013 at 11:27 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones at microsoft.com
> <mailto:Michael.Jones at microsoft.com>> wrote:
> 
>     Yes, that’s exactly it.  If you already know where the keys are or
>     what they are (for instance, if you’ve established that information
>     at registration time), there’s no need to use these parameters.  But
>     for some use cases, this is valuable information that can be
>     dynamically provided.  (The Key ID (“kid”) can also be dynamically
>     provided, if appropriate to the use case.)____
> 
>     __ __
> 
>                                                                      --
>     Mike____
> 
>     __ __
> 
>     *From:*openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net
>     <mailto:openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net>
>     [mailto:openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net
>     <mailto:openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net>] *On Behalf Of
>     *Tim Bray
>     *Sent:* Tuesday, April 02, 2013 11:19 AM
>     *To:* <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net
>     <mailto:openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>>
>     *Subject:* [Openid-specs-ab] jku and x5u____
> 
>     __ __
> 
> 
>     Almost certainly I’m just missing something obvious, but I’m having
>     trouble understanding why the jku and x5u header claims exist.  The
>     idea is I get a message and believe the message’s assertion about
>     where I should go to get the cert to validate the message?  -T____
> 
> 
> 
> 
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