[Openid-specs-ab] Id token at token endpoint
Torsten Lodderstedt
torsten at lodderstedt.net
Sat Dec 29 16:59:14 UTC 2012
Hi John,
I'would be fine with the change you proposed.
Regards,
Torsten.
Am 29.12.2012 um 16:52 schrieb John Bradley <ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>:
> We have discussed connect and the resource owner credentials flow.
>
> I think the decision was to try and not preclude it but that it probably needs its own extension spec.
>
> It is different in that many of the things that work through the front channel won't work.
>
> It is really a type of assertion flow where the client is trading a set of credentials for an assertion & token. rather than a SSO flow.
>
> I don't happen to like the resource owner credentials flow as it is not comparable with multi factor authentication etc.
>
> I would be OK with changing this to say that connect only defines returning a id_token with the code grant, but other grant types may define the semantics returning a id_token if appropriate.
>
> John B.
>
> On 2012-12-29, at 6:30 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten at lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>
>> *** taking this discussion to the list again :-) ***
>>
>> In my opinion, the id token represents an authentication event and it doesn't matter whether this event took place in a web browser or during a backend call.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Torsten.
>>
>> Am 29.12.2012 um 00:41 schrieb Brian Campbell <bcampbell at pingidentity.com>:
>>
>>> So an ID Token is tied (as much as is possible) to a web session at which the end user is present, which is really only achieved though interaction with the authorization endpoint. I'm only guessing/assuming though.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 3:08 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten at lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>>>> Why?
>>>>
>>>> Am 28.12.2012 um 22:56 schrieb Brian Campbell <bcampbell at pingidentity.com>:
>>>>
>>>>> I'd always assumed that the intent was to preclude it?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 1:25 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten at lodderstedt.net> wrote:
>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I just noticed the following statement in messages:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Note that id_token MUST NOT be returned if the grant_type is not authorization_code"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What is the rational for this restriction? I remember discussions not to allow an exchange of refresh tokens for id tokens. That's ok. But I can imagine to provide clients with id tokens based on the password grant type. Do you want to preclude this?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Torsten.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> Openid-specs-ab mailing list
>>>>>> Openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net
>>>>>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-ab
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Openid-specs-ab mailing list
>> Openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net
>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-ab
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs-ab/attachments/20121229/6a023686/attachment.html>
More information about the Openid-specs-ab
mailing list