[Openid-specs-ab] Connect Flows and Userinfo Endpoint

Nat sakimura at gmail.com
Fri Jan 7 16:06:42 UTC 2011


That is the whole point I and Hideki was making. 

I assumed that what David is pointing out is that the protected resource being a PoCo endpoint directly or existing OAuth endpoint. 

=nat via iPhone

On 2011/01/08, at 0:24, John Bradley <ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com> wrote:

> One of the motivating factors of the JWT is that it can be a oAuth access token.
> 
> It seems simpler to include claims like userID in the signed access token,  rather than having to include a separate access token inside.
> The access token is for the user info endpoint in ether case.
> 
> Accessing public info at the user-info endpoint without a token should not be impacted by the access token format.  Am I missing something?
> 
> If you get the access token through some other flow there is no particular issue with it being a JWT or some other format as long as the protected resource understands it.
> 
> Or are you talking about the protected resource being a PoCo endpoint directly?
> 
> John B.
> 
> 
> On 2011-01-07, at 6:39 AM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
> 
>> Hmmm. That is interesting. So, it means that I should not optimize for the OpenID/OAuth use cases. The two cases below are different use cases than the OpenID/OAuth protected resource access. Is there any other use cases that people have in mind? 
>> 
>> On Fri, Jan 7, 2011 at 4:43 PM, David Recordon <dr at fb.com> wrote:
>> I see two cases which may not work here:
>> you're requesting public data in which case just a userid is required and no access token or JWT
>> For accessing public data, one can always ask without a token. 
>> (I actually like the graph.facebook.com/username style access.) 
>> Using JWT received as a token to access restricted content does not  prevent this behavior. 
>> Am I missing something? (In the older version of the connect proposal, it was returning such URL instead of opaque user_id. That was good.) So this does not seem to be a blocking factor. 
> 
> 
>> you got the access token via a non-OpenID OAuth 2.0 flow. I can imagine a PoCo endpoint doubling as the OpenID user info API.
>> This probably is more relevant. 
>> 
>> Then the question would gets to the point Hideki pointed out: 
>> why cannot we make "signed" as we call now the "access_token" with token_type=signed_openid? 
>> It will save us from defining an OAuth extension variable called "signed" and more OAuth2.0 compliant. 
>> 
>> (As a side issue: I started to feel that we probably do not need "code" in the OAuth2.0 spec., but just "access_token" with type="authz_code". "code" is just another type of access_token which can only be used once and at the authz endpoint.)
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> On 1/6/11 11:40 PM, "Nat Sakimura" <sakimura at gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi guys. 
>> 
>> Do you have objection to passing the entire JWT ("signed") instead of access_token and user_id extracted to the UserInfo endpoint? 
>> That seems to be a lot simpler. 
>> 
>> =nat
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>> http://www.sakimura.org/en/
>> http://twitter.com/_nat_en
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> 
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