[security] Security issue with ruby-openid library

[Chris]

Nat, no response from either project maintainer for the ruby-openid
project.  I am communicating privately with known affected developers, but
I suspect there are hundreds more that I haven't discovered through manual
research.

In my testing, I found a PHP open source library for OpenID named
"LightOpenID" that is also high-risk to SSRF attacks.  This PHP library
appears to be quite popular as well in the community, and in my opinion, is
even riskier than ruby-openid.  In addition to the SSRF weakness, I was
able to demonstrate auth bypass against one affected app by performing what
is known as a Malicious Endpoint Attack (an attacker spoof's an OpenID 2.0
Provider (OP), and uses the Blind SSRF to gain unauthorized access to other
app user accounts).

The developer of the LightOpenID library has a notice at the top of his
READE.md: NOTICE. I am no longer able to support or maintain this project -
if you would like to take over the project, please drop me a line.

I am communicating privately with known affected developers who use this
vulnerable OpenID library, but again, I suspect there are many many more
that I don't know about.

I'll keep in touch using this thread.  If you need more information, or
want more detail over a protected channel, let me know.

Best Regards
-chris



On Sat, Mar 2, 2019 at 9:19 AM Chris <setenforce1 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Thanks Nat, I reached out via email to who I believe is the project
> maintainer yesterday.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Chris
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019, 11:27 PM n-sakimura <n-sakimura at nri.co.jp> wrote:
>
>> Chris,
>>
>> Thanks for reaching out. Sorry that I could not respond earlier.
>> I was flying from Tokyo to San Francisco.
>>
>> I will let the secretariat know about it so that they can act
>> accordingly.
>>
>> In the mean time, if you could use your own path to get in touch with the
>> author of the gem, it would be great as well as it is over the weekend in
>> the U.S.
>>
>> Additionally, I will Bering it up in the board meeting to make our
>> process more effective on these things.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Nat Sakimura
>> Chairmen of the board
>> OpenID Foundation
>>
>> ------------------------------
>> *差出人:* security <openid-security-bounces at lists.openid.net> (Chris <
>> setenforce1 at gmail.com> の代理)
>> *送信日時:* 水曜日, 2月 27, 2019 9:09 午前
>> *宛先:* openid-security at lists.openid.net
>> *件名:* [security] Security issue with ruby-openid library
>>
>> openid-security mailing list:
>>
>> I have discovered a remotely exploitable weakness in the ruby-openid
>> library that Rails web applications use to integrate with OpenID
>> Providers.  Severity can range from medium to critical, depending on how a
>> web application developer chose to implement the ruby-openid library.
>> Developers who based their OpenID integration heavily on the "example app"
>> provided by the project are at highest risk.
>>
>> I hesitate to provide too much detail publicly, as I would prefer to
>> responsibly report the details of this issue privately, to ensure that the
>> OpenID community has time to confirm my findings, implement appropriate
>> code changes, and communicate effectively with affected developers.
>>
>> Can one of the main admins on the list please suggest a viable approach?
>> One of the primary maintainers of the ruby-openid project could contact me
>> directly (reply to this email?), or I could be provided with a short list
>> of maintainers to contact.
>>
>> Thank you
>> -
>> Chris
>>
>
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