[security] Must to have for an Open ID Provider

Tue Mar 23 22:53:36 UTC 2010

Well, the third point listed is

"OpenID Providers MUST not allow their Login or Approval screens to be
framed by the RP. Allowing the Login or Approval screens to be framed makes
the approval flow vulnerable to
clickjacking<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking>,
and trains users to expect the URL Location bar to not have the OPs URL,
leaving them vulnerable to phishing."

Framing and clickjacking are already covered. So presumably the first
recommendation is trying to make a separate point.

- Jacob.

On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 11:44 AM, Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott at gmail.com>wrote:

> I think what that is getting at is that a Provider should not allow itself
> to be hosted in a frame.  One objective being that the user can see in the
> address bar that they're talking to the genuine Provider and not a phishing
> site. Another objective being to mitigate against click-jacking attacks that
> iframe content is vulnerable to.
>
> --
> Andrew Arnott
> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death
> your right to say it." - S. G. Tallentyre
>
>
> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 3:21 PM, Jacob Bellamy <toarms at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Actually one thing that has always had me a bit confused about the
>> security recommendations in the wiki is the following:
>> "OpenID Providers that use passwords to authenticate users MUST require
>> that their password verification form be displayed in an independent browser
>> window or popup, with the address bar displayed. OpenID Providers are
>> strongly encouraged to educate their users about the dangers of phishing,
>> and how to recognize the OP's login screen."
>>
>> How exactly does putting the login in a pop-up help prevent phishing?
>>
>> - Jacob.
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 5:30 AM, David Recordon <recordond at gmail.com>wrote:
>>
>>> And take a look at http://wiki.openid.net/OpenID-Security-Best-Practices
>>> .
>>>
>>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 6:58 AM, Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> > I'll add a few:
>>> >
>>> > Make sure to include XSRF measures on decision pages (do you want to
>>> log
>>> > into [this RP]?)
>>> > Be sure to not release new attribute values to each requesting RP
>>> without
>>> > prompting the user first.
>>> > For recycled OpenIDs, use the #fragment provision allowed for in the
>>> OpenID
>>> > 2.0 spec.
>>> > Consider only allowing OpenID 2.0 RPs and disallowing 1.1 RPs.  That
>>> said, I
>>> > think most of the added security of 2.0 can be created against 1.1 RPs
>>> > anyway, and DotNetOpenAuth is one such library that already does this.
>>> But
>>> > it depends on your customers, I'd say, as an argument for just 2.0
>>> support
>>> > is to help encourage the 1.1 RPs to finally upgrade.
>>> >
>>> > Although it hasn't yet been refactored as we've once discussed on this
>>> list,
>>> > http://wiki.openid.net/SecurityIssues may still be a good resource for
>>> you
>>> > or a collecting ground for the results of this thread.
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > Andrew Arnott
>>> > "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the
>>> death
>>> > your right to say it." - S. G. Tallentyre
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 6:17 AM, Bart van Delft <
>>> bartvandelft at yahoo.com>
>>> > wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> Hi Jaideep,
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Hope the following helps you answering your questions.
>>> >>
>>> >> I happen to be looking into OpenID security aspects recently, so I
>>> could
>>> >> name a few things that might be useful (but a context would help
>>> indeed).
>>> >> Searching the internet you'll find a lot of security aspects on
>>> OpenID,
>>> >> however there does not appear to be a coherent / complete list
>>> somewhere.
>>> >> When our project is over (end of April) we'll post a 'whitepaper' on
>>> the
>>> >> findings online, hoping it helps and stimulates the community - the
>>> hints
>>> >> below at least give you an idea of what to look for, exact details on
>>> every
>>> >> aspect will be in the paper.
>>> >>
>>> >> - use a standard, widely used and known to be reasonable secure
>>> library. I
>>> >> do not happen to know which ones those are, but sure others do :-) See
>>> the
>>> >> openid website for an extensive list. Most of the following points
>>> could be
>>> >> included in libraries but I am not aware of that being the case.
>>> >> (http://openid.net/developers/libraries/)
>>> >> - do not allow your provider's page to be framed. This prevents
>>> >> clickjacking / 'secretly' logging in users (or at least users will
>>> notice
>>> >> something strange is going on)
>>> >> - obey a Relying Party's policy such as "the user has to 'sign in'
>>> again
>>> >> before granting permission" etc. as much as possible. You could also
>>> choose
>>> >> to use these additional security measures by default.
>>> >> - use HTTPS
>>> >> - keep in mind the risk of 'OpenID recycling': if the account
>>> >> foo at yourOP.com changes from owner, you will probably clear the data
>>> of the
>>> >> previous owner from your server, however the RP's won't notice and the
>>> new
>>> >> owner could see the data on those RP's from the previous owner - if
>>> you find
>>> >> a good way to handle that problem please let me know :-)
>>> >> - phishing is even more of a problem than on regular login forms, so
>>> think
>>> >> about creating possibilities for users to set a 'personal icon', or
>>> have a
>>> >> 'time delayed submit button'. You could also inform your users about
>>> >> applications/addons such as seatBelt.
>>> >>
>>> >> I don't know what you precisely mean by not so famous? there are e.g.
>>> >> myid.net  and myopenid.com that are not infamous but do seem to give
>>> the
>>> >> user confidence in being in a secure environment.
>>> >>
>>> >> HTH,
>>> >>
>>> >> Bart van Delft
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> ________________________________
>>> >> From: Breno de Medeiros <breno at google.com>
>>> >> To: Jaideep Khandelwal <jdk2588 at gmail.com>
>>> >> Cc: openid-security at lists.openid.net
>>> >> Sent: Tue, March 23, 2010 1:29:23 PM
>>> >> Subject: Re: [security] Must to have for an Open ID Provider
>>> >>
>>> >> Hi Jaideep,
>>> >>
>>> >> Could you give some context about this request? Are you looking to put
>>> >> together developer documentation/guidance for external consumption? Or
>>> >> is this an internal survey?
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 13:36, Jaideep Khandelwal <jdk2588 at gmail.com>
>>> >> wrote:
>>> >> > Hello everyone,
>>> >> >
>>> >> > I have few queries that I need to ask ,
>>> >> >
>>> >> > What are the  security concerns that should be kept in a mind while
>>> >> > developing your own Open ID provider and what are the ways to check
>>> all
>>> >> > the
>>> >> > security aspects .
>>> >> > Can some one suggest some of the NOT SO FAMOUS Open ID providers but
>>> >> > providing the end users a sense of security.
>>> >> > Some links and resources will be helpful and appreciated
>>> >> >
>>> >> > Thanks
>>> >> >
>>> >> > Regards
>>> >> > Jaideep
>>> >> >
>>> >> > _______________________________________________
>>> >> > security mailing list
>>> >> > security at lists.openid.net
>>> >> > http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>> >> >
>>> >> >
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> --
>>> >> --Breno
>>> >>
>>> >> +1 (650) 214-1007 desk
>>> >> +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
>>> >> MTV-41-3 : 383-A
>>> >> PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7)
>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>> >> security mailing list
>>> >> security at lists.openid.net
>>> >> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> Send instant messages to your online friends
>>> http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com
>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>> >> security mailing list
>>> >> security at lists.openid.net
>>> >> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > security mailing list
>>> > security at lists.openid.net
>>> > http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>> >
>>> >
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> security mailing list
>>> security at lists.openid.net
>>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> security mailing list
>> security at lists.openid.net
>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>
>>
>
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