[security] Widespread Timing Vulnerabilities in OpenID implementations

[Eric Norman]

If I understand the alleged attack correctly, it depends on the timing difference if a standard
byte sequence comparison is "optimized" by exiting as soon as two bytes differ.

Has code been written that actually demonstrates that this can be effective?  That is, has code
been written to demonstrate that the time to execute, for instance, about two instructions
between failure of the byte comparison at the first byte and failure at the second byte can
actually be detected over a network?

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