[security] passing password on identification request?
John Bradley
ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com
Mon Oct 19 15:40:49 UTC 2009
The user needs to approve the oAuth access somehow. It only needs to
be a web browser if you want to use openID for that.
Sorry for the bad news, but openID requires a browser at this point.
If you are the authenticator for the account and not a third party
then there are lots of ways to solve your problem, but you will have
to stretch to claim they have any connection to openID.
John B.
On 2009-10-19, at 12:28 PM, Anthony Brassac wrote:
> But no matter what, even with oAuth I will need to log in using a
> web browser at some point in order to get that key/secret
> combination, won't i? Unless there are providers that offer
> programmatic log in?
>
> I have a feeling we are going to end up having to write something
> ourselves :S
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2009 at 11:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>
> wrote:
> You can have the user authenticate to the oAuth provider via openID
> if it is a condition of the grant:)
>
> That may be the best way to do it anyway depending on how the app is
> configured.
>
> John B.
>
> On 2009-10-15, at 12:00 PM, Anthony Brassac wrote:
>
>> Thanks all for your replies, oAuth looks like it could do it for
>> us, however it seems management had agreed upon using OpenID
>> (research grant related I think), so I'll have to see what gives.
>> Anyway, I appreciate your support.
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 1:47 AM, SitG Admin <sysadmin at shadowsinthegarden.com
>> > wrote:
>> Users giving there passwords to RPs is what openID is trying to
>> prevent.
>> That is why passwords are not supported in the redirect.
>>
>> Hmm . . . minor clarification here, though: users giving passwords
>> *their passwords for the OP* (or otherwise transmitting "in the
>> clear") is not compatible with OpenID.
>>
>> If the RP wants to ask for another password (one local to that
>> system), e.g. for rarely invoked high levels of access, it *might*
>> be compatible with OpenID (depends on the exact use, but isn't
>> automatically NOT compatible).
>>
>> The description Anthony gave sounds vaguely like Kerberos (from the
>> MIT dialogue), but my mind is stuffed full of other things right
>> now and I get a bit of a headache just getting some meaning out of
>> roughly half of it (the rest seems beyond me tonight).
>>
>> -Shade
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> security mailing list
>> security at lists.openid.net
>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-security/attachments/20091019/90f8e4d5/attachment.htm>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: smime.p7s
Type: application/pkcs7-signature
Size: 2468 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-security/attachments/20091019/90f8e4d5/attachment.bin>
More information about the security
mailing list