[security] passing password on identification request?

John Bradley ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com
Mon Oct 19 15:40:49 UTC 2009


The user needs to approve the oAuth access somehow.  It only needs to  
be a web browser if you want to use openID for that.

Sorry for the bad news, but openID requires a browser at this point.

If you are the authenticator for the account and not a third party  
then there are lots of ways to solve your problem,  but you will have  
to stretch to claim they have any connection to openID.

John B.
On 2009-10-19, at 12:28 PM, Anthony Brassac wrote:

> But no matter what, even with oAuth I will need to log in using a  
> web browser at some point in order to get that key/secret  
> combination, won't i? Unless there are providers that offer  
> programmatic log in?
>
> I have a feeling we are going to end up having to write something  
> ourselves :S
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2009 at 11:54 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>  
> wrote:
> You can have the user authenticate to the oAuth provider via openID  
> if it is a condition of the grant:)
>
> That may be the best way to do it anyway depending on how the app is  
> configured.
>
> John B.
>
> On 2009-10-15, at 12:00 PM, Anthony Brassac wrote:
>
>> Thanks all for your replies, oAuth looks like it could do it for  
>> us, however it seems management had agreed upon using OpenID  
>> (research grant related I think), so I'll have to see what gives.  
>> Anyway, I appreciate your support.
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 14, 2009 at 1:47 AM, SitG Admin <sysadmin at shadowsinthegarden.com 
>> > wrote:
>> Users giving there passwords to RPs is what openID is trying to  
>> prevent.
>> That is why passwords are not supported in the redirect.
>>
>> Hmm . . . minor clarification here, though: users giving passwords  
>> *their passwords for the OP* (or otherwise transmitting "in the  
>> clear") is not compatible with OpenID.
>>
>> If the RP wants to ask for another password (one local to that  
>> system), e.g. for rarely invoked high levels of access, it *might*  
>> be compatible with OpenID (depends on the exact use, but isn't  
>> automatically NOT compatible).
>>
>> The description Anthony gave sounds vaguely like Kerberos (from the  
>> MIT dialogue), but my mind is stuffed full of other things right  
>> now and I get a bit of a headache just getting some meaning out of  
>> roughly half of it (the rest seems beyond me tonight).
>>
>> -Shade
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> security mailing list
>> security at lists.openid.net
>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-security
>>
>
>

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