[security] Please convince me not to ban SSL (OP's)

SitG Admin sysadmin at shadowsinthegarden.com
Fri May 8 15:43:34 UTC 2009


>when I use OpenID on a wireless network in a coffee shop, it's fairly
>easy for an attacker to interfere with my connection to an HTTP OP,

I'm not too worried about that, I can always just spit out an error 
message instead of redirecting users.

>but it's much harder for that attacker to interfere with the backend
>communication between the RP and the server that hosts my URI

This is the area where I'm trying to move past "reasonable security" 
to "maximum security" :)

All the security in the world on an OP doesn't do any good at all if 
the attacker can get DNS to say "Oh, that URI is actually over here; 
and the page has new delegation headers, by the way."

(To clarify, I'm fine with URI's that have SSL delegating to OP's 
that also have SSL, since SSL-all-the-way wouldn't be vulnerable to 
the same attack here - it's when users insist on an unprotected URI 
that I'd want to insist upon warning them rather than blithely 
accepting *and validating* their illusions of security. This does 
disturb me, though, because of how it generally restricts URI's to 
personal domains and dedicated IDP's that can afford SSL for pages - 
I went to a Geocities homepage and went to https, no response.)

-Shade



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