[security] PAPE Policy for RPs to force authentication without browser cookie
Nate Klingenstein
ndk at internet2.edu
Wed Jul 1 06:27:46 UTC 2009
Dirk,
> Good catch. That's another argument for max_auth_age in the request
> merely being a hint, and auth_time in the response being the thing
> that matters.
This is exactly my point, but phrased better than my long-winded
responses. Until we get signed requests, the request is just
signaling, and that is hard to do precisely in this instance. It can
signal the oldest authentication it thinks it will accept, but that's
flaky in a federated world with multiple servers with little state if
you're talking about very narrow windows, and without request signing,
it's just not a rule the OP can be asked to enforce.
Between auth_time and the nonce timestamp, I think the RP is already
receiving all the information we can possibly give it, too. It knows
exactly when authentication happened, and exactly when the response
was minted. If we try to obscure the exact time authentication
happened, the potential for clock skew and other issues to throw
things off increases, because it will always receive the oldest time
that the OP believes might be permissible.
Clarifying the text would be fine. Adding signatures to the request
would be fine. Other approaches don't make much sense to me yet.
Take care,
Nate.
More information about the security
mailing list