[security] HTTP and HTTPS URL issue (was RE: security)

[Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)]

BTW, did anybody of you notice, that the exchange of information
(assoc_handle) between the RP and IDP is completely optional?

-- 
Regards
 
Signer:      Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
Phone:       +1.213.341.0390

Pete Rowley wrote:
> Dan Lyke wrote:
>> On Fri, 27 Oct 2006 11:49:13 -0700, Pete Rowley wrote:
>>  
>>> That was the point of the original attack - causing someone to log 
>>> into an account controlled by the attacker.
>>>     
>>
>> Martin's point is that the Relying Party needs to process the 
>> redirected-to URL as the identifier, so if this redirect URL is new
>> to  the Relying Party, it should be treated as an entirely new URL,
>> not  the one the user initially entered.
>>   
> And my point is that that is the whole point - a user is logged into
> an account controlled by an attacker. The problem is "if this redirect
> URL is new to the Relying Party" is like saying "if this is a badly
> crafted attack."
>

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