[security] Username / password etc. is out of scope for OpenID

Recordon, David drecordon at verisign.com
Thu Oct 26 17:55:45 UTC 2006


+1, while I certainly think reputation networks will develop that may do
this, I see a conflict of interest for myself in both promoting what
OpenID is as well as running one of these "accreditors". 

--David

-----Original Message-----
From: security-bounces at openid.net [mailto:security-bounces at openid.net]
On Behalf Of Dan Lyke
Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2006 10:15 AM
To: security at openid.net
Subject: Re: [security] Username / password etc. is out of scope for
OpenID

On Wed, 25 Oct 2006 18:47:56 -0700, Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote:
> I suppose something like an "OpenID Foundation", which will register 
> IDP's after making some basic checks of the facility implemented.

If such a thing occurs, I will immediately stop using and promoting
OpenID, and I will actively promote its abandonment. Nothing personal,
but I'm not interested in a technology with that kind of overhead or
central control.

When I log into an e-commerce site, I control my username and password.
Nobody from Visa is asking to come into my office to verify that I don't
have that username and password written on my whiteboard, nor will I let
them. Why should my identity URL be any different?

Already I have various sites which require a username and password
combination from me complaining about my choice of passwords. At first
glance, this seems like a good idea: Some heuristic to make sure that
you're not in the 95% whose first choice of password is "IAmASexGod"  
is probably a good idea.

The problem comes when we have sites which start to clamp down on what
is and isn't a good password to such an extent that they make the
password *less* secure. On a few e-commerce sites, I've tried passwords
with letters and punctuation. No good, they have to have letters and
numbers. In fact, on some high profile sites (I no longer use my
Discover card, so I can call them out), there's no punctuation
whatsoever allowed in  the password (apparently they haven't yet
discovered escaping text before sending it to the SQL engine).

So pretty soon we go from 95^N (where "N" is the number of characters in
the password) to 62^N, but, wait, we start to have rules about the
interleaving of letters and numbers, and before too long we're down to a
password that's probably actually crackable by trial and error.  
Worse, by the time I actually find one that gets by their password
filter, it's probably remarkably similar to one I used at another site
where there was a broken password filter, and we see yet another
security compromise.

With any bureacracy, I foresee similar issues which actually slow
adoption of better security procedures.

And if you're going to try to enforce some sort of bureacracy and
overhead on to "who controls a URL", you're going to drive out the
hobbiests and the people who are the first adopters, because all of a
sudden I have to open up my site to some sort of external security
audit, probably from people I have no reason to trust, and you're going
to start enforcing rules like "username and password" (already not an
optimal security system), probably "third party CA" (if it's my own
website, why do I have any reason to trust a third party CA versus
installing my own cert in my own browsers), and we're down a slide that
leads us to the sad sorry state of internet security today.

If people will start getting very specific with "Customer X will only
adopt this technology if these 5 points are met", then I think we have a
place to start talking. But this "Throw HTTPS at everything, because
it'll be more secure that way" are much like the "Well, if we rot13
encrypt a document it's secure, so if we do it *twice*, then it'll be
twice as secure, right?" people.

And if you want to start a third party "Visa URL Identity Security
Compliance" site which gives Relying Parties a site they can query with
a URL and get back a "we approve or disapprove of this URL"  
that's great, but don't do it under the OpenID umbrella, and don't
expect me to use my identifier(s) on any site which requires such
approval.

Dan
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