<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt">Eddy,<br><br>> On 02/14/2012 06:46 AM, From Francisco Corella:<br>> > I guess you mean that if the relying party downloads a certificate in<br>> > the body of an HTTP response with a content-type header whose value is<br>> > a MIME type indicating that the body contains a certificate, and if<br>> > Firefox "finds a valid key pair" then Firefox will import the<br>> > certificate automatically. Did I guess right?<br>> <br>> Yes.<br>> <br>> > Well, depending on the details, that could be a security hole. If the<br>> > valid key pair that Firefox finds consists of the publick key in an<br>> > existing certificate and the associated private key, Firefox could end<br>> > up replacing the existing certificate with one downloaded by an<br>> > attacker
that binds the public key to the attacker's identity.<br>> <br>> No, if an attacker could do that it'd be too late anyway, then he<br>> probably could impersonate the entire internet. "Finding" a public key<br>> that would match a private key is kind of impossible (with sufficient<br>> key size). But I'm not sure if this is the right forum for such crypto<br>> stuff.<br><br>When you say "Firefox finds a valid key pair" you must be talking<br>about finding the key pair IN THE BROWSER STORE. I don't see why it's<br>impossible to match the public key in the certificate being downloaded<br>to the public keys found in the browser store.<br><br>Anyway, we are going around in circles because the process you use to<br>generate a certificate and get the browser to import it is not<br>documented. You really should document it. In this day and age it is<br>not acceptable to use security protocols that are not documented
and<br>open to the scrutiny of others. Especially if you are running a CA.<br><br>Francisco<br><br><div><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"> <div style="font-family: times new roman, new york, times, serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <div style="font-family: times new roman, new york, times, serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <div dir="ltr"> <font face="Arial" size="2"> <hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold;">From:</span></b> Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) <eddy_nigg@startcom.org><br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">To:</span></b> "openid-general@lists.openid.net >> 'openid-general'" <openid-general@lists.openid.net> <br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Sent:</span></b> Tuesday, February 14, 2012 2:55 AM<br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Subject:</span></b> Re: [OpenID] OpenID Providers Invited to Join in an NSTIC Pilot Proposal<br> </font> </div>
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On 02/14/2012 06:46 AM, From Francisco Corella:
<blockquote type="cite">
<div style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0);background-color:rgb(255, 255,
255);font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt;">I guess you mean that if the relying party
downloads a certificate in<br>
the body of an HTTP response with a content-type header whose
value is<br>
a MIME type indicating that the body contains a certificate, and
if<br>
Firefox "finds a valid key pair" then Firefox will import the<br>
certificate automatically. Did I guess right?<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
Yes.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div style="color:rgb(0, 0, 0);background-color:rgb(255, 255,
255);font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt;">Well, depending on the details, that could be
a security hole. If the<br>
valid key pair that Firefox finds consists of the publick key in
an<br>
existing certificate and the associated private key, Firefox
could end<br>
up replacing the existing certificate with one downloaded by an<br>
attacker that binds the public key to the attacker's identity.<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
No, if an attacker could do that it'd be too late anyway, then he
probably could impersonate the entire internet. "Finding" a public
key that would match a private key is kind of impossible (with
sufficient key size). But I'm not sure if this is the right forum
for such crypto stuff.<br>
<br>
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