<html><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">John,<div><br></div><div>We spent a lot of time looking at ways of simplifying canonicalization by having the signature in a separate doc.</div><div><br></div><div>This minimally requires a separate network access to get the signature document if one wants to check it. </div><div><br></div><div>It also presumes that XRD will only be used in applications using http:.</div><div><br></div><div>One solution proposed by Google was to include the signature in the headers, to reduce accesses. </div><div><br></div><div>However this makes deployment at the OP end more difficult, because you no longer have just static files, and may also behave unpredictably with proxy's</div><div><br></div><div>For simplicity of deployment of the files having a single static file seems to be the preference. </div><div><br></div><div>We looked at using HTLM form encoding with the XRD body base64 encoded but that added unnecessary complexity for people not wanting signatures.</div><div>S/MIME PKCS7 and other options were considered but had no clear advantage over a constrained form of XML normalization.</div><div><br></div><div>Being able to keep the signature and document together has advantages for audit logs, creating XRDS documents for XRI, using XRD for protocols other than HTTP.</div><div><br></div><div>If I want to send a XRD as a AX Attribute because some of the endpoints are private sending the signature in the document makes life much easier.</div><div><br></div><div>Infocard pushing a XRD discovery document as the value of a claim also benefits from the single document approach.</div><div><br></div><div>Peter is not unusually looking farther down the road. </div><div><br></div><div>X.509 is a ASN.1 meta-data document that has an enveloped signature. Probably not something you want to parse from scratch in Ruby.</div><div>X.509 was designed to be flexible and contain may types of meta-data.</div><div><br></div><div>It has never really lived up to the design goal. In practice they are not useful for conveying arbitrary meta-data.</div><div><br></div><div>I think Peter is imagining that if we have a well understood extensible meta-data container XRD, with an enveloped signature like X.509 it could replace X.509 certificates.</div><div><br></div><div>People on the Shibboleth side of the world are considering such things with SAML meta-data.</div><div><br></div><div>I will leave the required rant about overthrowing the evil CA oppressors to others.</div><div><br></div><div>It is possible that signed XRD could play a valuable role in expanding trust on the internet in areas where traditional PKI has not stepped up to the challenge.</div><div><br></div><div>The question is a single human readable document that can be consumed both by signature aware and unaware applications the way to go?</div><div><br></div><div>Is being compatible with existing XMLDsig libraries and being reasonably easy to implement in scripting languages compatible?</div><div><br></div><div>XRD has broader use cases than just openID. We are honestly trying to provide a good balance. </div><div><br></div><div>John B.</div><div><div><div>On 14-Jun-09, at 12:47 PM, John Panzer wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"> <div bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000"> John Bradley wrote: <blockquote cite="mid:5ED12C6B-13E5-4553-A430-947DE5BEA39A@wingaa.com" type="cite">Peter, <div><br> </div> <div>Yes some of us see the possibility of XRD as signed meta-data being a useful alternative to X.509 eventually.</div> <div><br> </div> <div>If we have an signature method that supports enveloping signatures, XRD will be more useful for those applications.</div> <div><br> </div> <div>We can opt for the simplest signing, that of signing the binary representation of the XRD and keeping the signature in a detached file. </div> <div>This may make life simpler for scripting languages dealing with cannonicalization but at the cost of making it awkward to deal with in other environments where having the signature in the same document is very useful.</div> </blockquote> For the record, and for those of us not versed in X.509, can provide some use cases and details on how having the signature in the XRD doc is necessary/useful for for XRD?<br> <br> <br> <blockquote cite="mid:5ED12C6B-13E5-4553-A430-947DE5BEA39A@wingaa.com" type="cite"> <div><br> </div> <div>Full XMLDsig is ugly because of qnames and other issues. We are proposing a constrained implementation that eliminates most of the cannonicalization complexities, but is still compatible with existing libraries.</div> <div><br> </div> <div>John B.<br> <div> <div>On 10-Jun-09, at 12:10 PM, <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:general-request@openid.net">general-request@openid.net</a> wrote:</div> <br class="Apple-interchange-newline"> <blockquote type="cite"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-family: monospace; ">Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2009 09:10:44 -0700<br> From: Peter Williams <<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:pwilliams@rapattoni.com">pwilliams@rapattoni.com</a>><br> Subject: Re: [OpenID] Signing method for XRD<br> To: Santosh Rajan <<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:santrajan@gmail.com">santrajan@gmail.com</a>>, "<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:general@openid.net">general@openid.net</a>"<br> <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:general@openid.net">general@openid.net</a>><br> Message-ID:<br> <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:BFBC0F17A99938458360C863B716FE46398DCE8FDD@simmbox01.rapnt.com">BFBC0F17A99938458360C863B716FE46398DCE8FDD@simmbox01.rapnt.com</a>><br> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"<br> <br> <br> my first reaction was ugh - xml-dsig has its own inband mechanism for referencing keying material - and here is openid/xrd doing yet another standard for verifying signatures and validating the supporting keying material (probably poorly).<br> <br> My second reaction on reflection was that xml-dsig is rarely used to its full potential. Its typically used as a PKCS7 signing and sealing emulation modes, with an XML centric view of the world - with no particular benefit. But, if xml dsig fully uses its external references, and the references are to a world of XRD files which are TRUSTED to act as a key distribution mechanism, things get rather more interesting. In that world, the XRD is becoming a certificate, as we know it - and one whose format and semantics would enable it to go beyond the staid ol X.509 cert chains and benefit the full expression power of xri queries and XRI resolution.<br> <br> What the X.509 v3 format work took part (divorcing asymmetric key management from dap/ldap resolution), XRI/XRD may be putting back together: query-based named-key resolution supporting trust fabric meshes.<br> <br> </span></blockquote> </div> <br> </div> <pre wrap=""><hr size="4" width="90%">
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