[OpenID] OIDC federation using ID Tokens as OAuth2 grants

[Peter Williams]

I find swapping id tokens for api tokens to be architecturally dubious. It goes against the dod theory about how to manage huge scale key distribution (in complex infrastructure with multiple players) I was trained in a different era, if course.

Swapping some beater object verified wrt an idtojen is fine.

idcerts are not issued for that purpose and only swapping an idtoken at its own issuer is not an open security model (just more American silos).

Swapping a saml assertion, similarly, I find dubious. It's all very hacky.





Sent from my Windows Phone
________________________________
From: Cal Heldenbrand<mailto:cal at fbsdata.com>
Sent: ‎4/‎22/‎2015 11:47 AM
To: Peter Williams<mailto:home_pw at msn.com>
Cc: openid-general at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-general at lists.openid.net>
Subject: Re: [OpenID] OIDC federation using ID Tokens as OAuth2 grants

Hmm, that's interesting.  A few things that I spotted as a little different:

* The issuer and subject are the same
* The issuer is not a URL as with ID Tokens.  (Does this hint that it's
self-signed by the client?  And if an OIDC Provider were to implement this,
it would hypothetically be the URL?)
* The audience is a URL, and not an OAuth2 client_id

Maybe I skipped something in reading the draft, but section 3.2
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer-12#section-3.2> is
pretty vague and doesn't specify how the client credentials token should be
constructed.

Good find though Peter!

--Cal

<cal at fbsdata.com>

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 11:34 AM, Peter Williams <home_pw at msn.com> wrote:

>
> http://www.cloudidentity.com/blog/2015/02/06/requesting-an-aad-token-with-a-certificate-without-adal/
>
> Someone posted google related info. Here is some that doesn't require one
> to use vendor specific libraries.
>
> Sign a jwt you construct, and attach a cert to help the std verify the
> signature. Present the signed blob as a bearer, seeking ti have the std
> swap it for azure signed blob. Azure will then send suitable logging
> information (to NSA as part of fedramp) to a cybersecututy scanning firm
> looking for pattern based signatures.
>
> The last part is not well known. I've no doubt google has the same "added
> value", as does yahoo and salesforce. It's all voluntary, note.
>
> Sent from my Windows Phone
>  ------------------------------
> From: Cal Heldenbrand <cal at fbsdata.com>
> Sent: ‎4/‎15/‎2015 12:11 PM
> To: openid-general at lists.openid.net
> Subject: [OpenID] OIDC federation using ID Tokens as OAuth2 grants
>
>     Hi everyone,
>
>  I've been doing a lot of reading on OpenID Connect, and there's one area
> that I'm a little confused on -- federated identities.  My curiosity was
> piqued from Page 225 of the book Advanced API Security
> <https://books.google.com/books?id=_-BPBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA225&lpg=PA225#v=onepage&q&f=false>.
> In particular, this quote:
>
> * ...you need to find a way to exchange the ID token received in OpenID
> Connect authentication for an OAuth access token, which is defined in the
> JWT grant types for the OAuth 2.0 specification.  Once the web application
> receives the ID token ... it has to exchange it for an access token by
> talking to the OAuth authorization server.  The authorization server must
> trust the OpenID Connect identity provider.*
>
>  I realize this is a grey area between OIDC and OAuth2... but are there
> any spec documents that outline this trust relationship, and how it applies
> to ID Tokens in particular?  (Also, are there any known implementations out
> there that actually use this?)
>
>  I've read through the draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwt-bearer-12>document, and
> it seems very close to what I was looking for.  But the JWT format is a
> little different from an ID Token, and the audience is not in the format of
> a typical client_id.  And, I was assuming Authorized Party (azp) would
> somehow fit into this flow.
>
>  Any extra info on this would be very helpful!
>
>  Thank you,
>
>  --Cal
>
>
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