[OpenID] UCI Idea: An iPhone OP (?)
Paul Madsen
paulmadsen at rogers.com
Wed Mar 3 17:03:40 UTC 2010
Hi David, FYI, NTT built something like you describe for SAML SSO -
specifically the scenario you list below in #4
http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/3960/26523/file/NTT-SASSO%20liberty%20case%20study.pdf
paul
On 3/3/2010 11:33 AM, David Fuelling wrote:
> Wondering what people think about using as an iPhone (or Android/etc)
> application as a personal OP.
>
> Basically, the way it would work is as follows:
>
> 1. Go to RP, get prompted with a login form.
> 2. Turn on iPhoneOP application on your iPhone.
> 1. iPhone App turns on lighttpd (or some other ultra-small
> web server) to serve web requests from the phone and act
> as an OP.
> 2. iPhone App then connects to a DDNS service that connects
> the phone's current IPV6 address to the OP domain.
> 3. The iPhone is now the user's OP.
> 3. User signs into the RP, which then does the OpenID dance with
> the OP running on the user's iphone.
> 4. The user could login via the web, or optionally just
> get prompted on the phone that a login is occurring - the user
> could then accept the login and/or enter a security code (in
> case of a lost iPhone).
> 5. User is logged-into the RP.
> 6. iPhone App turns off.
>
> Some initial thoughts I've had:
>
> 1. Could this take us a lot closer to a user-centric identity?
> Imagine if this software was built into the phone (so you
> didn't have to run an App to make it work).
> 2. Something like this would be interesting from a multi-auth
> perspective. On the one hand, it could preclude the need for
> mulit-auth because a person could turn off his OP when the app
> isn't running (thus ensuring no RP logins without the
> phone....mostly -- see some security drawbacks below).
> 3. Alternatively, it could provide one multi-auth solution in that
> an RP could be required to get an assertion from a "regular" OP
> and a user-centric OP (like the iPhone) before allowing access.
>
> Security Drawbacks (?)
>
> 1. The user should trust his/her DDNS provider because somebody at
> that provider could change the IP address hooked up to the
> domain backing the iPhoneOP (without the knowledge of the user).
> However, this is an issue with current OPs (the rogue employee
> problem). Either could be mitigated with multi-auth.
>
>
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