[OpenID] user centric delegation vs portability: LRDD : competing threats: the consumer's fear hypothesis

[Dirk Balfanz]

Hi Peter,

thanks for your thoughtful response.

As I see it, provider-independent identities are merely a means to an end.
They shouldn't be the one-and-only litmus test applied to single sign-on
solutions.

To me, what's important is that users can get quickly to a personalized
experience across the web. That is - when I see a new web site, and it
promises a useful service (which requires an account), I can immediately
start using it. With just a few clicks, I can tell the service who I am,
connect it to other services I use that it needs data from, etc.

I like the idea of provider-independent identities. It is one (although not
the only) way to allow me to continue to use said service even when/if I
leave my identity provider. However, that's but one of many considerations
we need to make. If the only technical solution we can come up with is one
that (1) features provider-independent identities and (2) increases hurdles
to personalized web content (e.g., is too difficult to use by the majority
of users), I have to admit I would start looking into whether relaxing
requirement (1) could possibly help with problem (2) (not saying that
currently OpenID falls into this category - just illustrating my
priorities).

It's true that I am a bit nervous, from a security point-of-view, about the
delegation model used by OpenID today. As OpenID moves into the mainstream,
I'm worried that a single "defacing" attack (i.e., one in which an attacker
alters the content served from a certain server) can move the identity
provider for a whole DNS domain to some machine under the control of an
attacker.

Finally (as John points out), delegation and provider-independent identities
certainly aren't prevented by the proposed OpenID discovery mechanism. Sites
like Blogger or Facebook, etc., could leave it up to their users to pick
(and change) OpenID providers. If you have your own domain, you can pick
(and change) your identity provider. But if you're one of 300,000 IBM
employees, there are certain things you can't pick about your work account -
you can't pick your email provider, you can't pick your calendaring
software, and you can't presumably pick your identity provider -
professionals at IBM who get paid to worry about this stuff will pick one
for you that they are reasonably sure will not, say, put into jeopardy the
401k accounts of the combined IBM workforce (because, hypothetically
speaking, IBM uses OpenID to log their employees into fidelity.com).

We need a single sign-on solution for the Web that works both for
Blogger/Facebook/consumer use case as well as the IBM use case.

Dirk.


On Sun, Oct 25, 2009 at 3:57 PM, Peter Williams <home_pw at msn.com> wrote:

>
> I found the writeup at http://hueniverse.com/2009/09/openid-and-lrdd/
> convincing, technically. It moved the whole set of technical delegation
> issues forward. It told a story. It was well written.
>
> A. It reminded me of what Ping Identity once proposed for
> dynamically-sharing SAML metadata between IDPs and (affiliations of) SP:
> use a url-factory rule to deduce a URI from a domain name, get metadata
> from
> said URL, and apply https/domain-cert controls to test for a saml entities
> authority... to make assertions for that domain name. Optionally, sign the
> metadata (much as one optionally signs XRDs). All Pretty obvious stuff
> ...but effective.
>
> B. It reminded me of the leap forward of myopenid, when hosting outouurced
> OPs via OPX (which uses DNS control principles to enable domain admins to
> prove the delegated domain is authorizing the outsourcer to speak for it).
>
> C. And, it reminded me of openid2, in that there are various flow
> fallbacks.
> These allows communities to choose different flows (and thereby address
> different players issue sets) when delegating and locating providers.
>
> What I didnt like what the bias I heard throughout the writeup - concerning
> the criteria I described in C.
>
> Unlike the openid communities traditional mission (empower users, and give
> them control over their data and names), there was a fear message at the
> heart of it: focus on all that which COULD go wrong. And into that fear
> rides the fearless knight on a white horse... the OP.
>
> The fear said, users are easily duped and cannot in any case be trusted to
> get it right - unlike the corporate CISO in whom we must trust. (Peter is a
> CISO, by the way). Furthermore, we will bias the fallbacks so corporate
> CIOs
> can control, before users control. If this was law, folks just coded their
> bias in favor of the CIO and against the user/subscriber - through the
> formulation of the legal presumptions.
>
> Now, this bias may well be fine (if your audience is corporate buyers of
> outsourced apps, leveraging openid protocols to get login sessions and
> attributes). And, perhaps that is who the vendor is pitching its LRPP
> technology to .
>
> But, surely, the openid movement more generally needs to be focussed more
> widely than only corporate sales -it also has consumer interests to
> consider. If it fails here, it will risk falling into the pit that SAML
> fell
> into - and fail to stay current with the larger currents of the web itself.
> Historically (in the years before openid challenged SAML), every corporate
> SAML link took a year, cost a million, was the bane of the CIO life, and
> noone did two if they could avoid it.
>
> Now, as oft associated with the Facebook brand, there are interplays
> between
> the corporate control and consumer rights - particularly over data
> ownership
> and identity control isues. And some mega-brands do better than others in
> getting the balance right (and some actively hamper the user when
> dis-associating from the brand, once things go sour). Some brands
> infamously
> create explicit exit barriers (preventing you from exporting your contacts
> to a file, say, or impose legal controls that limit just who you may (NOT)
> choose to also work with).
>
> When considering whether LRPP MAY be right for openid movement, we must
> reflect that the openid movement is -or at least WAS - in the middle of
> these issues, and took a position. It traditionally allowed for identifier
> portablity and data rights. If you were to lose rights of access at an OP
> (paypal dumps peter for violating service rule X) ... delegation ensured
> that this 1 OP's suspension of Peter made no difference to Peter's private
> life and Peter's relationship with RPs (becuase the protocols automatically
> fell back on the next OP to which peter had delegated YOUR name). Peter
> either could take such pre-cautions, or not - depending on his needs.
>
> What Im hearing in the LRPP story is not consistent with the original
> openid
> user-centric story - targeting social networks (vs corporate application
> outsourcing). The fear line seems to be implicitely denying the legitimacy
> of user centric identity. In its marketing line, it seems to be saying
> that:
> its far more important for consumers  to be free of fear, than be free of a
> provider (when the relationship goes sour).
>
> Interesting changes going on in this movement!
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> View this message in context:
> http://www.nabble.com/user-centric-delegation-vs-portability%3A-LRDD-%3A-competing-threats%3A-the-consumer%27s-fear-hypothesis-tp26052720p26052720.html
> Sent from the OpenID - General mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>
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