[OpenID] Password age and password reset

[Allen Tom]

That's why I don't quite understand this proposal. If the RP detects 
that the account is possibly compromised, telling the user to change 
their password is very likely the same thing as informing the attacker 
that he's been detected. Since the attacker has the password, he might 
as well change the password (and the account recovery data) to lock out 
the original user.

At any rate, having the OP publish its "Account Management" link seems 
to be a useful thing. For RPs that want give the user to also sign out 
of the OP when the user signs out of the RP could also benefit from 
having the OP publish its Logout link as well.

Allen


George Fletcher wrote:
> The key is that as an RP, you have to be able to shut down "bad 
> accounts" and if that account is an OpenID (or any other federated 
> identity), then there is no way for the user (good or other wise) to 
> reset things. They are locked out completely. Hence, in order to 
> enable a good experience for users, the RP would like the OP to do 
> something to prove the user is really "good" before the RP will let 
> them back in. This does of course not protect against the attacker 
> going through the hoops to prove the attacker is "good", but I'd say 
> that's out of scope for this proposal.
>
> Thanks,
> George
>
> Andrew Arnott wrote:
>> Hi Breno,
>>
>> But if the RP detects malicious activity, why would it ask the OP to 
>> have the user change their password?  Isn't it too late by then, and 
>> wouldn't it be asking the malicious user to reset the password, thus 
>> locking out the real user?
>>
>> Also, some OPs don't even use passwords to authenticate their users, 
>> so whatever we come up with, the extension should be able to behave 
>> reasonably in that case.
>> -- 
>> Andrew Arnott
>> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the 
>> death your right to say it." - Voltaire
>>
>>
>> On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 9:03 AM, Breno de Medeiros <breno at google.com 
>> <mailto:breno at google.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     Let's give a concrete scenario:
>>
>>     1. RP detects malicious activity on the user's account at the OP.
>>
>>     2. In such cases, the RP would have asked the user to reset the
>>     password. However, this user logs in via OpenID so the RP does not
>>     have the choice.
>>
>>     3. The RP puts some messaging that the user should change their
>>     password at the OP. However, because there is no standard to even
>>     communicate which URL at the OP the user can change password, the
>>     experience is broken. A lot of users either don't know (without help
>>     from the OP) how to change their passwords.
>>
>>     4. Users give up, or seek personal assistance.
>>
>>
>>     On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 8:17 PM, Santosh Rajan
>>     <santrajan at gmail.com <mailto:santrajan at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>     > Wouldnt it be better if the OP took complete responsibility of
>>     the users
>>     > security instead of bringing the RP into the loop? OP can decide
>>     based on
>>     > the users usage pattern how often he must change his password
>>     and post a
>>     > recommendation to the user whenever he logs in.
>>
>>
>>
>>     --
>>     --Breno
>>
>>     +1 (650) 214-1007 desk
>>     +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
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