[OpenID] Password age and password reset

Breno de Medeiros breno at google.com
Wed May 13 18:12:37 UTC 2009


Hi Andrew,

Please understand that it may well be impossible or at least
inadvisable to have a discussion into specific scenarios where asking
for a password change might be a good idea from a security viewpoint.


On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 10:36 AM, Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott at gmail.com> wrote:
> Ok, so I think I see what you're saying, but rather than just a simple
> password change, it sounds like this scenario warrants the OP challenging
> the user.
>
> Scenario 1:
> User walks up to a kiosk and notices that a prior user didn't log out of
> their OP.  He maliciously leverages that to log into an RP using the victims
> OP account.  The RP detects strange behavior (somehow).  The RP wants to
> signal this to the OP.
>
> Scenario 2:
> Attacker phishes OP credentials out of a victim, or otherwise steals login
> rights at the OP.  Attacker logs into an RP as the victim.  The RP detects
> strange behavior and wants to signal this to the OP.
>
> Either way, having the OP help the user change their password is not a
> mitigation to this problem, IMO.  Now, simply using the existing PAPE
> extension, the RP could force the user to re-login to their OP, which would
> mitigate scenario 1.  But scenario 2 could only be solved by the OP sending
> the user through extra identity checks, such as "where were you born?" type
> questions.

Sarah Palin would have something to say about this, I am sure.

>If the user failed the test, then the OP would need to use
> another channel to notify the genuine user that it's time to reset their
> password.  If the user passed the test, then the "suspicious activity" was
> legitimate and no password reset is necessary.
>
> So in no case does it seem useful for the OP to jump directly to "change
> password".
>
> --
> Andrew Arnott
> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death
> your right to say it." - Voltaire
>
>
> On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 9:41 AM, George Fletcher <gffletch at aol.com> wrote:
>>
>> The key is that as an RP, you have to be able to shut down "bad accounts"
>> and if that account is an OpenID (or any other federated identity), then
>> there is no way for the user (good or other wise) to reset things. They are
>> locked out completely. Hence, in order to enable a good experience for
>> users, the RP would like the OP to do something to prove the user is really
>> "good" before the RP will let them back in. This does of course not protect
>> against the attacker going through the hoops to prove the attacker is
>> "good", but I'd say that's out of scope for this proposal.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> George
>>
>> Andrew Arnott wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Breno,
>>>
>>> But if the RP detects malicious activity, why would it ask the OP to have
>>> the user change their password?  Isn't it too late by then, and wouldn't it
>>> be asking the malicious user to reset the password, thus locking out the
>>> real user?
>>>
>>> Also, some OPs don't even use passwords to authenticate their users, so
>>> whatever we come up with, the extension should be able to behave reasonably
>>> in that case.
>>> --
>>> Andrew Arnott
>>> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the
>>> death your right to say it." - Voltaire
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 9:03 AM, Breno de Medeiros <breno at google.com
>>> <mailto:breno at google.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>    Let's give a concrete scenario:
>>>
>>>    1. RP detects malicious activity on the user's account at the OP.
>>>
>>>    2. In such cases, the RP would have asked the user to reset the
>>>    password. However, this user logs in via OpenID so the RP does not
>>>    have the choice.
>>>
>>>    3. The RP puts some messaging that the user should change their
>>>    password at the OP. However, because there is no standard to even
>>>    communicate which URL at the OP the user can change password, the
>>>    experience is broken. A lot of users either don't know (without help
>>>    from the OP) how to change their passwords.
>>>
>>>    4. Users give up, or seek personal assistance.
>>>
>>>
>>>    On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 8:17 PM, Santosh Rajan
>>>    <santrajan at gmail.com <mailto:santrajan at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>    > Wouldnt it be better if the OP took complete responsibility of
>>>    the users
>>>    > security instead of bringing the RP into the loop? OP can decide
>>>    based on
>>>    > the users usage pattern how often he must change his password
>>>    and post a
>>>    > recommendation to the user whenever he logs in.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>    --
>>>    --Breno
>>>
>>>    +1 (650) 214-1007 desk
>>>    +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
>>>    MTV-41-3 : 383-A
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>
>



-- 
--Breno

+1 (650) 214-1007 desk
+1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
MTV-41-3 : 383-A
PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7)



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