[OpenID] Password age and password reset
Breno de Medeiros
breno at google.com
Wed May 13 18:12:37 UTC 2009
Hi Andrew,
Please understand that it may well be impossible or at least
inadvisable to have a discussion into specific scenarios where asking
for a password change might be a good idea from a security viewpoint.
On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 10:36 AM, Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott at gmail.com> wrote:
> Ok, so I think I see what you're saying, but rather than just a simple
> password change, it sounds like this scenario warrants the OP challenging
> the user.
>
> Scenario 1:
> User walks up to a kiosk and notices that a prior user didn't log out of
> their OP. He maliciously leverages that to log into an RP using the victims
> OP account. The RP detects strange behavior (somehow). The RP wants to
> signal this to the OP.
>
> Scenario 2:
> Attacker phishes OP credentials out of a victim, or otherwise steals login
> rights at the OP. Attacker logs into an RP as the victim. The RP detects
> strange behavior and wants to signal this to the OP.
>
> Either way, having the OP help the user change their password is not a
> mitigation to this problem, IMO. Now, simply using the existing PAPE
> extension, the RP could force the user to re-login to their OP, which would
> mitigate scenario 1. But scenario 2 could only be solved by the OP sending
> the user through extra identity checks, such as "where were you born?" type
> questions.
Sarah Palin would have something to say about this, I am sure.
>If the user failed the test, then the OP would need to use
> another channel to notify the genuine user that it's time to reset their
> password. If the user passed the test, then the "suspicious activity" was
> legitimate and no password reset is necessary.
>
> So in no case does it seem useful for the OP to jump directly to "change
> password".
>
> --
> Andrew Arnott
> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death
> your right to say it." - Voltaire
>
>
> On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 9:41 AM, George Fletcher <gffletch at aol.com> wrote:
>>
>> The key is that as an RP, you have to be able to shut down "bad accounts"
>> and if that account is an OpenID (or any other federated identity), then
>> there is no way for the user (good or other wise) to reset things. They are
>> locked out completely. Hence, in order to enable a good experience for
>> users, the RP would like the OP to do something to prove the user is really
>> "good" before the RP will let them back in. This does of course not protect
>> against the attacker going through the hoops to prove the attacker is
>> "good", but I'd say that's out of scope for this proposal.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> George
>>
>> Andrew Arnott wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Breno,
>>>
>>> But if the RP detects malicious activity, why would it ask the OP to have
>>> the user change their password? Isn't it too late by then, and wouldn't it
>>> be asking the malicious user to reset the password, thus locking out the
>>> real user?
>>>
>>> Also, some OPs don't even use passwords to authenticate their users, so
>>> whatever we come up with, the extension should be able to behave reasonably
>>> in that case.
>>> --
>>> Andrew Arnott
>>> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the
>>> death your right to say it." - Voltaire
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, May 13, 2009 at 9:03 AM, Breno de Medeiros <breno at google.com
>>> <mailto:breno at google.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Let's give a concrete scenario:
>>>
>>> 1. RP detects malicious activity on the user's account at the OP.
>>>
>>> 2. In such cases, the RP would have asked the user to reset the
>>> password. However, this user logs in via OpenID so the RP does not
>>> have the choice.
>>>
>>> 3. The RP puts some messaging that the user should change their
>>> password at the OP. However, because there is no standard to even
>>> communicate which URL at the OP the user can change password, the
>>> experience is broken. A lot of users either don't know (without help
>>> from the OP) how to change their passwords.
>>>
>>> 4. Users give up, or seek personal assistance.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 8:17 PM, Santosh Rajan
>>> <santrajan at gmail.com <mailto:santrajan at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> > Wouldnt it be better if the OP took complete responsibility of
>>> the users
>>> > security instead of bringing the RP into the loop? OP can decide
>>> based on
>>> > the users usage pattern how often he must change his password
>>> and post a
>>> > recommendation to the user whenever he logs in.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>> --Breno
>>>
>>> +1 (650) 214-1007 desk
>>> +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
>>> MTV-41-3 : 383-A
>>> PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7)
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>
--
--Breno
+1 (650) 214-1007 desk
+1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
MTV-41-3 : 383-A
PST (GMT-8) / PDT(GMT-7)
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