[OpenID] OpenID User Interface Working Group

[Allen Tom]

Hi Andrew,

Thanks for the follow up, as Breno and I have stated a few times, we 
believe that from an anti-phishing perspective, the popup is equivalent 
to the existing full browser redirect UI. If the concern is that the 
browser chrome is spoofed in HTML, then I believe the special EV cert 
green address bar visual indicator would also be vulnerable to spoofing 
on IE and Firefox, although the treatment might be more spoofing 
resistant on Safari (the visual indicator appears in the browser's title 
bar).

The PAPE WG has defined a framework for users to be authenticated using 
phishing resistant authentication policies, so RPs and OPs that require 
phishing resistant authentication should look into the PAPE extension. 
PAPE is orthogonal to the Popup extension, and both extensions can be 
implemented simultaneously.

Thanks
Allen

Nash, Andrew wrote:
>  
> Hi Allen,
>
> Thanks for taking time to clarify the points of discussion (my apologies
> for the late response - other responsibilities kept me from addressing
> this).
>
> As you folks at Yahoo are well aware, the biggest challenge from a UI
> perspective is that the bad guys do not play by the rules. If there is
> something that can be used as a visual queue - in almost all cases the
> same visual queues can be replicated. The upshot is that we can create
> an environment in which users are lulled into a false sense of security.
>
> Providing the visual queues of an address bar may or may not be useful.
> Do you expect that there will be a facility as part of your scheme that
> will ensure that a site's SSL certificate (in PayPal's case an EV cert)
> can be used to verify the address bar contents? If an address bar is
> simply a visual queue with no supporting validation mechanism, then a
> spoof RP will simply render an address bar with the correct URL for the
> IDP and we have achieved nothing but ensuring that users are more easily
> fooled.
>
> This is the basis of my problem with the fundamental assumption of the
> WG - I have yet to see a solution in this space that actually works -
> and we have look at this problem on an almost daily basis. 
>
> If you have something that fundamentally changes the equation here in a
> trusted fashion I would be delighted to hear about it. I am like
> everyone else completely aware of the desirability of a more clean user
> experience for authentication - not just with OpenID.
>
> --Andrew
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Allen Tom [mailto:atom at yahoo-inc.com] 
> Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2009 7:07 PM
> To: Nash, Andrew; general at openid.net
> Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID User Interface Working Group
>
> Hi Andrew,
>
> I am in total agreement with you that phishing is a huge problem, and
> the Yahoo Membership team (the same folks working on OpenID) devotes a
> considerable amount of resources to fight phishing, and well as trying
> to help users who have been phished.
>
> We also put in a lot of effort to educate users about phishing, and we
> strongly encourage our users to setup a personalized anti-phishing
> Sign-in Seal, as well as to always check the address bar of the browser
> before entering their Yahoo credentials.
>
> http://security.yahoo.com/article.html?aid=2006102503
> https://protect.login.yahoo.com/
> http://openid.yahoo.com/ (Click on the OpenID Tour link to learn about
> phishing and OpenID)
>
> We are totally against the concept of allowing an RP to open a frame for
> the user to enter their OP's password. As you pointed out, the user
> would have no idea where the password is going, and this would be
> extremely insecure. Earlier versions of Facebook Connect used to
> demonstrate this behavior, and I'm very glad to see that Facebook has
> since moved the password validation into a standalone popup window, with
> the browser's addressbar clearly displayed.
>
> One of Yahoo's primary security requirements with Federated SSO (OpenID,
> OAuth, BBAuth, SAML) is that the user is able to recognize the Yahoo
> Login screen. We do this by educating users to always check the address
> bar and to create a customized Sign-in Seal.  The UI Working Group
> believes that a popup authentication screen, in a standalone browser
> window (not framed) and with the address bar clearly displayed,
> providers users with the same ability to detect phishing compared to the
> existing full browser redirect user experience that is used by OpenID
> today.
>
>  From a user experience perspective, eliminating the browser redirect
> maintains the context of the RP's site, which is the biggest complaint
> that we've received with BBAuth, OAuth, and OpenID.  Facebook, Yahoo,
> many others have UX research showing that the redirect is a very jarring
> experience, and the success rate can be dramatically improved by moving
> to a popup flow.
>
> As far as I can tell, an independent popup window, with the address bar
> displayed, has the same characteristics with regards to phishing, as the
> full browser redirect. The popup window does not prevent OPs from
> deploying anti-phishing technologies, and I believe that the popup will
> drive more widespread usage of OpenID, which will also increase demand
> for anti-phishing solutions.
>
> thanks
> Allen
>
>
> Nash, Andrew wrote:
>
>
>   
>> One of the ways that we have been able to reduce the incidence of 
>> successful account takeovers has been to drill into consumers that 
>> they should NEVER sign into an account on a domain that is not 
>> directly associated with the account provider. This is not perfect, 
>> but then none of the anti-phishing techniques are - it is why we have 
>> to spend so much money and utilize so many different strategies.
>>
>> As it reads, UI working group will be socializing the concept among 
>> users that it is perfectly fine to enter your authentication 
>> information at any site that pops up a frame asking for it. From an 
>> Internet trust perspective this is a REALLY BAD IDEA!
>>
>> OpenID is already criticized for its exposure to phishing and spoofing
>>     
>
>   
>> attacks. If this approach is taken in the way it seems to be 
>> described, we will pretty much ensure that no one that has medium to 
>> high value transactions or services will be interested in implementing
>>     
> OpenID.
>   
>> --Andrew
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> general mailing list
>> general at openid.net
>> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/general
>>   
>>     
>
>   

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