[OpenID] OpenID User Interface Working Group

[Andrew Arnott]

You know what would be neat is if there was an OpenID extension by which an
RP can discover  whether an OP deemed it safe to have its login page be
placed in an RP's iframe.  OPs can place their login pages in iframes
totally safely, I'd say, if they took InfoCard as their login credential.

--
Andrew Arnott
"I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death
your right to say it." - Voltaire


On Thu, Mar 19, 2009 at 7:07 PM, Allen Tom <atom at yahoo-inc.com> wrote:

> Hi Andrew,
>
> I am in total agreement with you that phishing is a huge problem, and the
> Yahoo Membership team (the same folks working on OpenID) devotes a
> considerable amount of resources to fight phishing, and well as trying to
> help users who have been phished.
>
> We also put in a lot of effort to educate users about phishing, and we
> strongly encourage our users to setup a personalized anti-phishing Sign-in
> Seal, as well as to always check the address bar of the browser before
> entering their Yahoo credentials.
>
> http://security.yahoo.com/article.html?aid=2006102503
> https://protect.login.yahoo.com/
> http://openid.yahoo.com/ (Click on the OpenID Tour link to learn about
> phishing and OpenID)
>
> We are totally against the concept of allowing an RP to open a frame for
> the user to enter their OP's password. As you pointed out, the user would
> have no idea where the password is going, and this would be extremely
> insecure. Earlier versions of Facebook Connect used to demonstrate this
> behavior, and I'm very glad to see that Facebook has since moved the
> password validation into a standalone popup window, with the browser's
> addressbar clearly displayed.
>
> One of Yahoo's primary security requirements with Federated SSO (OpenID,
> OAuth, BBAuth, SAML) is that the user is able to recognize the Yahoo Login
> screen. We do this by educating users to always check the address bar and to
> create a customized Sign-in Seal.  The UI Working Group believes that a
> popup authentication screen, in a standalone browser window (not framed) and
> with the address bar clearly displayed, providers users with the same
> ability to detect phishing compared to the existing full browser redirect
> user experience that is used by OpenID today.
>
> From a user experience perspective, eliminating the browser redirect
> maintains the context of the RP's site, which is the biggest complaint that
> we've received with BBAuth, OAuth, and OpenID.  Facebook, Yahoo, many others
> have UX research showing that the redirect is a very jarring experience, and
> the success rate can be dramatically improved by moving to a popup flow.
>
> As far as I can tell, an independent popup window, with the address bar
> displayed, has the same characteristics with regards to phishing, as the
> full browser redirect. The popup window does not prevent OPs from deploying
> anti-phishing technologies, and I believe that the popup will drive more
> widespread usage of OpenID, which will also increase demand for
> anti-phishing solutions.
>
> thanks
> Allen
>
>
> Nash, Andrew wrote:
>
>
>  One of the ways that we have been able to reduce the incidence of
>> successful account takeovers has been to drill into consumers that they
>> should NEVER sign into an account on a domain that is not directly
>> associated with the account provider. This is not perfect, but then none
>> of the anti-phishing techniques are - it is why we have to spend so much
>> money and utilize so many different strategies.
>>
>> As it reads, UI working group will be socializing the concept among
>> users that it is perfectly fine to enter your authentication information
>> at any site that pops up a frame asking for it. From an Internet trust
>> perspective this is a REALLY BAD IDEA!
>>
>> OpenID is already criticized for its exposure to phishing and spoofing
>> attacks. If this approach is taken in the way it seems to be described,
>> we will pretty much ensure that no one that has medium to high value
>> transactions or services will be interested in implementing OpenID.
>>
>> --Andrew
>>
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>> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/general
>>
>>
>
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