[OpenID] D-H vs SSL

[Allen Tom]

The DIY ethic of OpenID is also one of its main strengths, as as 
Johannes pointed out, there are plenty of scenarios where someone might 
want to run an OP without HTTPS. For instance, I'm not willing to pay 
the price to support HTTPS on my own personal domain.

As I mentioned earlier, I only brought up DH because I felt that it 
could be something that could be removed from the core spec, with the 
goal of making the spec lighter. Given the discussion so far, it looks 
like there are good reasons for keeping DH in the spec.

Allen


Andrew Arnott wrote:
> Well, the spec allows for session types to be implemented that are not 
> defined in the spec.  If DH is ever removed from the OpenID spec, I 
> hope the spec can reference another DH spec that keeps it alive as a 
> spec that people can optionally implement.
>
> --
> Andrew Arnott
> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the 
> death your right to say it." - Voltaire
>
>
> 2009/3/19 Allen Tom <atom at yahoo-inc.com <mailto:atom at yahoo-inc.com>>
>
>     If we consider OAuth's secret exchange mechanism for HMAC-SHA1 sigs,
>
>         * OAuth Service Providers usually issue a Consumer Secret to
>           the developer, without any input from the developer.
>           (hopefully via HTTPS)
>         * OAuth Request Token and Access Token secrets are issued by
>           the Service Provider to the Consumer (also, hopefully via
>           HTTPS), without any input from the Consumer
>
>     Returning cleartext secrets via HTTPS would be consistent with OAuth.
>
>     Although DH on top of SSL is safer than cleartext and SSL, is the
>     overhead of having the spec discuss DH worth it? If the OP is
>     unable to generate a strong secret on its own, or if the transport
>     layer between the RP and OP cannot be secured using HTTPS, then
>     arguably the entire system has issues.
>
>     I only mention DH, not because I have an issue with DH, but
>     because one of OpenID's most desirable traits is its relative
>     simplicity. The spec is pretty straightforward, and it's not all
>     that hard to implement. Sites that want a richer (and more
>     complicated) SSO protocol standard have alternatives that are
>     already in production and are widely used.
>
>     Allen
>
>
>     Ben Laurie wrote:
>>     Ah. I see.
>>
>>     So, I am going to be lazy, because I have not checked the spec, but
>>     its considered good practice when establishing a shared secret for
>>     both sides to contribute to that secret. Is that true for the
>>     cleartext secret?
>>
>>       
>
>     _______________________________________________
>     general mailing list
>     general at openid.net <mailto:general at openid.net>
>     http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/general
>
>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-general/attachments/20090319/81caec1a/attachment-0002.htm>