[OpenID] The OpenID and OAuth Flow: Playing with UX

Steven Livingstone-Perez weblivz at hotmail.com
Thu Jan 8 16:27:36 UTC 2009


Hi Peter - just to clarify, I don't think this is a finished solution either
- I agree it's very useful and would help towards creating such a solution J

 

Glad it was useful.

 

From: Peter Williams [mailto:pwilliams at rapattoni.com] 
Sent: 08 January 2009 08:11
To: Steven Livingstone-Perez; general at openid.net
Subject: RE: [OpenID] The OpenID and OAuth Flow: Playing with UX

 

I'm not sure about this being the "ultimate" solution: but the thread and
its links were definitely very valuable to me. 

 

I learned a lot about the doctrine of OAUTH (and "FireEagle") that was just
not apparent in the technical spec. he spec focused on the free and fun
world of SPs -data sources supporting OpenID RPs. If these control ideas are
part and parcel of OAUTH culture, I think I'm starting to understand why
Eran seemed to distraught during the election process. There may well be a
cultural disconnect, over the issue of OP control. This disconnect contrasts
with the obvious and apparently easy opportunity to harmonize the bits and
bytes of the two protocols

 

To make software,  in the interests of "security and safety of users"
(always a dodgy introduction in a control culture) developers used to be
commonly subject a distributor's certification of their PC app's code. In
particular, one may remember that app designers targeting the Apple platform
had to ensure the app's look was consistent with the platform's goals.
(Originally, this used to include even being required to submitting your
business plan to Apple). 

 

For OAUTH, this seems to translate: "portals" acting as OPs will not certify
third-party apps as consumers of the assertion (i.e. will refuse to issue
backchannel passwords or will revoke an existing credential) if the app
fails to continually demonstrate that it adopts certain design patterns that
promote the browser (vs. the PC or PKI) as the trust system. If a third
party site uses an embedded browser control, for example, the app not be
certified (as it compromises user identity protection boundary). The
argument is that any website design practice that doesn't advocate using the
"browser as a trust platform" fails to counter phishing attacks by
fraudulent websites).

 

Have I correctly captured the social issue? I note the advocacy of certain
folks who want the Foundation to promote and certify "UX", too.

 

 

 

From: general-bounces at openid.net [mailto:general-bounces at openid.net] On
Behalf Of Steven Livingstone-Perez
Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2009 5:04 AM
To: general at openid.net
Subject: [OpenID] The OpenID and OAuth Flow: Playing with UX

 

This is an excellent piece and discussion OpenID as part of the article.
Should be a kick off to design (at least on paper) the "ultimate" solution
I'd think.

 

http://ben-ward.co.uk/blog/oauth-flow/

 

steven

http://friendfeed.com/rooms/openidstream

http://livz.org

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